Chapter 9. Cross-Cutting Issues and Modalities of Support

Introduction

9.1 This chapter discusses issues that cut across the different sectors and components of the Danish aid programme that were reviewed in Chapter 8. It deals in turn with:

• the poverty focus of Danish assistance to Uganda;
• the cross-cutting issues of gender, HIV/AIDS, and the environment;
• approaches to accountability and corruption;
• the aid modalities adopted and developed;
• capacity development and technical assistance; and
• the overall organisation and management of the programme.

Poverty focus

Context: poverty focus in Danish aid strategy

9.2 Poverty reduction/alleviation was always implicit in Danish aid, but became a more explicit concern in the mid 1990s. Similarly the PEAP articulated GOU’s poverty reduction objectives much more clearly than ever before. Over time, the MDGs and successive PEAPs have provided more systematic approaches to setting targets and recording progress. We noted the evolution and application of Uganda’s poverty strategy in Chapters 3 and 4 of Part II above. Here we address poverty focus within the Danida programme: we note the evolution of Danida’s general approach to poverty reduction as an aid objective, then comment on how this has been reflected in the Uganda programme.

9.3 In common with other aid agencies, Danida paid increasing attention during the 1990s to poverty alleviation as an explicit objective of aid.⁵⁴ Udsholt 1997 analysed Danida policies in the field of poverty reduction and found:

A basic premise of Danish aid has been its focus on alleviating poverty. The paper argues that the lack of a more explicit and operational poverty focus throughout the last two decades has placed important constraints on the effectiveness of past poverty reduction efforts. Thus, Danish aid displays both specific results at the level of individual interventions and ’missed opportunities’ in terms of failing to address a number of institutional and structural constraints on poverty reduction.

9.4 Danida itself had come to the same realisation, and this was reflected in the 1994 statement of Danish aid strategy (A Developing World) and in the accompanying guidelines for the formulation of sector programmes (Udsholt noted that the sector programme support (SPS) preparation guidelines were much more specific about the poverty focus of interventions). Danida commissioned a major study of the poverty focus of its aid (COWI, 1996) which included Uganda as one of the case studies, and this has been an important source for the review of poverty focus within the Uganda programme to which we now turn.

Poverty focus in the Uganda programme

9.5 The first concern of the Museveni government was, naturally, with rehabilitating public infrastructure and institutions. Even so, there was an implicit poverty focus in Denmark’s Uganda strategy from the outset. This was reflected in its support for basic services and a concern to focus aid on the poorer regions and districts of Uganda. There was an implicit balance, too, between different dimensions of poverty reduction, with the three pillars of Danish strategy respectively addressing income poverty (through agriculture, infrastructure), service delivery (health, water and sanitation, special education etc) and empowerment (human rights, democratisation, decentralisation).

9.6 However, the 1996 review (COWI, 1996) found that attention to poverty reduction needed to be more explicit, and more systematically built into the design of interventions:

The conclusion drawn from the above analysis is that generally there has been no systematic nor comprehensive consideration given to the poverty concept in the formulation of the interventions. The poverty concept may have been addressed but in a haphazard way. This obviously then has implications for the individual intervention’s ensuing implementation and monitoring processes.
If the achievement of the poverty reduction objective is to become more realisable in the future, it is paramount that it is systematically taken into account at the initial stages of the intervention design. (ibid. Volume I, p71)

9.7 The present evaluation’s review of the main Danish interventions in Uganda indicates that they did pay more careful attention to poverty reduction after the sector approach was adopted. The GOU’s propagation of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan was a major boost to this process. As well as the general orientation of the Danish interventions in most sectors, there have poverty-relevant innovations within Danida programmes, such as the labour-based road maintenance initiative and support to private not-for-profit (PNFP) health providers serving poor districts.

9.8 Poverty focus has mainly been sought by supporting basic services that reach the poor, and by focusing aid on poorer regions and districts of Uganda. Thus:

1. The Rakai District Development Programme deliberately chose what was then believed to be one of the most deprived districts of Uganda.
2. In health, Danish support has been poverty focused in terms of providing medicines and supplies for basic services, which are most likely to be used by the poor; ensuring medicines get out to rural areas and remote facilities where the poor live; providing support also to the PNFP sector which are the main health service providers in some areas; and targeted support to Northern districts.
3. For water and sanitation, apart from the focus on basic services, geographical targeting was based on poverty, as well as avoiding overlap with other donors; thus Thematic Paper 2 notes, in the case of water and sanitation (RUWASA), the Appraisal Team justified their choice of Eastern Uganda in these words: Based on a regional comparison of water supply and sanitation coverage, water resources, prevalence of water related diseases, socio-economic condition and population density, the districts of Jinja, Iganga, Kumi, Tororo, Mbale, and Kapchorwa present areas in strong need for improvement of water and sanitation facilities (Danida, 1987a).
4. For roads, the poverty focus was reflected in the general bias towards feeder roads, the focus on Northern Uganda, and also in the work on labour-based approaches.
5. For agriculture, the interaction between poverty goals and programme design is traced in Box 9.1.

