Cover (left): Somali refugee, Yemen 2008. Photo: Khaled Abdullah/SCANPIX.


Cover (right): The UN's first female police unit, Liberia 2007. Photo: Christopher Herwig/SCANPIX.

Back cover: Child refugees from Darfur, Sudan, at the Red Cross camp in eastern Chad, 2004. Photo: Jenny Iao/SCANPIX.
It is estimated that in 2010 there are 43 fragile states in the world. These are characterised by having weak governmental structures, weak internal cohesion and a high degree of inequality, with massive challenges arising from extreme poverty, armed conflict and instability. Practically all of them are afflicted by, or emerging from, conflict and the majority are located in Africa. These are conflicts that spread instability to other countries and regions, and which in the worst case can become breeding grounds for global threats, as witnessed in Somalia and Afghanistan. Fragile states thus constitute one of the most significant challenges to peace and security in the world. Approximately 600 million people are living in fragile states. Approximately one third of the inhabitants are believed to be living in extreme poverty (less than 1 USD a day), so these states also constitute a considerable global challenge to poverty reduction and economic development.

A robust, targeted effort is required in fragile states to reduce poverty and counteract armed conflict and its consequences. For many years, Denmark has been among the leading countries in the world in terms of development assistance, and in addition we have participated in complex stabilisation efforts in a number of the world’s hotspots. By virtue of these activities, Denmark is acquiring the knowledge, experience and international credibility that enable us to make a special effort in fragile, conflict-afflicted states.

In the coming years, we will give greater priority to supporting these countries. The starting point is this policy paper that aims to establish priority areas both for our own bilateral engagement and for our contribution to strengthening the international community’s joint efforts in this critical area.

Fragility can take many forms. It could be that a state has collapsed and cannot protect its population, or that it does not have the monopoly on legitimate use of force, and lacks the capacity to exercise authority vis-à-vis the factions – rebel groups, for example – that challenge that authority. The challenges are not the same, for example, in Niger and Zimbabwe. This means that all efforts must be carefully adapted to local conditions. In some cases, we must respond to the overall challenges confronting a fragile state, while in others we must react to emerging fragile situations that threaten the stability of a country.
We will strengthen the integration of activities and ensure clear cohesion between Danish foreign and security policy in relation to fragile states. Experience clearly shows that extremely acute and complex situations necessitate efforts that draw on a wide range of military, political, humanitarian, stabilisation and development instruments. We also know from experience that support is most effective when combined and coordinated. This means that we must strive to combine and coordinate the different instruments under a common objective in the country in question. The priorities we set and the choices we make should be coherent across our focus areas. This requires integrated planning. Initiatives to further economic and social development must be integrated with the provision of security and political reforms, amongst other things. By linking emergency aid and development, the conditions that lead to vulnerability can be relieved. At the same time, building coherence and synergies
with humanitarian efforts should take place with respect for the fundamental humanitarian principles, on which Denmark’s humanitarian strategy is based.

Working conditions in fragile states are not the same as in most other developing countries. The political dimension of cooperation is much more pronounced in these countries. International support is typically driven by a general political stabilisation objective and all endeavours should be viewed in this perspective. This will often involve supporting political conflict resolution that include marginalised groups. It may also require the willingness to engage with groups that we do not regard as legitimate, but which must necessarily be engaged in negotiations if a conflict is to be resolved in a sustainable way.

It is also more difficult to achieve results in fragile states. In many cases, there will be relapses along the way, involving a heightened risk. We are obliged to accept such a risk as a fundamental working condition. For this reason, we will also be frank when it comes to risk assessment. We must, in addition, realise that if we are to make a difference in fragile states, a robust, persistent effort is needed. We can only make this effort if we concentrate our energies in a few countries.

Denmark does not engage in fragile states in isolation, which is why coordination with other countries and organisations involved and with the authorities of the country is key. For Denmark, an important priority is to establish a common, integrated frame for the joint international efforts as quickly as possible and with clear, common targets. When choosing how to channel our efforts, we will examine our specific comparative advantages and how we can best add value. In some cases, international organisations such as the UN will have the preparedness and capacity necessary to manage a concrete situation. In other cases, we will engage directly or through NGOs. A combination of these options is also likely.

Denmark’s key focus in fragile states will be to contribute to building up states where the support of the population constitutes the primary authority. This presupposes that the voices of the citizens are heard. It also requires that the authorities are capable of undertaking the security of the country itself, of protecting human rights, supplying basic services and managing the country’s development processes. We must assist these countries to reach the ‘turning point’ at which a more standard development effort is sufficient. This will require bringing many diverse types of assistance into play. Denmark will concentrate its support on five areas where the needs are particularly great in fragile states:

- Stabilisation and security;
- Promotion of improved livelihoods and economic opportunities;
- Democratisation, good governance and human rights;
- Conflict prevention; and
- Regional conflict management.

We can make a difference in fragile states with our experience and knowledge. We will also contribute to ensuring that international organisations such as the UN, the EU and NATO, regional organisations, international financial institutions, and other countries step up their engagement and continuously seek to improve collaborative efforts. A more efficient division of labour is needed as well as a more flexible adaptation of instruments to the needs of fragile states. We see it as our task to further this development. We also wish to be pioneers in promoting a whole of government approach as a leading principle in engagement with fragile states.
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INTRODUCTION

THE CHALLENGE

FRAGILE STATES constitute one of the most important challenges to international development and security today. Fragile states are far more vulnerable than other developing countries: poverty is twice as great in fragile states. At the same time these are the countries that are farthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals in terms of halving poverty, ensuring access to education and reducing child mortality by 50%. There is, simultaneously, a considerable risk of armed conflict in fragile states. 40% of post-conflict countries experience renewed conflict within 10 years of the conclusion of the original conflict. Armed conflicts in fragile states cost the global community more than 100 billion US dollars annually. Denmark should therefore contribute to turning the tide.

