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Evaluation of the Africa Programme for Peace 2004-2017

November 2018

Summary

Since 2004 over 900 million DKK has been allocated for the “Africa Programme for Peace” (APP). A fourth phase of the programme began 2018, maintaining the focus on support for African peace, security and governance efforts through regional organisations, including the African Union. An evaluation of the programme was considered opportune as a means of thoroughly assessing both progress and the difficulties encountered.

The evaluation had three main aims: to document and assess the results of the APP, 2004-17; to analyse the Danida contributions made to African peace, security and governance initiatives in terms of the value added to processes of conflict prevention and resolution; and to determine focused and targeted recommendations for enhancing the impact of the Africa Programme for Peace (in the fourth phase). Noting that many challenges have been faced by the regional organisations, the evaluation recommended renewed support for institutional capacity strengthening on the basis of clearly defined strategic objectives.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

Executive Summary

1 Introduction

2 Policy context

3 Africa Programme for Peace Overview

4 Detailed overview of APP

5 Relevance

6 Effectiveness

7 Efficiency

8 Impact

9 Sustainability

10 Coherence

11 Summary of findings

12 Recommendations

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Asiatisk Plads 2,
DK-1448 Copenhagen K
Phone: +45 33 92 00 00
Fax: +45 35 44 62 01
um@um.dk
www.um.dk


List of Abbreviations

AAU Addis Ababa University
ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AFISMA African Union’s African-led International Support Mission for Mali
AGA African Governance Architecture
AMERT Africa Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Tool
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
APP Africa Programme for Peace
APSA Africa Peace and Security Architecture
ARCSS Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
ASF African Standby Force
AU African Union
AULOs African Union Liaison Offices
CAR Central African Republic
CCR Centre for Conflict Resolution
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWS Continental Early Warning System (of the AU)
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CVE Countering Violent Extremism
DAC Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
Danida Collective term for the development activities of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DEVCO Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (of the European Commission)
DfID Department for International Development (of the UK)
DK Denmark
DKK Danish Kroner
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC East African Community
EASF Eastern African Standby Force
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOSOCC Economic Social and Cultural Council (of the AU)
ECOWARN ECOWAS Warning and Response Network
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EASBRICOM Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism
ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECPF ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
ERG Evaluation Reference Group
ESF ECOWAS Standby Force
EU European Union
EUR Euro (Euro 1.00 equal to DKK 7.44)
EVAL Danida Evaluation Department
FCS Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situtations
GIZ German Agency for International Cooperation
HoA Horn of Africa
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD Inter-Governmental Authority against Drought and Desertification
IGASOM IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia
IPF IGAD Partners Forum
IPSS Institute for Peace and Security Studies (of Addis Ababa University)
ISS Institute for Security Studies (of South Africa)
JFA Joint Financing Agreement
JPA Joint Partnership Agreement
KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LFA Logical Framework Approach
LGA Liptako-Gourma Authority
MICEMA ECOWAS Mission in Mali
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNJTF Multinational Joint Task Force
MoUs Memoranda of Understanding
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OAU Organisation of African Unity
PAPS Directorate of Political Affairs, Peace and Security
PCRD Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PMT Project Management Team
PSC Peace and Security Council (of the AU)
PSD Peace and Security Department (of the AU)
PSF Peace and Stabilisation Fund
PSO Peace Support Operations
PSOD Peace Support Operations Division
QA Quality Assurance
RECs Regional Economic Communities
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADSEM Southern African Defence and Security Management
SCP Somalia Country Programme
SPLA/SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SSR Security Sector Reform
TA Technical Assistance
TCE Training Centres of Excellence
TFG Transitional Federal Government
TNG Transitional National Government
ToC Theory of Change
ToR Terms of Reference
UCPD Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UK United Kingdom
UMA Arab Maghreb Union
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Partner
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNON United Nations Office at Nairobi
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USD United States Dollar (USD 1.00 equal to DKK 6.17)[1]
WANEP West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WPSI Women, Peace and Security Institute (of KAIPTC)
WTO World Trade Organisation
ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

[1] Currency rates as of 2 January 2018 as listed by the International Monetary Fund. www.imf.org.

Executive Summary

The evaluation of the Africa Programme for Peace, 2004-2017 was commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department for Evaluation and has been carried out by a team of international experts during the period December 2017 to August 2018. The purpose of the evaluation is two-fold: to enhance the impact of the Africa Programme for Peace and to learn lessons for future capacity-building efforts of multilateral institutions.

The APP seeks to enhance peace, security and governance in Africa by supporting the capacity of regional organisations, their member states and stakeholders. The programme’s logic is built around the ‘African solutions to African problems’ maxim, whereby the APP is to support key African organisations with the appropriate policy dialogue, funding and technical assistance in order to strengthen their capacity to plan and execute agendas – with a specific focus on implementing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). Increasingly, the programme logic has been complemented by the assumption that the APP would provide Denmark with better access to key African officials, thereby also enabling Denmark to better pursue its national security and trade objectives.

The APP has gone through three sequential phases (2004-2009; 2010-2013; and 2014-2017) and is currently in its fourth phase (2018-2021). APP Programme Documents set out the priorities and objectives of Danish funding for each phase; Development Engagement Documents are produced to specify Danish support to each individual partner organisation (breaking the APP down in separate ‘components’). The APP is managed from the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa.

This evaluation primarily focuses on three organisations that have been identified as the main APP partner organisations: the African Union

(AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In addition, the evaluation also assesses the APP support provided to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). Finally, the evaluation briefly reviews the APP engagement with the Southern African Development Community, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, the Institute for Security Studies, and the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism.

Overall, each of the three main APP partner organisations has been involved in conflict prevention, conflict management or conflict resolution processes critical to peace, stability and governance in Africa. As a funder to these APSA and AGA organisations, Denmark deserves credit for investing in initiatives that are highly relevant. While the relevance of APP and its partner organisations is confirmed by this evaluation, it is less clear that the programme and the organisations cover an adequate spectrum of relevant peace and security priorities. The nature of conflict in Africa has changed considerably, and it is not evident that the APP’s focus and approach have adequately adapted to new threats. The key question is where the added value of regional organisations lies, in relation to not only the changing nature of conflict in Africa, but also the changing stakeholders and geopolitical agendas. The relevance (and impact) of the AU, IGAD and ECOWAS seems to be mostly linked to their norm-setting roles and less to their ability to develop and implement transnational policies and operations (except in specific instances such as the AU mission in Somalia or post-election negotiations in the Gambia). The norm-setting function has primarily focused on the conflict prevention and mediation agenda, providing a supportive political backdrop for interventions in an effort to reach more versatile peace architecture in the region.