9.9 As regards geographical focus more generally, the 1996 analysis found that:

The current portfolio is geographically skewed, with over-concentration in the Kampala-Jinja area, where poverty is relatively less prevalent. (COWI, 1996: Uganda Volume I, p78).

However, this largely reflected a number of substantial infrastructure projects then under way. A more enduring problem has been that efforts by Danida (and other donors) to target aid to conflict-affected districts have often been frustrated by insecurity.

Box 9.1: Poverty Focus in Danida’s Agriculture Assistance to Uganda Not until the publication of the PEAP in 1997 did Danida’s support to the agricultural sector receive a strong and explicit poverty reduction focus. However, the alleviation of rural poverty was high on Danida’s agenda in the first phase of assistance in the period 1987–90. Examples of projects which were conceived and planned with poverty alleviation in mind were the Support to the Dairy Sector and milk collection schemes, the Farm Forestry Project and Credit for Small Farmers. In the period 1991–98, there was less explicit attention to poverty alleviation. The project documents for the Dairy Master Plan (DMP) and the Dairy Development Project made only brief reference to the importance of the dairy industry for ’agricultural growth and poverty alleviation’. Likewise, the initial 1993 Uganda National Farmers’ Association (UNFA) project document and appraisal report make no specific references to the project’s contribution to poverty alleviation. In 1997, a second project document was drafted to motivate funds for a ten-month bridging period, until ASPS-I came on stream. At that juncture, with the imminent publication of the PEAP, the UNFA assumed a modest poverty-alleviation objective, namely ’the improved livelihood of Uganda’s farmers’, but the scope of the programme was not significantly changed. However, the ASPS-I was designed in 1998 fully taking into account poverty issues raised in the PEAP and with the specific objective of poverty alleviation. All of its components were conceived, planned and implemented accordingly. The Household Agricultural Support Project (HASP) directed a major effort towards assisting resource poor households, including female-headed households (most vulnerable to food insecurity), women’s groups and youth groups, to achieve increased food security and/or increased incomes from sales of produce. The District Poverty Profiles (see Box 9.2) aimed to monitor links between programme activities and poverty trends. Under ASPS-II, with the assistance being provided to the recovery of the war-torn northern districts, the poverty reduction element is still strong, but the emphasis on poverty reduction is not so prominent. The scope of the components has narrowed and there is less opportunity for direct involvement with poor farmers now that support to extension is via basket-funding of NAADS. By its nature, the agri-business component is likely to pay less attention to poor households than HASP. Source: Adapted from Volume 4, Thematic Paper 1.

9.10 While the intent is clear, there is less evidence than would be desirable on the effects of public policy (not just Danish aid) on poverty. Danida has made direct efforts to strengthen poverty monitoring, through support to the Bureau of Statistics, and by initiating innovative gendered poverty profiles in selected districts (see Box 9.2).⁵⁵