The challenges arising from fragile states are very diverse. In some cases, the state quite simply breaks down, such as in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. In such cases, armed groups may gather around a warlord and compete for power, and the country will then either be locked in civil war or, at best, uncertain power sharing. A very large-scale international intervention with a number of instruments including a considerable military component is usually required to resolve the situation.

There are also fragile states, such as Sudan, Zimbabwe and Burma, in which the power of the state is relatively strong but regarded as illegitimate by the whole or parts of the population. In these cases, large population groups resort to direct resistance to the state, creating the danger of a lengthy period of instability or civil war. The effort here would need to include a strong political component.

A common example is when a state is not capable of exercising authority and controlling rebel groups and criminal gangs in the country, such as in Niger and Pakistan. Such countries are often in extremely precarious situations: in a constant state of political crisis, in a simmering armed conflict and with a lack of economic and social development. In these cases, a combination of humanitarian, political, security and development efforts will often be needed.

Finally, there are countries that are slowly working their way out of fragility, or where fragility or conflict is confined to a region or part of the country. This applies to a number of partner
countries such as Kenya and Uganda, which are challenged by fragile situations. Stable political and economic development over the course of many years is required for a country to emerge from the danger zone. The risk often exists of fragile situations mutating and forcing them in the direction of instability and conflict once again. This risk underlines the importance of focusing on conflict prevention.

For ease of reference, this policy paper deals with all these types of fragile states and situations under the heading ‘fragile states’.

The causes of conflict and fragility are as diverse as the conflicts themselves. Common features are weak or lacking systems for political negotiation, corruption, violation of human rights and a highly vulnerable population. In many cases, rising pressure from groups of youth without any prospects for employment is a contributory factor to instability, as witnessed in West Africa, Somalia and Afghanistan, for example. Weak security structures and unprotected borders make fragile states particularly vulnerable to piracy and trafficking of human beings, weapons and drugs. This criminal activity contributes to further conflict and fragility, not least because of money laundering, support for rival rebel groups and extensive bribery of police and officials. A growing struggle for natural resources such as land, water, oil, minerals and diamonds can also be a contributory factor in conflict and fragility – and accordingly become a challenge of national, regional and global dimensions.

Conflict, political instability and extreme poverty play a part in destabilising the surrounding societies. The consequences include crime, forced displacement, pressure on resources and the spread of infectious diseases. In extreme cases, fragile states can become havens for terrorists who aim their strikes at us and our
democracy. Hence, solutions are to be found not just in country efforts, but also in regional and global measures.

This policy paper is an elaboration of the chapter on Stability and fragility, one of the five priority areas in Denmark’s new Strategy for Danish Development Policy from 2010. Moreover, this paper is a natural continuation of the 2009 Defence Agreement and the Government’s upgraded Whole of Government effort (2010). This policy builds on the ground-breaking work of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) concerning fragile state engagement. It will be concretised in annual action plans and coordinated with the specific country papers for support to fragile states.

THE POLICY CONSISTS OF FOUR CHAPTERS:

Chapter 1
– gives an account of the four principles for the way in which Danish efforts in fragile states are implemented: alignment, Whole of Government Approach, willingness to take risks, and focus.

Chapter 2
– gives an account of statebuilding as the focus for framing support in fragile states.

Chapter 3
– gives an account of the five priority areas where efforts are particularly necessary in fragile states, and where on the basis of the specific context, Denmark will contribute in collaboration with other partners.

Chapter 4
– gives an account of the way in which Denmark can be instrumental in making the efforts of international organisations such as the UN, the EU and NATO more effective.
DENMARK WILL prioritise the following four principles for efforts in fragile states: alignment, a Whole of Government approach, willingness to take risks and division of labour.

ALIGNMENT
As mentioned in the introduction, fragility has many forms and expressions. Every fragile state has its unique challenges, and experience shows that standard solutions do not provide the answer. Denmark will therefore place decisive emphasis on aligning its efforts with the specific situation in the country in question. This requires thorough and upfront situation analysis. The analysis must uncover entry points to the way in which a Danish effort can most effectively further a beneficial political development, build up national (and regional) capacity, safeguard against instability and armed conflict and reduce the vulnerability of the population. Risk assessment and expectations of outcomes will form important elements in the situation analysis. This is, however, often complicated by the local security situation and the lack of sources with the necessary access to knowledge for fully understanding the complexity in the local conditions.

Accordingly, Denmark will pay particular attention to securing sufficient data for such analyses by, for example, supporting local knowledge production such as research, free media and civil society organisations. There will also be major emphasis on close cooperation with international organisations working with conflict analysis and with global and regional challenges that can influence patterns of conflict, including transnational crime such as drug smuggling and exploitation of natural resources.

Alignment must take place from the very beginning of any engagement, aiming at underpinning local ownership and capacity, such that local authorities and partners are placed at the centre of the effort as early as possible. Alignment and ownership are crucial for sustainability and for trust in the process from the local population.