While the evaluation found the APP and its partner organisations relevant, the intermediate results (outcomes) of APP funding have been less clear. The reporting on outcomes by the AU, IGAD and ECOWAS has been unsatisfactory throughout the evaluation period, resulting in a broken results chain where it is unclear whether the impact of the organisations can indeed be partially attributed to Danish APP funding. The APP contributions have allowed each of the three main APP partner organisations – but also the supporting organisations that received APP funding – to increase their capacity across a range of functions that are relevant to the APSA and AGA. Overall, the longer-term and flexible nature of the funding has been crucial in allowing the organisations to respond quickly to opportunities as they arose. Still, the capacity (both in terms of quality and quantity) of the organisations remains weak, and there is a continued need to strengthen the organisations’ financial, organisational, and technical capacity.

Whereas policy dialogues and regular interaction with the partner organisations have been identified as the most important instrument to the APP, this evaluation finds that these dialogues and interaction have mostly taken place in Addis Ababa in relation to the AU. While the APP contributions may have enabled access to African officials, there are no clear indications that the access has been leveraged to engage in a policy or political dialogue. A clear strategic framework identifying the overall purpose of access, e.g. influencing officials to pursue particular objectives or policies, has so far been lacking. Particularly given the overall weak capacity of the APP partners, more guidance and steering is required from an effectiveness and efficiency point of view. It is commendable that Denmark continues to ‘work through’ the APP partner organisations despite the capacity limitations that apply, rather than ‘working around’ them as many other donors do, as it engenders ownership. Yet it is also clear that such an approach must be accompanied by a regular strategic dialogue and technical assistance.

The cost-effectiveness of APP programming is hard to establish, given the insufficient reporting over the years, particularly as a large part of the APP’s funding goes through Joint Financing Agreements (JFAs), i.e. pooled funding arrangements. Compared to other donors, particularly the other Nordic donors, Denmark employs a relatively low number of staff to manage the APP. Danish officials noted, however, that the small team ensured better coherence and no division between the Danish political and development initiatives.

The choice to manage all APP components out of Addis Ababa makes sense from an efficiency standpoint, as in theory this allows Denmark to bring the various components together and ensure coherence between them. However, it is not clear how these potential benefits have been materialised in practice. The evaluation finds that the APP setup has not been conducive to establishing a more solid division of labour between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) based on their comparative advantages and abilities. By managing the various APP components as individual programmes rather than as elements of an overarching programme, Denmark did not stimulate or facilitate further cooperation between the organisations. This is linked to the fact that the evaluation has found ambiguity between the verbal and the written accounts on the programmatic feature of the APP. On one hand, officials engaged with the APP argued that the APP was simply a ‘funding stream’ that targeted institutions operating with similar objectives; on the other hand, officials maintained that all components should be managed from a single programme office, as this would increase synergy and cohesion. This ambiguity should be tackled in order to allow for a shared set of expectations vis-à-vis the APP across the range of stakeholders involved, and to allow for a clear and realistic results framework for the programme.

The APP is perceived as flexible by the partner organisations, and partners considered Denmark to be a constructive partner that operates on a level of equality. The consistency and predictability of the APP support allows for planning, and the flexible terms allows for shifting priorities. Yet other aid officials questioned whether the Danish approach has undermined the overall donor effort to keep specifically ECOWAS and IGAD accountable and focused on delivering, either on their convening mandates or capacity building efforts.

The sustainability of the APP support is weakened by the high level of dependency of the APP partners on external funding. Meanwhile, the JFAs allow for better coherence between Danish support to APP partners and the support provided by other donors. This is also important with regard to complementarity between Denmark’s ‘through the system’ approach, and other donors ‘around the system’ approach. Denmark needs to coordinate its efforts more with these donors in order to mitigate the risk of aid funding overlap. In addition, the evaluation notes a need for further alignment and coordination resulting from the growth of regional security initiatives in response to the current security threats in Africa.

Finally, the evaluation notes that synergies and coherence between the APP and the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF), the other major Danish instrument on the African continent focused on providing support to activities that directly target peace and stabilisation) have been variable. While the two instruments are distinct, they have the same overarching objective and often even work with the same organisations. One way of viewing the relationship is to see the APP as working at the ‘strategic normative’, continental and regional level, and the PSF as working at the ‘strategic operational’, and regional and country level.

Given the findings of the evaluation, the evaluation recommends (1) that Denmark continues to fund African institutions that contribute to peace and stability in Africa. In order to meet these ultimate objectives, the evaluation recommends that Denmark take the following actions, which are further detailed in Chapter 12.

A. Strengthen the analytical foundations

The APP is built on the assumption that peace and security in Africa is best ensured if there is a strong continental architecture of organisations and capabilities preventing and reacting to conflicts and building peace. Furthermore, Denmark has employed an open, flexible, eye-toeye approach with its partner institutions. Denmark, however, could be clearer on the conscious choice of approach and the consequent lack of intermediate, measurable results. Whereas the approach encourages flexibility in outcomes, the APP reviews note dissatisfaction with the paucity of results. As a first step, the evaluation recommends (2) that Denmark expounds the programme logic to specify how transmission effects occur or do not occur.

This can be achieved through two interlinked exercises. Firstly, the APP could helpfully combine the explicit (as listed in the Programme Documents) and the implicit (Danish officials’ verbal accounts) theories of change. If access to African officials and the furthering of Danish national interest on trade and security are commonly agreed objectives, the APP would benefit from a clear description of these elements. This would facilitate (a) a clearer understanding of Denmark’s interest among APP partners, and (b) a more adequate assessment of Denmark’s overall objectives. Secondly, the expanded programme logic would help clarify the apparent mismatch between the Danish flexible approach and the results expected.