Box 9.2: Gendered District Poverty Profiles Background56 This evaluation’s ToR (see Appendix A) anticipated that the ’district poverty profiles’ would be an important part of the evaluation. A report based on the second-round survey was scheduled to become available before the evaluation began, but the analysis of the results was not completed in time. Available reports cover only the first round. Provisional impact indicators are available for only the first phase of the Agricultural Sector Programme Support (ASPS1). However, the approach to External District Gendered Poverty Monitoring (EDGPM) by ASPS, which was out-sourced to Ugandan and Danish research institutions, could provide process and impact indicators for the M&E of the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture under UJAS. This could bridge the gap between the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment (UPPAP) and the traditional income and expenditure measurements by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). The relevance of EDGPM During the period 2000-2003, gendered poverty profiles were obtained for 5 pilot districts in which the Household Agricultural Support Project (HASP), an ASPS1 component, was operational, namely Kabarole, Rakai, Masaka, Pallisa and Tororo. HASP was a community-based activity which aimed to reduce rural poverty by improving income from household agriculture. It was coordinated with other ASPS initiatives involving formal and non-formal agricultural education and support to farmers’ organisations. HASP also sought to develop local governments’ capacity to respond to farmers’ needs. It tested policies which are now being more widely applied by the PMA, part of the government’s broader poverty reduction strategy. Under ASPS, the EDGPM depicted and compared the situation of the ’better off’, the ’less poor’ and the ’poorest’ households in the five districts according to a number of dimensions that local people themselves identified as important when describing poverty and well-being in their communities. In addition, the report analysed aspects of equality and inequality in gender relations within the household. Based on women’s own perceptions of their well-being, three levels of equality in gender relations were distinguished and related to household poverty.57 The methodology provides a basis for analysing outcomes, including both the households reached and the resulting behavioural changes achieved through various development interventions. It can be related both to poverty levels, gender relations and differences between districts. The methodology is based on a widely tested approach developed by Danish and other international researchers in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, several of whom are based at the Department of Development Research (formerly Centre for Development Research), Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Copenhagen. What issues would need to be resolved? If the EDGPM is to be aligned and integrated with the PMA, the scope of the survey instruments will have to be expanded to cover more districts and embrace the seven ’priority pillars’ (extension, research, agricultural education, farm credit and marketing, natural resource management and rural infrastructure) of the PMA. While implementation of the M&E system would be coordinated by the PMA, technical coordination would be the responsibility of the Poverty Monitoring Analysis Unit (PMAU) under MFPED. Further, the resolution of problems encountered by M&E of the ASPS and the PMA requires higher priority from programme management than it has received hitherto. It is evident that matters relating to M&E of outcomes have been typically pushed aside and postponed. EDGPM was poorly coordinated under ASPS1 and is lagging behind under ASPS2. Ugandan ownership of the process is vital. M&E must complement and link with national poverty monitoring systems. At the same time technical cooperation, which draws on relevant international experience, will be essential for the oversight of planning and data analysis. DIIS researchers are well qualified to provide the support required and should be more closely involved.

Cross-Cutting Issues and Themes in Danish Aid

Background

9.11 Danish aid policies include focus on a number of cross-cutting issue and themes. The ToR (see Box 1.1) include a requirement that:

... the evaluation will answer if – and to what degree– Danish assistance to Uganda:
-   Adhere to cross-cutting issues (gender, environment, popular participation) and themes (children and HIV/AIDS), as stipulated in the partners’ policies.

9.12 Three of these issues/themes – gender, HIV/AIDS, environment – have been prominent virtually throughout the evaluation period. They remain highly visible in Danida policy and programme documents (as well as GOU’s), and are reviewed below. The other two issues/themes have less visibility, but their substance has not been neglected:

• The theme of children does not appear to have the prominence now that it was given in the early years of the programme. However, given that Uganda has a very young population, and that the focus of much of the Danida programme has been on social and economic services that benefit poor families, children have been prominent among the beneficiaries from Danish aid.
• Popular participation has become a design principle in Danida programmes. It has also been directly promoted through Danida’s support to the Constitutional Commission and to decentralisation and by its human rights and democratisation programme.

Gender

9.13 Support to GOU gender policy has been noted in the previous chapter (8.58). Gender mainstreaming in sector programmes has been a constant thread in Danida support during the evaluation period. Although not specifically referenced in the 1996 Country Strategy, it was being implemented in practice both in the work of the Directorate of Gender and in the RUWASA programme. Danida was described as having pushed mainstreaming hard and as having been very demanding in expecting gender-relevant information to be included in plans and progress reports.⁵⁸ This is reported to have been successful, both in terms of how gender was reflected in programme documentation and, more substantively, in the way that gender issues are operationalised in sector programmes at district level. Sector-specific achievements include the development of a gender strategy for the water sector, and guidelines for the road sector especially the district and community roads. Danida has supported the mainstreaming of gender within the health SWAp, and a gender focus was built into the programme design and programme objectives for the ASPS, supported more recently by the gendered district poverty profiles (see Box 9.2). Evidently, challenges in all these areas remain, but, overall, Danish aid has played a significant role in strengthening the gender-awareness of Uganda’s development effort.

HIV/AIDS

9.14 Direct support to HIV/AIDS responses was noted in the previous chapter, and Danida has also contributed indirectly via the strengthening of basic health systems. This balance of direct and indirect support is judged appropriate. It is less clear that there has been much impact in terms of mainstreaming. It is difficult to assess impact in mainstreaming as it is typically intended to be integrated into programme approaches rather than separate activities and strategies. This evaluation has not identified significant influ-ence in other sectors during most of the period,⁵⁹ but it would require a more focused study to make a full assessment of this. The contribution to policy dialogue around HIV and AIDS was seen as constructive and supportive of harmonisation but seems also to have been limited, perhaps reflecting the focus of support on NGO services.