A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH
Denmark’s engagement in fragile states must be aligned with the realities of each individual situation. Underlying the effort will be the quest to strengthen the cohesion between the diverse efforts brought into play in these countries. This applies to
everything from military peace support operations, diplomatic peace initiatives, civilian stabilisation efforts, building up the justice and security sector, social and economic development assistance, to building up a state that is efficient and accountable, civil society efforts and humanitarian aid. The aim of the Whole of Government approach is to a high degree to promote peace and stability and mitigate the underlying causes of vulnerability by building on the competences and comparative advantages of different actors in a coordinated approach that enhances the synergy between different types of effort.

There are two important aspects of Whole of Government. Firstly, the different instruments must become more coherent in the field. Experience shows that this typically does not occur systematically in practice. Thus, international partners have to improve their ability to plan, function and coordinate the their efforts in unison. This needs to happen from the outset. Secondly, efforts must be made to integrate and coordinate the overall international support in each situation under a common overarching goal.

A strategic framework will be drawn up for Danish engagement in each fragile state, encompassing all Danish political, development, humanitarian, civilian and military efforts. Key actors must be prepared to coordinate their work from the very beginning. A lack of Whole of Government creates the risk of separate efforts not supporting one another, overlapping or in the worst case counteracting each other. It is also important to focus on integrated lesson learning. In this way, a common understanding can be built up of challenges and of a joint way ahead.

In Denmark, we have for a long time worked towards stronger integration of efforts, for example by building coherence between humanitarian support, our Region-of-Origin efforts and long-term development assistance. Denmark has contributed internationally to this agenda, inter alia as host to the ‘Early Recovery’ Conference in Copenhagen in 2008 and in the context of drawing up new transition financing guidelines in OECD/DAC.

In addition, Denmark is a pioneer in the area of civil-military cooperation, with concrete experience from Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. With the establishment of a new Whole of Government structure (2010), which includes an inter-ministerial secretariat based in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more integrated cooperation is being built up internally between relevant Danish government departments (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice etc.), with non-government actors, and between Danish and international actors. Within this framework, the
Government has established the Danish Stabilisation Fund, which has both development assistance and non-development assistance funds at its disposal. The aim of the fund is to enable an enhanced effort in the overlap between security and development, including interventions in fragile states. These funds and this new organisation mean that Denmark has created a special
platform for working together with other countries for more integrated and effective international stabilisation efforts.

WILLINGNESS TO TAKE RISKS
Working conditions in fragile states are notably different from conditions in other developing countries and interventions in these states will often be more hazardous. In general, achieving results will be more difficult and in many cases relapses will occur along the way. There are political, economic and operational risks involved. For this reason, engagement in fragile states will require a great deal of willingness to take risks in order to obtain the desired results. Our efforts in fragile states must be based on risk assessments.

We know that risk can take many forms. In the initial years following a conflict there is often a serious risk of conflict flaring up again or changing form. A school that has just been built might be bombed. Capacity building of local authorities might be wasted if the partners are replaced. It can be difficult for emergency aid to reach vulnerable population groups or there can be risk of it being misused by parties to a conflict or extremist groups. Our efforts could have unintended political consequences. The state might be extremely weak and the financial control structures not yet developed, increasing the risk of the support being misused. Nepotism is often a means of managing conflict and securing political alliances and stability. The security costs for posted staff or for supplying emergency aid can be great and activities can be dangerous for all those involved. During peace and reconciliation negotiations, we may be working with persons who might have violated human rights in connection with military operations or with states that are criticised for violations of human rights. In Zimbabwe, for example, Denmark supports the coalition government despite the fact that Robert Mugabe is still president, because the coalition government represents a step towards democratisation and freedom.

Hence, engagement in fragile states will often involve major risk. We should not ignore this reality, as that would be akin to pulling the wool over our own eyes. Denmark should be willing to accept a greater risk not least due to the potential benefits of successful stabilisation. At the same time we need to make the general public aware of the risks inherent in our efforts. It must be evident that we have assessed the risks, sought to minimise them and weighed them against the anticipated effect of the engagement.

We must be flexible in terms of the instruments we use and when. Interventions in fragile states often require a combination of long-term development efforts and more short-term, swift stabilisation initiatives. The situation is often marked by unpredictability, necessitating an ability for quick and flexible adjustment of the support and the will to experiment and make use of opportunities that arise, with no guarantee that the expected results will be achieved. Flexibility also implies that we should work with non-traditional partners and perhaps hostile groups, if we are to contribute to a peaceful solution to conflicts.

Willingness to take risks calls for a concrete, carefully thought out strategy for how risks are to be managed on an ongoing basis. This can take place through joint analysis and expectation matching in terms of political objectives and results. Agreeing to work with weak control structures in the context of widespread corruption does not mean that we dispense with our zero tolerance as regards corruption. We accept the risk, but wherever possible we install mechanisms to counter it and we follow up consistently if there are problems. It is also a matter of balanc-
ing short-term results and potential acceptance of waste (time, resources) against long-term goals. The efforts in Afghanistan are an example of the importance of bearing the long-term goal and peace and security in mind. This can be achieved by way of joint efforts with other donors and partners and by building up auditing capacity and budgetary transparency in the countries.

If cooperation becomes meaningless or counter-productive, in the most extreme cases we can pull out completely or join with the international community in initiating sanctions (commercial, personal). Therefore, the risks must be regularly re-assessed to see whether the preconditions for our engagement are still present and if we should change anything or stop completely.

We must give greater priority to integrated experience gathering and lesson learning. Denmark will likewise take the lead in close cooperation with, among others, the OECD/DAC and humanitarian partners in developing new methods for risk management.