B. Innovate monitoring methods

A critical challenge in designing and evaluating the APP is how to measure institutional success. What are the key indicators that would demonstrate progress towards a more capable institution? Is there a path of organisational development, which is suitable to particular institutions in specific circumstances? Can the progress of an organisation be benchmarked to help set target timelines and assess its performance? Given that the APP is broadly defined as an institution-building programme, such an institutional success measure is strangely absent. The evaluation recommends (3) that the ongoing monitoring and future assessments view the programme through an organisational development lens. The evaluation has developed a model which could be applied. It is presented in Chapter 12.

C. Invest in people and relationships

The evaluation found that Denmark’s moment as a ‘pioneering and special friend’ of the APSA and AGA institutions has passed. This development is partly due to the greater maturity of the organisations, and partially to the increasing number of donors who support the institutions. The evaluation recommends (4) that Danish officials reengage with a more proactive approach, particularly in light of the need to accompany institutional capacity building with strategic dialogue and technical assistance. Such a reengagement does not require greater control over programming or processes but a more energetic focus on making tangible progress.

The evaluation also recommends (5) that Denmark strengthens coordination with other donors to help monitor and strengthen the partner organisations’ administrative and financial capacity and to build coalitions to jointly advance political-level collaboration within and among partner institutions. This is particularly likely to lead to results on ECOWAS, but also on IGAD where Nordic donors could increase coordination, and on the AU where Denmark could help advance some of the conversations that the EU is finding difficult to make progress on.

Finally, the evaluation recommends (6) that the Africa Department more actively engages in regional Africa programmes by facilitating regular communication among embassies and Copenhagen and by effectively advocating that African conflict prevention is in Denmark’s strategic interest.

D. Consolidate programme focus and adjust programme management set-up

The evaluation found that the various APP components have been managed as individual projects rather than as elements of an overarching programme, possibly as a result of different interpretations of the need for cohesion and coherence within the overall programme. As such, Denmark purposely did not stimulate or facilitate cooperation between the APP organisations in relation to their roles and responsibilities in implementing the APSA and the AGA. To ensure coherence, the evaluation recommends (7) to strengthen the strategic focus of the APP, including in its choice of partner organisations. This should follow not only an overarching and coherent theory of change for the APP, but also a renewed political analysis of the organisations and their capacity to deal with new threats to stability, including violent extremism and migration.

Finally, if Denmark decides to continue to support both the AU and the RECs relevant to the Danish priority regions in Africa (i.e. ECOWAS and IGAD), then the evaluation recommends (8) to place the management responsibility, including the responsibility for political dialogue, with the embassies located in physical proximity to the relevant organisations. The embassy in Addis Ababa could act as the overall programme manager for the APP.

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose and objectives

As elaborated the Terms of Reference (cf. Annex E), the purpose of this evaluation is two-fold: to enhance the impact of the Africa Programme for Peace (APP) and to learn lessons for future capacity-building efforts of multilateral institutions.

The evaluation has three main objectives:

  • To document and assess the main outcomes of the APP in its lifetime, from 2004 to 2017 (Phases I-III);
     
  • To analyse Danish contributions to African peace, security, and governance initiatives in terms of the value added to processes of conflict prevention and resolution; and
     
  • To determine focused and targeted recommendations for enhancing the impact of the fourth phase of the APP.

The report explores these objectives by evaluating the APP through combining a programme theory model with the OECD criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and coherence) and by following a rigorous evaluation method. See Annex C for the Evaluation Matrix.

1.2 Scope

Institutional scope

The evaluation focuses on the institutions supported by the APP, including the African Union (AU), its member states, the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and four additional organisations, namely the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) also in Accra, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) at Addis Ababa University, and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) based in South Africa.

The evaluation takes into account the institutional context provided by the Danish government in terms of supporting peace, security, and governance in Africa. Thus, the evaluation specifically examines the coherence between the APP and the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF), and to a lesser extent the linkages to Denmark’s bilateral and humanitarian programmes. The evaluation also assesses the relevance of the APP in light of the initiatives funded by other development partners.

Geographic scope

By supporting the AU, the APP covers in principle the entire African continent. Because of the focus on ECOWAS and IGAD, however, the geographical scope of this evaluation is limited to the Sahel and the Horn of Africa (HoA). These priority regions for Denmark’s development cooperation have continuously been destabilised by conflict.

Thematic scope

The APP seeks to enhance peace, security, and governance by supporting the capacity of regional organisations, their member states and stakeholders. APP support comprises multiple forms of capacity-building and activities ranging from support for political decision-making and diplomatic actions to support for non-military components of peace operations. This evaluation covers the full range of activities supported through the three phases.

Temporal scope

This evaluation covers the entire span of the APP’s lifetime, including APP Phase I (2004-2009), Phase II (2010-2013) and Phase III (2014-2017). In addition, the evaluation takes account of the start-up phase of the APP (2002-2004) as part of its historical assessment of the programme, as well as Phase IV (2018-2021) of the APP as part of its forward-looking efforts to determine focused and targeted recommendations for future programming.

1.3 Evaluation team

Ecorys Netherlands and the Clingendael Institute have jointly engaged the evaluation team, which includes Peter W. Brorsen, Team Leader; Mariska van Beijnum, Peace & Security Specialist[2]; Erwin van Veen, Quality Control; and Thijs Viertelhauzen, Project Manager. Fransje Molenaar and Rens Twijnstra supported the team with their expertise on respectively the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In addition, Jacob Lindenbauer and Willemijn Tiekstra provided valuable analytical support throughout the process of conducting the evaluation.

The evaluation was commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) Department for Evaluation (EVAL) in October 2017 and has been carried out from December 2017 to August 2018.

1.4 Evaluation Reference Group

The Danida Evaluation Department established an Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) which provided advisory support and inputs to the draft inception report and the draft evaluation report with a view to ensure that the evaluation is based on factual knowledge about the engagement and how it has been implemented. It has also supported the implementation of the evaluation and has promoted the dissemination of the evaluation conclusions and recommendations.