Environment

9.15 There are two possible dimensions: direct interventions with an environmental focus, and environmental safeguards linked to the general interventions supported by Danida. The topic is reviewed in Thematic Paper 12 (see Volume 4 of this report), which notes that support for explicitly environment-focused interventions was left to other donors, although some of the activities supported by Danida (e.g. water resources planning) have a clear environmental dimension. The review of environmental safeguards linked to Danida-supported interventions shows that such safeguards (e.g. Environmental Impact Assessments) were generally carried out. However, project-by-project safeguard observance may miss more important issues that require a wider strategic assessment. For example, the planning and implementation of the Danida-funded power lines was environmentally sound, but the World Bank-funded Owens Falls Project extension, which supplied the power, was not properly assessed and makes unsustainable demands on Lake Victoria (Thematic Paper 12, 23). The recent PMA evaluation notes the lack of strategic environmental assessments in the agricultural sector, and such an assessment of ASPS-II would have been appropriate (Thematic Paper 12, 16). 

Accountability and Corruption⁶⁰

Context

9.16 Corruption has been a serious problem for Uganda throughout the period under review. It takes a number of forms, ranging from “petty corruption” – which may be the form most often directly encountered by the poor – to “grand corruption” involving the looting of public resources by the politically powerful. Although there is no doubt about the pervasiveness of corruption in Uganda, it is inherently more difficult to be certain of trends, since reporting reflects freedom to report as well as the underlying situation, and most statistics on corruption are based on perceptions. The influence of competitive democracy on corruption is ambiguous. In principle, elected bodies hold the executive to account. In practice, the need to finance political activity may itself act as a spur to corruption (and the extent of corruption at local government level is a special concern in view of Uganda’s radical decentralisation strategy). Transparency International’s perception surveys indicate some recent improvement, but around very unsatisfactory scores and only to regain the levels of 1998:

While Uganda’s score in Transparency International’s global corruption perception index improved from 1.9 in 2001 to 2.6 in 2004, it stood at 2.6 in 1998. Uganda remains in the category of 60 countries with a score of less than 3 out of 10, regarded as countries afflicted by “rampant corruption.” (World Bank 2005: 23)

9.17 The incoming government in 1986 had an anti-corruption agenda, and donors were keen to work with GOU to address the issue. Over time, there has been a loss of confi-dence in the Government’s commitment. As noted in Background Paper 2 (in Volume 3 of this study):

Corruption was one of the NRM’s 10 priorities when it took power and in its statements the government has given a high priority to anti-corruption measures. These initially involved strengthening the existing oversight institutions, such as the Auditor General’s Office, and creating new ones, like the Inspectorate General of Government and Directorate of Ethics and Integrity. Successive PEAPs have also included anti-corruption measures within the governance pillar. The original momentum of reform has not been maintained, however. Government anti-corruption initiatives have been under-resourced and a loss of political commitment is apparent in a low rate of prosecution and the failure to follow up on high profile corruption scandals. There is a general perception that the current incentives for corruption are too high and law enforcement too weak for substantial improvement to occur. (Tangri and Mwenda, 2001, 2003; Robinson, 2004)

9.18 The Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy notes:

The government is taking action to combat corruption. It has established the institutions required to fight corruption and prepared a credible anti-corruption strategy. But these measures have yet to yield tangible results. The government has failed to successfully prosecute a single high-profile case of corruption following various commissions of inquiry. This raises questions about the government’s commitment to genuinely fight the problem. Strong political will and adequate financing of anti-corruption agencies are both required to combat corruption.
(World Bank 2005, 23)

9.19 Increased use of government systems, including the trends towards sector and general budget support, have led donors to focus more directly on fiduciary risk and on strengthening those systems. UJAS points to areas of improvement:

Progress has been made in strengthening the systems of public financial management to reduce opportunities for corruption. The 2004 Country Integrated Fiduciary Assessment shows that between 2001 and 2004 performance improved in seven of the 18 areas assessed, although overall fiduciary risk remained high. Compared with other HIPC countries, Uganda’s system of public financial management is relatively strong. The IMF/World Bank 2005 comparative assessment of public financial management in 26 HIPC countries ranked Uganda fifth overall with “some upgrading required.” Its ranking was ahead of 19 countries where “substantial upgrading is required.” Nonetheless, Uganda’s performance slipped slightly, as it met only eight of 16 benchmarks in 2004 compared with nine in 2001. (World Bank 2005, 24)

9.20 As noted in Chapter 6 above, Danish aid policy takes a strong line on accountability and corruption. The latest OECD DAC peer review describes Danida’s policy as follows:

As Danida moves further from project support to closer collaboration with national authorities, the issue of local corruption is seen in the context of overall Danish efforts at sustainable development. Corrupt practices are of specific relevance to the provision of Danish sector and budget support funds. Drawing inspiration from the Partnership 2000 pledge to promote “… administrative practices free of corruption as an essential element in the creation of pro-poor growth”, Danida recently generated a five-year draft Action Plan to Fight Corruption (2003-2008), the country response to which will figure prominently in each Country Strategy. The Action Plan seeks to balance Danida’s concern about fiduciary risk with its focus on the developmental aspects of combating corruption and promoting good governance. To control corruption relating to Danish aid, Danida has a “zero tolerance” policy in relation to all persons, companies or partner institutions that manage Danish development funds. In a more developmental direction, Danida is expected to maintain a regular dialogue with all partners. It actively works to identify issues of institutional corruption and to help build capacity within the partner systems and to reform the national policies needed for effective corruption prevention and control. (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2003a)

Implications for Danish aid to Uganda

9.21 Concerns to tackle corruption and to ensure accountability for Danish funds have had a strong influence on Denmark’s aid relationship with Uganda. Thus:

1. As described in Chapter 8, Danida has, over long periods, provided support to accountability agencies of government, including the IGG and the Office of the Auditor General, and to NGO anti-corruption advocates.
2. Denmark has applied diplomatic pressure and advocacy via annual consultations and other forums. This is a topic that regularly recurs in the minutes of annual consultations, which, among other things, record the energetic follow-up of any discovered misappropriations of Danish aid. The cut in country framework aid levels after 2001 was linked to Denmark’s concerns about Uganda’s intervention in the DRC, in which military corruption was a salient feature.
3. There have been “crisis” episodes in various projects (e.g. Rakai, the NMS, the Constitutional Commission) when corruption is discovered. Sometimes the vigour of Danida’s reaction has caused significant “collateral damage” through the disruption of the services provided by projects.
4. In the process, Danida has established a strong reputation for in its intolerance of corruption. This was very evident from the perception study, from which relevant extracts are reproduced in Box 9.3.
5. Danida’s concern for accountability of Danish funds has led to some conservatism in its choice and design of aid modalities, so as to retain strong oversight of disbursements. This has been reflected, for example, in Advisers’ dual role as watchdogs for Danish funds.

9.22 There is much admiration for what is seen as a principled stand by Danida. However, there is also criticism at two levels. First, the resources used to pursue redress may be disproportionate and some reactions have excessively disrupted programmes. Second, and more seriously, Danida is committed in principle to using, monitoring, and strengthening national systems; in practice, its accountability concerns, allied to a model of ex ante controls on expenditure, tend to result in persistence of parallel disbursement and accounting arrangements, with consequent transaction costs, arguably less direct effort at strengthening the core national systems, and a constraint on Danish participation in joint donor arrangements (where these involve disbursement via government systems).

9.23 The nature of the dilemma that Danida faces was well expressed by a 1999 evaluation of Danida’s bilateral health programmes:

Danida has had difficulties in achieving the careful balance between trust and control that SPS demands. Trust, expressed in a shared vision, and transparency of operations, is the most important pre-requisite for long-term partnership. Conditionalities and ear-marking of funds reflect differences between donor and national priorities and management capacities. Tight programme frames of objectives and activities often leave the issue of conditionalities unresolved, or irresolvable. Danida’s strict application of conditionalities, even when initially patience has been practised, led to a freeze in Danish disbursements, resulting in the on/off implementation of HSPSs or their components (Kenya, Uganda and Zambia). The effects this has had on service delivery in countries highly dependent on donor aid were aggravated by the fact that no alternative strategies existed. This strict application has had a significant impact on trust and mutual understanding, making future dialogue even more difficult. (from Evaluation Summary of Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and Cowi, 2000)