**DIVISION OF LABOUR**

Perseverance and a strong, integrated engagement will be needed to make a difference in fragile states. This requires us to focus our efforts. At present, Denmark is engaged in a number of fragile states across Africa, Asia and the Middle East. In some cases, the support is limited to only a few hundred million US Dollars. Therefore, in the future our efforts should be concentrated on fewer countries, and only on a few focus areas in the individual country, thereby enabling better and more focused support.

The choice of partner countries and implementation partners will be based on a thorough analysis and risk assessment, weighing up comparative advantages, expectation of outcomes and cohesion with Danish development, foreign and security policy.

The subsequent selection of focus areas will depend on the specific needs of the country in question and will be established in close coordination with other partners. However, from now on they will be selected from among the five areas described in Chapter 4, in order to ensure the best possible quality of the Danish contributions.

Danish engagement will primarily take place within a common international framework. A combination of multilateral and bilateral efforts will often be preferable and may have the potential to minimise risks. Denmark has good experience of being able to utilise its great flexibility, enabling quick action, lesson learning and building on the efforts of larger actors.

As a rule, a large-scale Danish engagement, even if it is mainly channelled through multilateral partners or NGOs, will require a Danish presence in the country concerned and a prioritisation of the necessary resources for the task. In a few cases or in certain periods, however, the security situation can be so grave that a permanent physical presence is difficult (Somalia, for example).

A major, robust engagement will often have a horizon of at least 5-10 years. It is important to define the objectives of the effort and to establish a strategy for goal achievement, composition and scope of both international and Danish support from the very beginning. Building up the engagement too gradually is often ineffective, as it might lead to stabilisation activities and key capacity building efforts starting up too late. Accordingly, the strategic framework becomes characterised by duplication and the ‘turning point’ is delayed. Simultaneously, efforts will have to be flexibly defined to enable the alignment of the engagement to new developments and changed conditions en route.
DENMARK WILL place statebuilding at the core of our engagement in fragile states. Stable countries that can resist violent conflict and crisis are absolutely crucial for combating poverty, vulnerability, a lack of security and violations of human rights. Such ‘resilient’ countries also form a bulwark against international crime and terrorism and are thus important for our own security.

There are several basic challenges with regard to building up the state. A particular challenge is building legitimacy, i.e. that the population begins to support the state and the authorities (central and local) as the primary authority in the country. This presupposes that the citizens – both men and women – are involved in the political processes, and that ‘the social contract’ between the political system and the citizens is accepted as legitimate. In this process strengthening civil society and the relationship between state, civil society and citizen is important if the state is to be regarded as representative. For example, the state must be placed in a position to manage political conflict in a peaceful way and to further a national, inclusive reconciliation and reconstruction process. It is also important for legitimacy that the capacity of the authorities is built up with a view to enhanced public administration and management of public budgets, fighting corruption and supplying security and services such as clean drinking water, education and health, not least the local level.

Statebuilding processes must be nationally. National and local authorities must take responsibility for the efforts as early on as possible. Local ownership is vital for long-term sustainability and a precondition for the gradual reorganisation of the international effort. It is a matter of utmost importance to secure a response
Monrovia, Liberia, 2010. Photo: Stefan Katić
that is swift and effective, to avoid creating parallel structures we should only be responsible for tasks in cases where there is a lack of efficient local partners, as parallel implementation can contribute to undermining the state and creating confusion regarding the objectives.

Together with international partners, Denmark will contribute to building up national institutions such as ministries, courts, police forces, parliaments, election commissions, etc. The level of ambition and pace with respect to capacity building must be realistic and should be communicated to the local population to ensure support for the statebuilding process. Holding elections presents a particularly complex problem requiring careful preparation and an understanding of the fragile political context in the country. This was, for example, demonstrated by the post-election violence in Kenya in 2008.

Statebuilding should take place as close as possible to the citizens. The building of competent, reliable local authorities that practice good governance and provide the population with efficient services, together with involving the population through inclusive local political processes, can have a major stabilising effect. The population should be able to see and feel that there is a point in investing in state and peace building, and that processes that involve the population are preferable to undermining government or resorting to parallel structures.

In most fragile states informal and traditional structures play an important role in the provision of the rule of law, conflict resolution and basic services. Informal structures, most often organised on religious or ethnic lines, can be extremely important for basic survival and protection, not least with regards to the poorest section of the population. In some cases, parallel political systems exist, with informal justice systems, schools, private security services, civil society based health clinics and advanced parallel economies. Powerful movements, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian Autonomous Territories, seriously challenge the raison d’être and legitimacy of the state. Informal and traditional structures are thus often an intrinsic and important part of fragile states, but they must be integrated with formal structures in a way in which human rights and gender equality are promoted, and where statebuilding is not jeopardised.

Statebuilding and the promotion of democracy are also about building up civil society and strengthening the interplay between state and citizen. In cooperation with the state, civil society can play an important role in performing specific tasks that the state is not able to carry out, and it can contribute to building up state-citizen relations and dialogue. The population's needs and priorities are often expressed and accommodated through the informal structures of civil society. It is through these relations that public support towards the statebuilding process can be created. In fragile states there will often be a need for pragmatic solutions against the background of 'imperfect' political agreements (for example those entered into in connection with peace processes). Interaction with different NGOs with knowledge of the local context and Diasporas can contribute to tailoring efforts that can underpin these national processes.

In the next chapters we will identify the areas that Denmark will focus on to further such statebuilding processes in fragile states.
DENMARK WILL contribute in five areas requiring attention in fragile states:

- Stabilisation and security;
- Improved livelihoods and economic opportunities;
- Good governance and human rights;
- Conflict prevention; and
- Regional conflict management.