1.5 Report format

The report for the Evaluation of the Africa Programme for Peace (APP) 2004-2017 comprises 12 chapters: this introduction defines the scope of the evaluation and refers to the evaluation criteria.[3] Chapter 2 sets out the Danish policy context for development cooperation generally, then specifically focuses on peace and security. Chapter 3 provides an introductory overview of the APP, presenting the Programme’s objectives, operational context and main partner organisations. Chapter 4 subsequently provides a detailed overview of the APP’s programme level focus, set-up and expenditures by phase. Chapters 5 through 10 discuss findings according to evaluation criteria, with one chapter for each criterion. Chapter 11 presents the conclusions of the evaluation, and Chapter 12 lists the evaluation’s recommendations and introduces a model for measuring institutional performance.


[2] During the inception phase, Ms Mariska van Beijnum replaced Mr Luc van de Goor as Peace & Security Specialist.

[3] The detailed evaluation method was presented in the Inception Report, and the evaluation criteria and framework are found in Annexes B and C.

2 Policy context

The APP was initiated at a time when donor governments increasingly incorporated conflict prevention into their development policies. Ensuring peace and stability became an integral part of the quest to reduce poverty, while subsequently in the post 9/11 era the quest to reduce poverty – i.e. development cooperation – became an integral part of foreign policy (including defence and security). At the same time, aid effectiveness became a central component of the development agenda with donor governments committing themselves to increase ownership, alignment, harmonisation and mutual accountability in their aid delivery. The provision of support through existing country and regional systems (like budget support) was part of that approach.

It is against this background that the APP was developed, and therefore this environment should be taken into account when assessing the APP. This chapter presents a brief overview of the overall Danish development cooperation policy framework of the period subject to this evaluation, as well as an overview of the peace and security issues within those frameworks.

2.1 General policy framework for Danish development cooperation 2004-2017

During the period from 2004 to 2017, Danish development cooperation has been guided by four consecutive strategy documents.[4] All four documents identify poverty reduction and sustainable growth and development as the overriding objectives of Danish development cooperation. Other recurring issues are gender equality, environmental sustainability (linked to climate change), peace and stability, and human rights.

Throughout the years, strategies have increasingly linked Danish development efforts to Denmark’s own (economic) stability and development, making clear that a lack of stability and progress in developing countries can have a direct impact on Denmark.[5] This trend is in line with the development agendas of other Western donor governments, where the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis and an increasing polarisation of public debates have led to a focus on using aid to serve national interests. The strategies therefore underline that development cooperation is an integral part of Danish foreign policy, stating that Danish development cooperation shall contribute to advancing Denmark’s interests in a more peaceful, stable, and equal world.[6] A wide range of policy areas can have an impact – positive and negative – on development. These include policies for defence and security, trade, industry, the labour market, agriculture, tax, the environment, climate and energy. A lack of coherence between policies and instruments can undermine the effort to fight poverty and create sustainable development. To achieve a higher degree of synergy in development, all four strategies underline the need for a coherent approach in order to strengthen the link between relevant Danish policies and instruments.[7]

Denmark consistently relies on long-term, mutually binding partnerships with developing countries and other participants in development cooperation. In building these partnerships, Denmark positions itself as a solid and reliable partner, underlining that a successful partnership requires mutual commitment, flexibility, political will and the ability to bring about change – acknowledging that change is often difficult and requires a long-term commitment.[8] The strategies underline that Denmark is recognised and respected as a credible and open partner in its cooperation with developing countries. In addition, there should be predictability in Danish priorities and assistance funds as well as transparency in decisions, requirements and consequences.[9]

These strategies highlight that Denmark’s partners have to take the lead in setting priorities and ensuring relevance to local needs. The documents also stress the need to be innovative and prepared to accept mistakes and setbacks on the way to long-term progress.[10] Minor or short-term setbacks are dealt with as part of the on-going dialogue with partners and within the framework of the individual programme.[11]

This links to the need to monitor and document results: another issue that consistently features in all four strategies. As part of the partnership approach, the strategies note that joint control and responsibility for both the administration of development assistance and its results are the best guarantors of efficient and result-oriented cooperation. Development results should be documented, assessed. and communicated. In mutually binding cooperation with partner countries, organisations and other development partners, Denmark will define specific targets and monitor progress so that it can identify the results achieved and adjust its engagement accordingly.[12] The strategies recognise that development and change are not simple strategies that can be created in a day, but rather require sustained commitment that may often be difficult and time-consuming.[13]

Denmark uses different policy instruments for its development engagement. Until 2017, sector programme and budget support were key instruments in Danish aid, as these were considered most suitable for promoting ownership, capacity, and mutual accountability.[14] As such, Denmark followed international principles for effective development assistance, including those found in the Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action and New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. However, the 2017 strategy for development cooperation states that Denmark will not conclude new bilateral agreements on general budget aid as a development policy instrument. Instead, Denmark will continue its work in specific thematic areas and in sectors where support, including the results achieved, can be monitored closely. This change of policy is in line with the general trend among other like-minded development partners in recent years.

Africa has consistently been the main geographic concentration for Danish development cooperation – partly due to the fact that the development needs in the African region are considered to be the most dire.[15] In addition, Africa offers the possibility to concentrate initiatives on regional anchors of stability in areas where Danish security and migration policy interests are involved and where engagements can add substantial value.[16] All four strategies state the need for Denmark to focus its engagement on a selected number of countries. Throughout the evaluation period, Denmark has reduced the number of countries receiving Danish assistance and supported increased regional cooperation between developing countries. The support not only focuses on partner countries’ regional engagement, but also on relevant regional institutions and initiatives.[17] In this way, Denmark positions itself as a progressive development actor, leading the way in promoting increased division of labour between all development actors.[18]

2.2 Peace and security as part of Danish development cooperation 2004-2017

Support of the prevention, management, and settlement of armed conflicts in developing countries has been a key component of Danish development cooperation throughout the evaluation period. Each of the four Danish strategies on development cooperation link lasting and stable peace to development assistance, and focus specifically on tackling the underlying and structural causes of conflict.[19] Peace and security are considered preconditions for development, and development a precondition for lasting peace and stability.[20] Denmark presented a policy specifically aimed at peace and stabilisation in fragile states, which became a central component of its development assistance and foreign policy.[21] Denmark concentrates its support to fragile states on five specific areas: 1) stabilisation and security; 2) promotion of improved livelihoods and economic opportunities; 3) democratisation, good governance and human rights; 4) conflict prevention; and 5) regional conflict management.[22]