9.24 From the discussion, next, of Danida’s aid modalities, it is clear that these issues are still relevant.

Box 9.3: Perceptions on Accountability and Corruption From the Perception Study in Volume 2 of this report: Danida informants hold the perception that an important characteristic of Danida, which enables it to hold a strong line on ethics and integrity, is its “zero tolerance” approach to corruption and an emphasis on strict accountability. “While the Danes are relaxed on [some] things, they are very tough on certain things for example, corruption. … People say that the Danes listen; also [that they are] very strong on ethics and integrity. People say ’You have to be very careful when you’re working with the Danes.’ If someone steals, it’s not enough for the Danes for him to pay it back; they expect him to be taken to court. The Danes are less interested in getting the money back than in seeing due process.” (D) “Denmark is very strict on accountability – complete zero tolerance about anything to do with mismanagement of funds.” (ND – local government) There are non-Danida informants who regard Danida’s approach to corruption and accountability as being good, with the main reason cited that it is helpful in building up the culture and processes of accountability. The Danida attitude “is a very big help”. “[In cases where we are weak] it’s a help to be able to say ’there’s a donor agreement, so we can’t compromise.” (ND – central government) Because of emphasis on accountability, the oldest vehicle in [district] is one provided under a Danida funded education project. “If this becomes a culture it will be very useful.” (ND – local government) “Generally speaking I think Danida have helped the country – and [we] really value Danida’s support. Maybe they also have a point. African countries have never been very accountable – why should we get money from their taxpayers to mismanage or steal it. The country will eventually become corruption-free.” (ND – local government) However, other non-Danida informants believe that Danida’s zero tolerance stance is not the most productive strategy. A very senior government official perceived that “Danida’s weak spot is that they have been too concerned with corruption” (ND – central government) and unrealistic in their expectations. It is perceived that because of this preoccupation with corruption, Danida overprotects its funds and, as a result, is often less efficient than it perceives itself to be, as well as being overly-cautious of using government systems: One perception is that as a requirement from HQ and the Danish parliament, Danida’s accountability to Danish tax-payers has been stronger than Danida’s accountability to partner governments, and the result has been that Danida has used Government planning but not Government accounting. “[Danida] invest so much to stop their shilling getting lost.” (ND – central government) As lead agency of a basket fund, a perception is that Danida had more stringent rules than the other donors. Discussions “of the rules and regulations always seemed to dog the relationship, always seemed to be the most important issue”. (ND – central government) Source: Perception Study, Chapter 2, 3.18, 3.19 and 3.21. Note: D = Danida informant; ND = non-Danida informant.

Aid modalities / harmonisation and alignment

Background: aid effectiveness debates

9.25 Throughout the period there have been general concerns among the donor community to raise the quality and effectiveness of aid. Elements have included:

• pressures to reduce the tying of aid;
• moves away from a narrow focus on projects, recognising the importance of the policy and administrative environment for projects to be effective;
• further recognition of the costs of congestion and the undermining of government capacity that result from uncoordinated donor activity, especially in aid dependent countries;
• recognition of the importance of country ownership if policies and programmes are to be relevant and sustainable;
• hence, the evolving OECD DAC harmonisation and alignment agenda culminating in the Rome and Paris Declarations.

9.26 As noted in Chapter 3, Uganda has been at the forefront of many of these trends, aided by the exceptional capacity of GOU (and MFPED in particular) to take the lead in coordinating donors, and to provide a coherent strategy and a transparent prioritised budget/MTEF with which donors could more easily align.

Danida approaches on aid modalities

9.27 Danida is no different from other donors in having, within its ranks, a mix of attitudes to aid modalities, and differing degrees of comfort with “letting go” standard practices of project earmarking and controls. However, it has been at the forefront of donors thinking in “like-minded” ways and seeking to adapt aid modalities so as to increase aid effectiveness. This is evidenced in its early adoption of a sector approach to its own aid. Strategies (written and unwritten) throughout the period show a concern to avoid duplication and fit around what other donors were doing (see the detailed review of country strategy in Appendix E). As the 1996 Uganda country strategy indicates, the SPS approach was partly driven by this concern for coordination, partly by concern for policy influence:

Sector programme support
Based on existing Danish initiatives within priority sectors, development assistance will be gradually reorganised into sector programme support. In the first instance the objective will be to attain greater influence at the policy formulation stage of macroeconomic planning. This will ensure that Danish initiatives, often concentrated at subsector level, can and will be implemented in coordination with other activities within the sector. The need for complementarity in Danish initiatives in relation to initiatives as a whole will thus come into sharper focus.
(MFA Danida, 1996i)

9.28 An important contextual factor is that sectors are characteristically different, and this affects the ease, and the practical configuration of a sector approach, in different sectors. (Figure 3.3. in Chapter 3 above indicates some of the differences in aid modalities applied to different sectors). Uganda has been a pioneer in seeking government-led aid coordination linked to sector-wide approaches and budget support. The same general pattern has played out rather differently in the different sectors in which Danida is principally involved.⁶¹ Thus:

1. In water and sanitation: Danida was a prime mover in sector planning and development of SWAp arrangements in which Denmark has fully participated (up to the level of sector budget support) – see Box 8.8 in the previous chapter.
2. Agriculture is a sector hampered in most countries by a lack of consensus over agricultural strategy and government’s appropriate role in it; this applies even more so in Uganda, where the Ministry of Agriculture has been regarded as particularly weak and its sector plans as unconvincing. Hence both donors and MFPED played leading roles in the emergence of an overarching Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) – see Box 8.4. Danida’s first ASPS was a Denmark-specific programme; the second ASPS is still separate, but explicitly linked to PMA strategies, and involves some shared funding of NAADS. It is reported that other donors may be interested in co-funding elements of ASPS-II.
3. Health: here again there have been two rounds of Danida Sector Programme Support; in which the second is more systematically linked to the health SWAp (HSSP). While Denmark has been supportive of efforts to coordinate and rationalise sector planning, it has been diffident about reliance on government disbursement systems. Added complications in health are caused by different donor approaches, the effects of vertical programmes (notably for HIV/AIDS) and recently a loss of confidence in the Ministry/Minister of Health as a SWAp partner.
4. Roads: Danida has organised its own support in programmatic fashion (which, inter alia, makes this more of a partnership with GOU than simply the implementation of pre-set projects). But Danida feels it has little leverage to influence the overall Road Sector Development Programme (RSDP): it is a small player in a sector dominated by large investments and contracts (a “billionaires club”).
5. “Governance” is not in itself an obvious “sector” but there have been significant sector developments within this field, notably the Justice, Law and Order (JLOS) SWAp; there has been some contention over whether Danida should incorporate its justice programme within JLOS. Also, Danida efforts to rationalise its human rights and democracy activities into a coherent programme (HRDP) have led to the emergence of HUGGO – see Box 9.4 below. This has given Danida distinctive management capacity, and it is the purse-holder for a number of pooled funds in the sector.

9.29 However, the Danida portfolio in Uganda has not, since the cessation of its debt relief funding, included a general budget support instrument. As discussed in Chapter 8 (8.14 and Boxes 8.2 and 8.3), both the 1994 evaluation of balance of payments support and the 1996 evaluation of poverty focus recommended that Danida should make deliberate use of such an instrument, but this recommendation was not taken up.

9.30 Efforts to improve aid effectiveness are manifested not only in “set-piece” SWAps and sector programmes but also in the style of individual interventions within such programmes. The next issue to be discussed – capacity development – has also been high on the aid effectiveness agenda.

Box 9.4: HUGGO Danida’s support to human rights and democratisation is managed by the Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office (HUGGO), a Programme Support Unit separate from but reporting to the embassy, under the leadership of a Chief Technical Adviser. HUGGO is responsible for support to the judiciary and to anti-corruption agencies and for funding to Ugandan NGOs. HUGGO is one of the pillars of the Good Governance Liaison Office (GGLO) which also provides an administrative framework for Danida’s support to decentralisation and public administration reform. Danida’s objectives for HUGGO were to contribute to greater coherence and synergy in support to governance interventions and to increase Danida’s capacity for administering funds and monitoring partners’ performance. Through HUGGO, Denmark has made a much greater investment in managing governance interventions than has been made by other donors. More than half the funds administered by HUGGO are now channelled through multi-donor Basket Funds where Danida acts as Lead Agency. This has enabled Danida to take the lead in pushing for better coordination and alignment of donor support. Through HUGGO, Danida has had a much more ’hands-on’ relationship with its partners than is the case for most other donors. This has mostly been welcomed by partners. NGOs have appreciated Danida’s engagement with their strategic concerns, though they have also been uncomfortable with HUGGO’s close involvement in their day-to-day operations. HUGGO is now seeking to become more engaged at the strategic level and less involved in operational matters. Danida has pushed for a common donor approach to support for NGO District Networks and has led the process for developing a multi-donor foundation for funding NGOs’ work in human rights. HUGGO has been criticised for being anomalous at a time when Danida’s policy was to reduce the number of its Technical Advisers and Project Implementation or Management Units. However, HUGGO is not a parallel structure to government, rather its role is to support the supply, demand and regulatory sides of human rights and democratisation. Moreover, the physical and institutional separation of HUGGO from the embassy is seen as giving Danida an almost unique capacity to operate in sensitive political situations, for example in relation to the ceasefire in West Nile. Problems have arisen when the technical and political perspectives diverged, and when the respective mandates of each were blurred. Danida’s ability to capitalise on the comparative advantages of HUGGO and the Embassy depends on good communication between the Adviser and the relevant embassy official.

 

Capacity Development and Technical Assistance

9.31 Capacity development has been a consistent theme of the Danida programme in Uganda. In several interventions (decentralisation, the judiciary and other accountability institutions, the gender ministry) capacity development was the prime objective, and there have been strong capacity building elements in other interventions (water, health, roads). This section is a summary of the findings discussed at more length in Thematic Paper 4 (in Volume 4 of this report).