To get fragile states past the ‘turning point’ where an ordinary development effort is sufficient, a broad range of efforts will be required. If Denmark is to make the most effective contribution to this process, we need to focus on a limited number of areas – areas in which we have worked up special competences and special knowledge by virtue of our long-standing experience of stabilisation, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The highest possible degree of efficiency is achieved through division of labour with other countries and organisations that also make a contribution.

This chapter examines the five priority areas within which we will concentrate our engagement and where we find that we can contribute most effectively to statebuilding in fragile states.

The establishment of these five priority areas does not mean that Denmark must engage itself in all these areas in each individual situation. Nor does it mean that they encompass the entire span of efforts needed in fragile situations. These priorities are areas where we know from experience that special attention is required and where Denmark should consider an engagement as determined by the actual situation and the possibilities for engagement. There will, for example, be a need to engage in dialogue concerning democratisation and human rights in fragile states. There will be a need for development efforts to build capacity in the area of basic services and to create improvement in living conditions and new economic opportunities. There will also – as is the case in Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia, for example – be a need to create security through international peace support operations and capacity building of national police and security forces. There will still be a need for acute and long-term humanitarian efforts in a limited number of crises.

Every situation is unique and can entail many different chal-
A FOCUSED EFFORT: DENMARK’S ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN—BASED ON A BROAD DANISH PARLIAMENTARY COALITION

The general objective of the Danish engagement in Afghanistan is to make a contribution to national, regional and global security by preventing the country from once again becoming a haven for terrorists. At the same time, Denmark’s engagement is to contribute to the growth of a stable and more developed Afghanistan that can provide for its own security, continue its democratisation and further respect for human rights.

Danish soldiers have been deployed to help create security for the population in a period of transition and enable Afghans to obtain the peace required to reconstruct their own country. The military engagement is led by NATO on the basis of a UN mandate and at the invitation of the Afghan government. In time, the Afghan police and the Afghan army are to take over the task of protecting the population. Therefore, the role of the Danish soldiers will increasingly be to train the Afghan security forces. But short-term security cannot stand alone. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and stability presupposes significant progress for the population. Hence, Denmark is assisting the Afghan government with development assistance. But there are also expectations on our part: a precondition of Danish assistance is that Afghanistan continues its democratisation. Among other things, Afghanistan is to improve conditions for women, which is an essential part of human rights and written into Afghanistan’s own constitution.

The integrated Danish engagement in Afghanistan consists of many elements:

- Coordination between international contributors and the Afghan Government concerning ends and means in the stabilisation of the country. This implies, inter alia, diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the UN, the EU, NATO, other countries’ envoys and the Afghan government.
- Military intervention to support the Afghan security forces. Increased emphasis on capacity building.
- Reconstruction efforts through support for statebuilding, education and improvement of living conditions contribute to long-term stability.
- Close civilian-military cooperation in volatile areas such as Helmand.
- Refugees are helped to return to their areas of origin.
- Acutely arisen disasters and insecurity of food supplies relieved through humanitarian organisations.
- Danish NGOs’ activities in the country receive financial support from Denmark and assist the Afghan government in implementing national programmes.
- In recognition of the regional impact of stabilisation, Danish development assistance has commenced in the border areas in Pakistan.
- Willingness to take risks is a precondition – instability or corruption can bring projects to a halt.

STABILISATION AND SECURITY

Denmark may contribute to the stabilisation and provision of security in selected countries through international and regional peace support operations. A decision by the international community to deploy a military peace operation with a view to stopping an armed conflict or to preserve an agreed peace
PRIOIRITIES IN FRAGILE STATES

provides a unique framework for comprehensive engagement in the country in question. This military stabilisation and provision of security must be followed up by political stabilisation efforts to further peace and reconciliation processes and the reintegration of combatants, for example. At the same time the military, police force, prisons and judicial institutions of the country must be built up to enable them to take over the role of providing security and rule of law. A key task is to strengthen security institutions responsible for countering destabilising cross-border activity such as transnational crime and global terrorist groups that exploit fragile states for the production of drugs, transit areas and setting up training camps, etc.

Denmark will contribute to integrated justice and security sector development as a key element in building up the capacity of the state and in democratic control of the security sector. Denmark can likewise make a contribution to building up the capacity of military security forces and play a substantial role in building up the police force through EU police missions, for example. It is vital not to view capacity building of armed forces or police as isolated efforts. If military capacity building takes place without the build up of the necessary civilian control mechanisms, the security forces can become the tools of a future despot. If capacity building of the police force takes place without the simultaneous build up of judicial institutions and a prison system, this can lead to human rights violations and oppression. It is important to involve informal justice mechanisms – which in many cases are the institutions that the majority of the population use and trust – in a manner that furthers democracy and human rights.

The UN, EU, NATO and regional organisations will often be relevant partners in justice and security sector reform.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO INTEGRATED JUSTICE AND SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

- Capacity building of the military
- Capacity building of the police force
- Building up the justice system
- Correctional facility reform
- Demobilisation and reintegration programmes
- Integration of non-state providers of security and justice
- Civil society engagement
- Promoting human rights
- Promoting participation by women at all levels
- Regional cooperation
- Combating piracy and securing waters
- Anti-terror efforts

IMPROVED LIVELIHOODS AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

Livelihoods and economic opportunities in fragile states differ from the situation in other developing countries. While they are not fundamentally different, the challenges are greater and the resources to meet the challenges are more limited.