Throughout the years, Denmark’s assistance in the field of peace and security has consistently revolved around three fundamental premises: local ownership and dialogue, coordination, and coherence among the various activities.[23]

In terms of local ownership, Denmark aims to build up countries’ own conflict prevention and peaceful resolution capacities.[24] It aims to do so through the establishment of effective, accountable and inclusive institutions and mechanisms for conflict resolution, the support of reforms for armed forces and the police, and the strengthening of state abilities to supply basic services. Denmark also focuses on dialogue, mediation and the prevention of radicalisation.[25]

The premise of coordination is applied both regionally and internationally. More specifically, Denmark aims to contribute to developing countries’ efforts to build regional capacity for the prevention and management of armed conflicts, to carry out peacekeeping operations, and to strengthen regional forums as mechanisms for cooperation and conflict prevention.[26] The 2010 and 2017 strategies refer specifically to the AU in this regard, stating that regional forums such as the AU are important contributors to local solutions (in addition to the United Nations and the European Union). Denmark supports the AU in its efforts to become better equipped to play a leading role in regional peacekeeping operations.[27] Given their general level, no reference is made to the APP however, in any of the four overarching strategy documents.[28] This is different for fragile states policy, where the APP is presented as one of the instruments listed under the focal area of regional conflict management, stating that Denmark provides direct support for the AU’s, ECOWAS’ and IGAD’s own strategic plans (2004-2014: DKK 500 million).[29] It also states that Denmark will build upon the APP with the Danish Peace and Stability Fund, and that military and other regional security capacities may be supported through cooperation with the Danish armed forces.[30]

The various policy documents also highlight the need for international coordination, stating that the international community must take joint responsibility for peace and security issues. In this regard, Denmark emphasizes the need for a stronger international division of labour and close cooperation with EU partners and multilateral organisations to enable the necessary prioritisation of Denmark’s efforts in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCS).[31] Reference is made to international policy frameworks like the Millennium Development Goals, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, and Sustainable Development Goal No. 16 regarding peace, justice and institutions and Goal No. 17 on partnerships. The latter two guide the current Danish development cooperation, as they are considered basic choices on which the entire Danish engagement is based and act as a foundation for achieving results within other goals. Goals No. 16 and 17 thus represent a connecting thread in Danish development policy.[32]

Finally, the premise of coherence is applied to Denmark’s own efforts to support the prevention, management and settlement of armed conflicts in developing countries. Denmark is a pioneer in integration and a whole-of-government approach in the broader security policy area. With reference to the engagements of the Peace and Stability Fund, Denmark underlines the need to strengthen integration and coordination of its diplomatic, development, security and humanitarian efforts in fragile and conflict-affected settings.[33] The 2017 strategy for development cooperation underlines the importance of regional connections, stating that these will define the framework for integration of future interventions. Country programmes and other national interventions in connection with conflict prevention and resilience will be increasingly linked to regional programmes for peace and stability.[34] However, no specific reference is made to the APP.[35] Notably, Danish programmes within APP countries do not typically refer to the APP. Only the Somalia Country Programme (SCP) for 2015-2018 references the APP, stating that the APP provides a broad mechanism to support continental peacebuilding and political initiatives in Somalia, noting that the SCP can engage in different locations. Also, reference is made to the fact that Somalia engages interests in the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which are partners to the APP.[36] For other country programmes analysed, no APP reference was found.[37]


[4] These strategies are: Partnership 2000 (2000); Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010); The Right to a Better Life (2012); and The World 2030 (2017). In addition, the Danish government annually publishes its priorities for development cooperation for the coming four years (see: http://amg.um.dk/en/policies-and-strategies/priorities-of-the-danish-government/). These priority documents fall within the wider frameworks provided by the strategy documents.

[5] See e.g. Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 5 / The World 2030 (2017), p. 1.

[6] The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 3.

[7] Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 14.

8 See e.g. Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 6 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 33 / The World 2030 (2017), p. 11.

[9] Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 12 / p. 14.

[10] Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 6.

[11] Partnership 2000 (2000), pp. 14-15.

[12] Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 31.

[13] Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 6.

[14] See e.g. Partnership 2000 (2000), p. 6 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 36.

[15] See e.g. Partnership 2000 (2000), p. 22 / Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 11 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 33.

[16] Specifically, Denmark aims to engage in the arc of crisis and insecurity around Europe, which in particular impacts Danish security, and in selected protracted and often forgotten humanitarian crises. Prioritised engagements comprise i.a. the Middle East and North Africa, Afghanistan, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. See: The World 2030 (2017), p. 18. See e.g. Partnership 2000 (2000), p. 22 / Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 11 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 33.

[17] See e.g. Partnership 2000 (2000), p. 18 / Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 11.

[18] Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 12.

[19] See e.g. Partnership 2000 (2000), p. 44 / Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 25 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 29.

[20] Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 25.

[21] Peace and Stabilization – Denmark’s policy towards fragile states (2010).

[22] Peace and Stabilisation – Denmark’s policy towards fragile states (2010), p. 13.

[23] Partnership 2000 (2000), p. 45.

[24] See Partnership 2000 (2000), p. 45 / Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 27 / Peace and Stabilisation – Denmark’s policy towards fragile states (2010), p. 5 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 28 / The World 2030 (2017), p. 18.

[25] See Partnership 2000 (2000), pp. 44-45 / Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 25 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 28 / The World 2030 (2017), p. 18.

[26] Partnership 2000 (2000), p. 46. See also Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 25 / Peace and Stabilisation – Denmark’s policy towards fragile states (2010), pp. 18-19 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 30 / The World 2030 (2017), p. 21.

[27] Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), pp. 25-26 / The World 2030 (2017), p. 21.

[28] The annual priority documents for Danish development cooperation (2005-2017) also do not contain specific references to the APP, with the exception of the priority document published in 2007 (A World for All), which states that “from 2009, the Africa Programme for Peace is expected to be replaced by a new programme which focuses on broader regional integration in Africa. The new programme will be formulated and implemented in collaboration with the African Union and regional organisations.” (p. 17).

[29] Peace and Stabilisation – Denmark’s policy towards fragile states (2010), pp. 18-19.