9.32 Danish aid has shown a consistent commitment to the strengthening of Ugandan systems, and often a very practical recognition that short term capacitation may require vehicles, stationery, offices and office equipment, rather than elaborate foreign expertise. From the beginning, there was recognition that, as a legacy of the colonial education system, the quality of personnel is often higher than in neighbouring countries (though their numbers may not be adequate). The Uganda country strategy aimed to use relatively small numbers of expatriate TA. Although data are sparse, there is some evidence that the ratio of TA inputs to total Danish aid expenditure has been less than in most other Danida programme countries. Figures from a study of Danish TA during the 1990s (which are reproduced as Appendix D, Table D18) showed that between 1994-99, Uganda had a lower ratio of person-months TA per DKK million spent than virtually every other Danida programme country.

9.33 Nonetheless, some informants had the impression that Danida is more prone than some other donors to rely on expatriate TA. There certainly have been areas where expatriate TA have visibly concentrated,⁶² and they may have been more noticeable because of their role in managing and monitoring the use of Danish funds. Thematic Paper 2 (Infrastructure, see Volume 4) notes that Danida was felt to have been over-reliant on expatriate TA in the first round of Water Action Plan preparation and adopted a lighter approach in later rounds. Support to decentralisation made extensive use of Ugandan expertise for the decentralisation secretariat, with additional international experts on call.

9.34 It is recognised, by Danida and other donors, that donors’ capacity development efforts have often been too fragmented, project-oriented and supply-led, and that this is an important challenge to future collaboration between donors and government. Although Danida’s overall record is good, Danish accountability concerns have in some respects militated against capacity building. As already noted, they have served as a deterrent to greater use (and strengthening) of government systems. They have tended to perpetuate a conflict of interest in Advisers’ dual role as controllers of Danish resources. And they have had a secondary role in inhibiting Danida from deeper involvement in SWAPs and sector budget support.

9.35 Thematic Paper 4 concludes that there are a number of areas where Danida may be able to improve its approach to capacity development. It may need to:

• Develop a more strategic approach to capacity development with other partners, providing the context within which it continues to identify and pursue opportunities for capacity development.
• Consider how to develop alternatives to international TA, including maximising the contribution by Ugandan people and institutions in capacity development.
• Consider how to balance control and risk, in order to avoid inconsistency in implementation, and to prevent Danida becoming too risk-averse to sustain its record of innovation.
• Learn to make a more realistic assessment of the impact of its own footprint on local economies, funding relationships and organisations.
• Learn to address problems of dependency and exit processes, especially in long-term programmes.
• Develop the application of “open system” perspectives in all programmes, to prevent too tight a focus on single organisations.

Organisation and Management of Danish Aid

9.36 Thematic Paper 10 (in Volume 4 of this report) reviews the organisation and management of Danish aid to Uganda. Apart from the initial establishment and subsequent growth of the programme, its management has had to adapt to a number of trends. These included the shift from project-focused towards programmatic approaches; a reduction in the tying and the earmarking of Danish aid, the quest for greater harmonisation among donors and better alignment with government strategies and institutions. Effective decentralisation of programme management has fluctuated: there was a high degree of de facto discretion at country level in the early days of the programme; more recently there has been a formal decentralisation of much greater programme responsibilities from Copenhagen to Embassy level, this time accompanied by more explicit results-based management accountability.

9.37 In general, programme management has adapted well to the demands on it, but there are challenges to maintain the right mix of general and sector skills, to make the most of available Ugandan expertise, and to ensure that results-based accountability does not lead to undue emphasis on “results” that are more easily measured, at the expense of a continuing contribution to long-term, locally-owned processes of development, in collaboration with other development partners.

54) See Schulpen, 1998.

55) See Volume 4, Thematic Paper 11 for more on poverty monitoring in Uganda.

56) For a more detailed review, see Volume 4, Thematic Paper 11.

57) Ravnborg et al., 2004.

58) The Perception Study in Volume 2 includes a compilation of observations about gender in the Danida programme – see its Annex 2C.

59) Although there have been HIV/AIDS efforts within various Danida-funded programmes (e.g. the distribution of condoms via Farmers’ Associations, and support for the development in 2004 of an HIV/AIDS mainstreaming strategy for the water sector).

60) See also Volume 4, Thematic Paper 6.

61) Such variations were not limited to Danida’s Uganda programmes. As noted by the 2003 OECD DAC peer review of Danish aid: sector approaches still vary widely, from simple assemblages of individual projects under a sector umbrella to more strategically framed sector programmes and budget support.
(OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2003a.)

62) Often in the form of personnel employed through company contracts rather than directly engaged by Danida (e.g. in infrastructure and water and sanitation).