It can be difficult for local authorities to supply even the most basic services. In such situations, Denmark, together with other partners, will support the supply of basic services and protection-related activities through international and humanitarian organisations and by involving the private sector and civil society locally. This could include security, clean drinking water and basic education, not least for girls. To the greatest extent possible, support will be provided in close cooperation with the authorities of the country and with the objective of building up national capacity.
It is absolutely vital to create the framework for furthering private sector development and entrepreneurship. It is notable that the most pragmatic solutions to cooperation are often to be found in the private sector – even in conflict situations. Together with partners such as the World Bank and the UN, Denmark will contribute to the creation of economic activity, which is necessary for growth, income opportunities and the improvement of living conditions, including food security. This will often require the stabilisation of the economy and advancing financial security for investors and the business community. The types of efforts will depend on local contexts and needs, but involving women in economic development is of particular importance.

Moreover, Denmark will engage in employment creation among weak groups in both urban and rural communities. A lack of income and employment opportunities undermines support for the statebuilding process and creates political instability. Insufficient economic opportunities for young populations in particular can have significant destabilising effects and lead to the rekindling of conflict, crime, migration and, in some cases, radicalisation.

Concurrent with economic stabilisation, we can assist in the development of markets, business development, support for entrepreneurs and vocational education and training. Rapid establishment of microcredit systems are of great importance in engaging poor population groups in urban and rural communities in economic activity. Women’s participation, right of inheritance and equal access to ownership of land will be accorded special priority. There will also be a focus on strengthening natural resource management with the aim of preventing conflict as well as public revenue generation.

It is also important to combat transnational economic crime through international and regional cooperation.
DEMOCRATISATION, GOOD GOVERNANCE & HUMAN RIGHTS

Denmark will work for democratisation, good governance and human rights at both the national and local level. Special attention will be afforded to women and children, who are particularly affected by violations of human rights, abuse, discrimination and exclusion.

Strengthening good governance and the rule of law at the same time as a sudden influx of support (and with it large resource flows) can pose a significant challenge in terms of corruption. A government that works only to line its own pockets creates a barrier to citizens and can develop into the tyranny of a small group vis-à-vis the wider population. A police force whose primary task is to demand money from the population will never obtain their backing. Denmark will focus its work on building up administrations, locally and nationally. The specific effort must be carefully adapted to the local context, but possible focus areas include combating corruption, strengthening financial administration, and capacity building for supplying social services at local level.

Broad participation and ownership of the political processes generates support for peace processes. Denmark can make a difference by supporting institutions and groups that wish to promote freedom, democracy and human rights.

Another priority is to strengthen civil society and free media in fragile states. Strengthening of free media is vital in statebuilding. An active civil society and freedom of expression strengthen the dialogue between state and society and between contending parties and create greater freedom, accountability and transparency.

Denmark will work for stronger international, regional and national judicial institutions to promote human rights and combat impunity, i.e. for war crimes. Denmark will also further national reconciliation processes. Unresolved tensions, violations or a sense of injustice can lead to instability and new conflicts. Denmark will work to ensure cohesion between efforts that further prosecution for war crimes and protection of civilians. This will include, for instance, ensuring that tribunals and criminal courts prevent new conflicts from flaring up.

Together with international and regional partners, Denmark will strengthen its efforts to operationalise the principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), which entails the international community undertaking a special responsibility to protect civilian populations against genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes in cases where the state itself cannot protect its citizens.

CONFLICT PREVENTION

Denmark will give greater priority to conflict and crisis prevention. It is far more difficult, time-consuming and costly to stop an armed conflict than it is to prevent it. The focus will be on strengthening the preventive capacity of the countries, regions and the UN and on the integration of conflict prevention in our own engagement. The countries and regions, just like the international community, must become better at intervening in situations that are deteriorating and which can lead to conflict or the breakdown of the state. Denmark will increase its focus on building local and regional knowledge about conflict triggers with the purpose of furthering the regional and local initiation of political processes and solving problems before they lead to armed conflict. Strengthened civilian capacity in the area of conflict prevention is also relevant.

Denmark will focus particularly on increased conflict preven-
In his function as mediator sent by the African Union, former Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan presents an agreement for power sharing together with Kenya’s president Kibaki and the leader of the opposition – and incoming prime minister – Odinga, Nairobi, 2008. Photo: Antony Njuguna/SCANPIX.

We must also be aware that efforts are not neutral but affect power relations to varying degrees and give rise to redistribution of resources between groups and communities, potentially contributing to tensions. This is the case irrespective of whether we support women’s participation in parliamentary work or pay for a road to be built in a certain region in a partner country. Profound knowledge of the societal processes in the country in question is required as well as is the will and ability to carry out flexible initiatives with a view to defusing possible armed conflict.

Denmark will also contribute to conflict prevention through its humanitarian efforts. In accordance with its humanitarian strategy, Denmark will prioritise the protection of civilians during armed conflicts and will focus on the protection of children and combating gender related violence *inter alia* under the Danish Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security, which seeks women’s active participation at all levels of peace processes and reconstruction. In addition, Denmark will work for rapid reconstruction and permanent solutions for displaced population groups, e.g. through the Regions of Origin Initiative.

**REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

Denmark will strengthen the capacity of regional organisations to prevent and manage conflicts. It is vital that the international community becomes better at handling conflicts and fragile states via regional initiatives. The majority of the world’s fragile states are in Africa, and the African regional organisations, spearheaded by the African Union (AU), are experiencing positive development. Since 2004, Denmark has contributed to building up African capacity for conflict prevention and conflict management through the Africa Programme for Peace (see
The AU has increasingly taken a position as an important actor, not least through the central African Peace and Security Council and through the deployment of peace support operations in a number of cases, including in Sudan and Somalia. The sub-regional organisation for West Africa (ECOWAS) directs economic cooperation and integration in West Africa and has mediated in several of the western African conflicts. ECOWAS has developed the capacity to prevent and forecast conflicts and has deployed peace support operations and mediated in several of the conflicts in the region. In recent years, the sub-regional organisation for the Horn of Africa (IGAD) has strengthened its efforts to stabilise one of the most difficult regions in the world. Denmark has been among the countries taking the lead in supporting the strengthening of the regional organisations in Africa. It is a priority to strengthen this engagement and that the joint initiatives of the international community be efficiently coordinated by the organisations themselves.

Denmark will continue to prioritise regional cooperation aiming at managing negative, cross-border effects. Afghanistan is a good example of the fact that a complex conflict cannot be managed solely by an engagement in the country itself. Central to stability in Afghanistan is countering drug smuggling and the opportunities for global terrorist groups to strengthen the rebel groups inside Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan, for example. A strengthened effort to stem negative trends must be embedded in the long term in regional organisations. Where this is not possible or insufficient, the international community must step forward, *inter alia* through the UN.

Denmark will work to strengthen regional collaborative mechanisms for common goods such as the Nile Basin Initiative in Africa or the Mekong River Commission in Asia. Controlling rich natural resources is a key issue. In many locations in Africa, the uncontrolled struggle for access to deposits of diamonds, oil and rare metals has contributed to grave, lengthy conflicts such as in Liberia and The Democratic Republic of Congo.

Denmark will contribute to strengthening regional cooperation and greater economic cooperation. It is a weakness in many developing regions that obstacles to trade and corruption impede internal trade between these countries. Such cooperation is under way in a number of these regions, but progress is slow. Here, the EU, among others, can play a pivotal role.
DENMARK WILL prioritise:

- Better integration of UN efforts
- Integration of EU efforts at country level with a clear mandate
- NATO’s ability to enter into integrated efforts with other actors

As mentioned earlier, Denmark’s efforts in fragile states will most frequently be part of a comprehensive international engagement. In many situations, Danish support will be channelled through international organisations and other partners in the country based on an assessment of comparative advantages. Denmark also supports multilateral work through core contributions to the organisations.

In addition, Denmark makes an active diplomatic contribution to the same organisations and provides civilian and military contributions to the UN and NATO. Civilian contributions, such as police officers, are also provided to the EU. Multilateral engagement is thus a fundamental platform for Denmark’s contribution to resolving conflicts globally and in the fight for freedom, poverty reduction and stability in fragile states.

Denmark will promote integration, division of labour and efficiency in the overall efforts of the international community at country level with a focus on the UN, the EU and NATO. In countries where Denmark itself is present, it will be a core task to further this agenda. We will also contribute staff to multilateral organisations to promote Danish priorities through professional expertise and key placement.

In addition to a prioritised engagement through the UN, EU and NATO, Denmark will work to improve the ability of international finance institutions (e.g. the World Bank and the African Development Bank) to meet the needs in fragile states. The banks often administer key donor trust funds in countries where the state apparatus is unable to manage the inflow of the total amount of development assistance funds or unable to be in charge of concrete stabilisation efforts. They have special competence in stabilising the economic sector and the financial markets and assisting in the capacity building of national and local authorities in key areas. Their presence sends a signal to other investors concerning busi-
ness opportunities in fragile states. In terms of the banks’ internal procedures, control mechanisms and lack of willingness to take risks, the supply of services remains sluggish and bureaucratic.

Against this background, the World Bank’s State and Peace-Building Fund and the African Development Bank’s Fragile States Facility were established with the purpose of playing a catalytic and innovative role in relation to stabilisation contributions and private investments.

UNITED NATIONS
Denmark will work for increased efficiency and integration between UN efforts at country level. With its 192 member countries and global presence, the UN is an important international actor with special legitimacy and options for action with both normative and operational tools. The UN can deploy peacekeeping forces, post political missions and police missions, implement human rights investigations and introduce sanctions and natural resources regimes. The UN can provide support in terms of humanitarian and development assistance. The UN is a global actor that sets the standards inter alia in relation to fighting terrorism, arms limitation, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating international crime, including piracy. The UN also plays an important role in enhancing the capacity of regional organisations to manage conflict. This applies in particular to the efforts of the UN to build up and support the peace operations of the African Union in Somalia and Darfur.

The 2009 report of the UN Secretary-General on “Peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflicts” shows that great challenges remain. Denmark will press for the UN, with Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon at the head, to work proactively to meet these challenges. It is crucial to post better heads of mission, responsible for the overall efforts of the UN in a given fragile state. It also entails strengthening the UN’s integrated planning. With its funds and programmes such as the UNDP, UNICEF and the World Food Programme, the UN has at its disposal a large operational capacity and a physical presence even in extremely unstable and difficult situations, which can seldom be matched by others. However, the overall efforts of the UN at country level are often too fragmented and uncoordinated and without a common strategic direction.

Denmark will also work for strengthened cooperation and division of labour between relevant entities such as the Department for Political Affairs, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in UNDP. We would like to see greater impact and better utilisation of scarce resources. Denmark will also specifically work for more efficient gathering of experience and lesson learning across the UN, for example across justice and security sector development.