[30] Peace and Stabilisation – Denmark’s policy towards fragile states (2010), p. 19.

[31] Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 25 / Peace and Stabilisation – Denmark’s policy towards fragile states (2010), p. 9 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 30.

[32] The World 2030 (2017), p. 6.

[33] The World 2030 (2017), p. 21 / Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change (2010), p. 25 / Peace and Stabilisation – Denmark’s policy towards fragile states (2010), pp. 5-8 / The Right to a Better Life (2012), p. 27.

[34] The World 2030 (2017), p. 21.

[35] The policy framework refers specifically to the Danish Neighbourhood Programme and the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme, as well as to the Peace and Stability Fund (p. 9).

[36] Somalia Country Programme, New Deal Compact Support – Country Programme Document 2015-2018, p. 7.

[37] The evaluation team had access to the country strategy documents for South Sudan (2016-2018), Burkina Faso (2016-2020), Mali (2017-2022), and Niger (2017-2022).

3 Africa Programme for Peace Overview

This chapter provides an introductory overview of the APP. It first presents the Programme’s objectives, and then provides short introductions of the peace and conflict challenges on the African continent in a general sense, and the Sahel and the Horn of Africa specifically, in an effort to present the context in which the Programme is operating. The chapter subsequently presents the organisations that have been identified as the main APP partner organisations, providing an overview of their mandates and experiences in response to conflict and stability challenges in their respective areas of operation.

3.1 Programme level objective

The APP is built on the assumption that peace and security in Africa is best ensured if there is a strong continental architecture of organisations and capabilities preventing and reacting to conflicts and building peace, thereby following the ‘African solutions to African problems’ paradigm that underpins the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs).[38] Throughout the four APP phases,[39] the overall programme objective has remained largely the same: to promote peace and security as the basis for development in Africa through strengthening the capacity of African institutions to respond within their mandate. When looking at the objectives identified in the different programme documents for the various APP phases, it is clear that the concept of ‘development’ is further specified throughout the programme’s life cycle:

  • Phase I and Phase II: to promote peace and security as a basis for sustainable development in Africa;
     
  • Phase III: to promote peace and security as the basis for addressing poverty reduction and human rights in Africa;
     
  • Phase IV: to contribute to enhanced conflict prevention and good governance through strengthening the ability of African institutions to engage in preventive diplomacy, mediation, and democratisation engagement on the continent.

Also, the main assumption underlying the programme remained the same, namely that peace and security are prerequisites for development in Africa. In addition, regional organisations that are mandated to act as facilitators for peace and security on the African continent remained the key beneficiaries of the APP. The overall programme objective as identified by the mid-term review of the APP III therefore best captures the programme’s main objective and underlying assumptions:

To support the structures and processes that will enable Africa to address peace and security challenges and thereby promote poverty reduction and human rights.[40]

3.2 Conflict and peace on the African continent

The incidence of violent conflict has steadily increased in Africa since the end of the Cold War, making it the most unstable continent in the world. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), Africa was home to more than 75% of the global total of violent conflicts between 1990 and 2015. The UCDP finds that Africa has witnessed an estimated 630 conflicts in this period, and that while the number of conflicts seemed to reduce between 1990 and the early 2000s, an upward trend manifested itself since 2010. It also finds that while armed conflicts have been registered in approximately 30 African countries, about three-quarters have occurred in just seven countries: The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.[41]

Most conflicts on the African continent can be labelled as protracted violence, or ‘repeat civil wars’. Some 90% of all civil wars worldwide were such repeat civil wars at the beginning of this century, with most occurring in the Middle East and Africa. With the exception of Libya, every civil war that started since 2003 was a continuation of a previous one.[42] This not only raises serious questions for policy makers and organisations involved in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, it also raises questions about more traditional approaches in response to conflict (military interventions or sanctions, for example), which seem to be less effective. Partly, this problem of repeat civil wars is caused by the political order in many of the countries that are experiencing these conflicts. With governments, leaders and elites only held accountable to the public in a limited way, situations arise that make societies more susceptible to conflict. Poverty is often mentioned as a key variable in this regard.[43] In reality however, poverty is not a sufficient explanatory variable for war or conflict. The combination of bad governance, democratic deficits (accountability mechanisms lacking), minority rule, and resulting poor state performance seem more relevant causes of conflict.[44] Though these factors often coincide with poverty, it is important to recognize them as separate.

Reference is also often made to the shift from ‘traditional’ interstate conflict towards intrastate conflict, in particular on the African continent. The label of interstate and intrastate conflict suggests well-defined and functioning political territorial units. However, this is not always the case. In cases where the state is weak, where the central government fails to control all of its territory, where security forces are unprofessional or inadequate, and where dispute resolution mechanisms (other than the use of force) are lacking, the state is often part of the problem. In such circumstances, new actors such as paramilitary groups, criminal gangs and terrorist organisations can challenge government. Whereas some of these actors may have a clear structure and agenda, others may lack such characteristics. More traditional conflict resolution approaches may no longer apply, and new approaches may have to be developed to engage a wide range of non-state actors – warlord factions, tribes, clans, or militias – as well as security forces (police, military) of the state.

In reality, there is an increased hybridity of conflict, where conflicts are influenced by regional developments and cross-border processes, therefore rarely remaining confined to the territory of just one state.[45] Most so-called intrastate armed conflicts in Africa could be more accurately labelled as ‘internal conflicts with important internationalized economic, political and military components’[46] both in terms of regional actors and interlocking political and economic agendas, as well as the wider geopolitical power balance (proxy wars). For this reason, issues like cross-border military operations, transnational organised crime and irregular migration are considered in this evaluation, focusing on the role and the effectiveness of the AU and the RECs in this regard.

However, the primary origins of many conflicts ultimately remain largely domestic in nature, which means that (sub)national social, economic and political processes are key foci for analysis, reflection and action.

Most of the causes of conflict have largely remained the same over the last decades. Competition over resources, territory, the state or people continue to ignite and recur the bulk of violent conflict, impacting large groups of people but securing power and wealth for only a few. The Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Impact Report finds that conflicts across the continent in 2016 were driven by issues related to: national power (22%); system/ideology (20%); subnational predominance (19%); resources (17%); autonomy (9%); secession (6%); and territory (4%).[47] Regionally, there are interesting differences to be noticed on the African continent. The large majority of conflicts in North Africa took place at the level of medium to high intensity, with conflicts in this region predominately being fought over system or ideology (i.e. violent extremism). The major conflict drivers in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, were national power (23%), subnational predominance (20%) and resources (18%). Here, system or ideology was only fought over in 14% of conflicts.[48]

Even though many armed conflicts at the subnational level stem from localized disputes over sources of livelihood, often related to environmental issues such as access to land and water,[49] one of the most important factors contributing to the level of intrastate violence and conflict is the level and character of governance, particularly the level in which people experience freedom to hold their government accountable. Freedom House identifies a negative trend in this accountability, noting that African countries are becoming increasingly less ‘free’ in this regard (with 20 countries in the ‘not free’ category in 2016 versus 14 countries in this category in 2008).[50]

In addition, there are a number of factors that further complicate the story of conflict in Africa in the 21st century. First, conflict and instability are aggravated by demographic changes, such as population increases and urbanisation that coalesce with, and intensify struggles over, scarce resources. This dynamic that is further intensified by the consequences of climate change. In addition, the increase in irregular migration (and related human trafficking) negatively affects traditional migration patterns as an alternative livelihood protection strategy, as is common in many of the affected regions. National governments and donor countries alike are struggling to find the right balance between halting the smuggling and curbing the refugee flows, while at the same time allowing for traditional migration to continue. This creates a potentially explosive situation in already unstable regions that offer few economic alternatives, such as the Horn of Africa or the Sahel.[51] Furthermore, the influx of refugees in Europe has resulted in a surge in populist and xenophobic sentiments, further strengthened by the various violent extremist attacks such as 9/11.[52] This has resulted in a general trend where international actors focus their engagement in Africa more around their own national interests, which are increasingly driven by a security perspective (the EU’s focus on containment and the creation of a security belt around Europe is a prime example of this trend).[53]

Additional factors to consider are gender and youth. Gender, an area that the APP focuses on, remains an important issue in conflicts on the African continent. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) research shows that the countries with the highest number of reported cases of rape and gender-based violence are African FCS like Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR) and DRC.[54] The youth bulge, high rates of unemployment and underemployment, limited social mobility, easy access to small arms and light weapons, and persistent inter-group animosities are now well-understood as a dangerous mix.[55] The interrelation between youth bulges and conflict is illustrated by the fact that those countries with the youngest populations in Africa (CAR, DRC, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda and Tunisia) are also the most conflict-affected states on the continent, where young men aged 15 to 29 account for the majority of casualties from lethal armed violence.[56]

3.3 Conflict and peace in the West African region

The West African region has historically experienced continuous cycles of instability and conflict. The postcolonial history of the Sahara-Sahel is characterised by multiple waves of unrest and periods of violence. Authoritarian regimes were ushered in by coups d’état in Mali (2012 – following earlier coups in 1968 and 1991), Mauritania (2005 and 2008 – earlier coups took place in 1974 and 1984), Libya (2011), and Niger (2010 – other coups occurred in 1974, 1996 and 1999). The region also witnessed border disputes between Libya and Chad; Burkina Faso and Mali; Nigeria and Chad; and between Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and the Polisario Front. Mali and Niger experienced multiple Tuareg (federalist and secessionist) rebellions in the 1990s and the 2000s and 2010s, while Algeria remained entangled in a civil war for over a decade (1991-2002).[57] Likewise, West Africa has been plagued by regionalized civil war in Nigeria (1967-1970), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Liberia (1989-1996; 1999-2003), Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999) and Ivory Coast (2002-2007; 2010-2011); coups d’état in the Gambia and Guinea; ethnic conflict in Benin and Nigeria; insurgency in Nigeria (2004-2009) and the rise of Boko Haram (2009).[58]

Not unlike the situation on the wider continent, the chronic instability in the West African region is largely driven by the weakness of its states, the presence of inequality and greedy elites, and the proliferation of armed groups.[59] Maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, trafficking (oil, cocaine, cannabis, firearms and humans), the rise of religious extremism, political exclusion, democratic deficits, migration, and contested land tenure are additional drivers of instability in the region.[60] Moreover, food insecurity has the potential to exacerbate violence and is linked to high risk of democratic failure, protests and rioting, and the protraction of conflicts.[61]

West African states form a relatively compact regional grouping with a great population mobility, and both formal and informal cross-border trade.[62] These strong connections deepen the concerns of these countries for each other’s stability and increase the potential for spill over of conflicts.

Over the past decade, three cross-border phenomena – conflicts over natural resources, proliferation of organised crime and armed extremism – have arisen that contribute to instability in the region. First, confrontations between herders and farmers are becoming more frequent and violent.[63] At the base of these conflicts lies competition for increasingly scarce resources (such as land), proliferation of weapons in the region, failure of traditional adjudicative mechanisms to resolve tensions between herders and farmers, and clashes between the sedentary culture of the farmers and the nomadic culture of the herders.[64] Second, the proliferation of organisational crime – and the emergence of Latin American drug cartels in West Africa in particular – has become a game changer in regional conflicts. Northern and Central Mali exemplify this phenomenon. In Mali, increased fragmentation of armed groups has become intertwined with local and communal land and resource conflicts, all funded through drugs and other forms of trafficking.

This fragmentation stands in the way of efforts at conflict resolution.[65] Third, armed extremism has become an additional conflict layer on top of these new drivers of conflict. Boko Haram, which originated in the Nigerian state of Yobe as a protest movement to the state governor’s corruption, is now an ultra-violent movement operating in the north of Nigeria and in the Diffa region of Niger. Around 240,000 people fled Nigeria and have been forced to live in camps in Diffa.[66] At the same time, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Sudan currently face the creation and expansion of armed groups influenced by Wahabist and Salafist extremist thought.[67] Such groups are particularly mobile and carry out operations in the Sahelo-Saharan region with great ease (not only military, but also illicit trafficking).[68] Their mobility is further enhanced by wide social networks that allow them to organise across borders (and to strike where the state is weakest) in a way that is unparalleled by groups in other fragile nation states that constitute the region.