Together with the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), the PBSO must be strengthened and become a genuine frame for more integrated and efficient peacebuilding efforts at country level, which include relevant perspectives from peacekeeping as well as stabilisation and development efforts. Up to now, the PBF has not contributed sufficient value-added and has been somewhat supply-driven and fragmented in its efforts. Against this background, Denmark will intensify its dialogue with the UN concerning more strategic and efficient utilisation of the PBF funds. Denmark will also work for a more focused role for the PBC, not only in relation to the UN
system's many actors, including strengthened interplay with the Security Council, but that the Commission also involves financial institutions such as the World Bank. Together with like-minded countries, Denmark will also work for the PBSO being granted the resources necessary to live up to its responsibility as the coordinating department for strengthened peacebuilding.

Denmark will continue to make contributions to the UN’s peacekeeping operations. There is a rising demand for peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the UN. Both the Danish Defence Agreement (2010-14) and the Prime Minister’s Vision (Denmark 2020) emphasise that Denmark must be able to send soldiers to international missions. Denmark will also contribute by strengthening its civilian capacity (for example, political advisers, stabilisation advisers, police) and support for building up “south-south” capacity.

EUROPEAN UNION
With the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the Common Foreign Service, Denmark will work for closer cooperation between the Council Secretariat, the Commission and Member States. The Lisbon contract can strengthen the EU’s integrated (Whole of System) approach to crisis management through the new Representative for Foreign Affairs and the EU’s Foreign Service with common EU missions in partner countries. The EU will have at its disposal better tools for furthering common priorities and values, encompassing political dialogue with third countries and regional organisations, crisis management missions, the European Stability Instrument and extensive development assistance for fragile states. The EU has the unique possibility of implementing integrated operations by drawing on both military and civilian activities from Member States and from its own civil resources. Denmark can make a police contribution to international missions in the range of up to 75 full-time equivalents. Due to Denmark’s defence opt-out from the EU, we do not take part in the military cooperation.

Denmark will work to strengthen the integration of EU efforts at country level. The bureaucratic barriers that have hampered the EU’s possibilities of achieving maximum foreign, development and security policy impact must be broken
The UN’s first female police unit,
Photo: Christopher Herwig/SCANPIX
down. A special challenge is posed by the tendency of the EU to centralise decision-making competence, which has impeded the operational efficiency of the EU at local level to a high degree. A particular Danish priority will be working proactively to strengthen the EU’s impact, responsiveness, integration skills and efficiency locally. Among other things the EU must become better at operating flexibly, rapidly and in a coordinated way within a common international framework. Strengthened Danish civil capacity aims at contributing to furthering the efficiency of the EU in-country affairs.

NATO

Denmark will work towards NATO’s competences in the areas of security sector development and military capacity building being utilised to support fragile states, including outside of the framework of a military stabilisation intervention. Since the 1990s, NATO has built up considerable experience in partner cooperation in the field of security and defence sector reform, first in Eastern Europe and subsequently in the Caucasus and the Middle East. At present, NATO is acquiring experience of capacity building of security forces, not least through its engagement in Afghanistan.

Denmark will work towards NATO becoming better at functioning in genuinely integrated engagements together with civilian actors. Through interventions in the Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO has acquired practical experience in terms of building up the capacity of the military to function together with civilian actors in extremely demanding areas of operation. NATO has a special role to play in training local security forces. NATO is working on developing its ability to function in integrated civilian-military efforts with a clear civilian objective. This development is seen particularly in Afghanistan. Some years ago, Denmark was among the initiators of a process aimed at strengthening the ability of the organisation to interact with other international institutions including the UN, NGOs and local actors in planning and implementing operations. Specifically, the

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO SOMALIA & PIRACY

The Security Council of the UN has taken the initiative to form the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in which approximately 60 countries and international organisations are participating. Denmark is chair of the Working Group on Legal Issues. It meets quarterly and works with legal and practical aspects of the fight against piracy, such as detention and prosecution of pirates.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a visible symptom of the unstable political and humanitarian situation in which the country has been for decades. Stabilisation of the security situation and improvement of the humanitarian conditions are the only long-term solution. Denmark provides humanitarian assistance and supports projects for employment, economic growth and basic services. In addition, Denmark takes part in capacity building of security institutions, in particular police training. Members of the Somali community in Denmark have been involved in putting together the engagement.

Denmark’s military contribution to fighting piracy includes a naval contribution to NATO’s standing maritime group in 2010. The contribution consists of a frigate serving as commando ship to lead the entire naval force during Operation Ocean Shield. This contribution can number up to approximately 180 persons together with a number of specialists, such as military police and maritime Special Forces.
Danish soldiers from the support ship Absalon inspect a Yemeni vessel in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. Photo: Danish Defence.
ground is being prepared to create better focal points in NATO headquarters for proactive, external cooperation, setting up enhanced liaison arrangements with other actors, upgraded training and education activities for civilian and military personnel in NATO and the member states, as well as increased exchange of experience on a Comprehensive Approach in international operations. Denmark will work to further these aspects *inter alia* when NATO’s new Strategic Concept is being drawn up.

Denmark will give special priority to building up closer cooperation between NATO and the EU as a substantial contribution to strengthening integration. The mechanisms for civilian-military cooperation are unclear and politically difficult, for example in situations where the EU is engaged in NATO areas of operation with different types of civilian efforts, such as in Afghanistan and Kosovo. The consequences impose severe limitations on the possibilities to coordinate efforts.