3.4 Conflict and peace in the East African region

The Horn of Africa (HoA) is one of the most unstable regions in the world. The region is characterized by porous borders, interstate competition, and remains the stage for large pockets of state fragility as well as ongoing protracted violent conflict. At the historical crossroads between Asia, Europe and Africa, the Horn of Africa has always been a fault line of shifting geopolitical centres of power and influence and maintains a legacy of violent conflict and foreign involvement in local affairs. While specific actors, interests and drivers of conflict have shifted in the wake of decolonization and the Cold War, the nature of regional conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa has arguably remained the same. Conflict drivers vary from conflicts over natural resources to religious extremism.

The Horn of Africa is blessed and cursed with a range of natural resources that have historically formed a problematic driver of local and regional conflict. Issues relate not only to resources access and extraction rights, but also to market access. Though in pre-colonial days, ivory, slaves, spices, and gold were the main commodities extracted from the region, we now see a dependence on income generated from crude oil, teak, and other minerals. These commodities are extracted from the peripheral backwaters and transported downstream to the Nile or to the ports of Mombasa, Zanzibar, Mogadishu, and Djibouti. The Nile is the longest river in Africa and connects at least four[69] of the eight countries comprising what is now considered the Horn of Africa, and has therefore often been a source of conflict. For example, the controversial Jonglei Canal plan has been cited as one of the main proximate triggers of Sudan’s second civil war.[70] With the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia tensions have risen again, as the Egyptian and Sudanese governments fear losing control of the Nile, which serves as their major water supply.[71] In a similar vein, conflicts between pastoral groups and agriculturalists on resource use remain. In Kenya for instance, the most prominent conflicts revolve around livestock in general. Such conflict including disputes over grazing land due to the high premium placed on livestock and livestock products, expansion of agricultural land, commercialization of pastoralism and agriculture, and episodic droughts and food insecurity.[72]

Ethnic identity politics can also act as a driver of conflict as the examples of Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda (Karamojo) show. In Rwanda, ethnic identity politics and the clash between pastoralist groups and agriculturalists led to one of the biggest genocides in modern history. The hierarchical power structure of ethnic identities in Rwanda between the Tutsis (pastoralists) and Hutu (agriculturalists) was used as narrative by the Hutu government for mobilizing resources, institutions and organised armed groups – in particular unemployed youth – to participate in a genocide against all Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity.

Conflicts are also driven by geopolitical agendas. Like many other parts of Africa, the Horn of Africa was the stage for many bloody proxy wars fought during the Cold War between the US and its allies against the USSR and its allies. The Eritrean war of independence (including the prelude to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war in 2000), the first and second Sudanese civil wars, and the military government under Siad Barre in Somalia are all examples of such proxy wars. In addition, separatist non-state armed actors receiving support from competing regional powers, who are in turn backed by foreign interests, have been at the centre of many conflicts in the Horn of Africa. For example, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan was first supported by socialist Ethiopia and based much of its identity on other socialist movements such as South Africa’s African National Congress, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola. After the end of the Cold War, the SPLA aligned itself with the US and Israel, as its main ally against Khartoum was rapidly falling out of favour with the West. This shows how a local conflict whereby a marginalized group takes up arms to fight for more autonomy is quickly hijacked by regional, and by extension global, geopolitical interests. It is interesting to note, however, how quickly alliances and interests in these proxy configurations can shift. The Horn of Africa has witnessed the emergence of more armed non-state actors than any other part of Africa. In fact, the term non-state may be misleading considering how swiftly so many non-state actors were incorporated into (state) power, and how former state actors defected to becoming non-state armed insurgents.

Religion has always played an important role in shaping the cultural identities and socio-economic relationships between wide ranges of communities in the Horn of Africa, and recently the role of Islam has been especially influential in this respect. Islam features in a diversity of ways throughout regional conflicts, and it is particularly important to differentiate the role of political Islam as separate from that of violent Islamic radical extremism. For example, Sudan offers an instance of political Islam, where the rise of Omar Al Bashir and his National Congress Party has been appropriated into a mechanism of state control. Somalia demonstrates an example of Islamic radical extremism, where the rise of religious, extremist non-state actors such as Al-Shebab signify a fragmentation of state control. Notably, the cases of Sudan and Somalia also demonstrate that regional responses to religious movements are often deeply interwoven with foreign geopolitical interests. Both the positions of the main incumbent political force in South Sudan (the SPLA) and the transitional government in Somalia are largely due to Western response to the (perceived) threat of militant Islam.

State fragility is another driver of conflict in the region. State fragility does not strictly mean a withdrawal of the state and lawlessness. Rather, fragility is a situation in which the lines between state and non-state, or licit and illicit, become blurred. This is characteristic for some parts of the HoA. In South Sudan, for example, the largest corruption scandals take place through the Government of South Sudan’s procurement offices as well as its military supplies and services. Another example is Somalia, where piracy has become a lucrative business – in fact, a multimillion dollar enterprise – and the waters off the coast of Somalia are considered among the most dangerous shipping lanes in the world. While the world’s attention lies primarily on prosecuting pirates and mobilizing naval forces, the actual challenges are ashore: the rise of piracy has primarily been driven by the non-functioning political system, poisoned waters, illegal fishing, poverty and lack of job opportunities.

3.5 The African Union’s response to conflict

The African Union (AU) was established in 2002 on the foundations of the post-colonial continental body the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and consists of 55 member states. Its overall mandate is to promote political cooperation, peace and security, and economic integration in Africa. In 2004, the AU in collaboration with the RECs established the so-called African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA evolved in the late 1990s, when the African continent was confronted with severe crises such as the civil war in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda. At the time, the statutes of the OAU did not allow intervention in the inner affairs of another state. In order to be able to intervene in situations of severe human rights violations, the member states of the OAU decided to establish the AU and subsequently the APSA. Through the APSA, it is the AU’s purview to prevent, manage and resolve crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the African continent.[73] The approach of the AU to conflict prevention includes: 1) structural prevention aimed at reducing the possibility of conflict by supporting ‘the balancing of political, economic, social and cultural opportunities among all segments of society, contributing to the strengthening of democratic legitimacy, the effectiveness of governance institutions, peaceful conciliation of group interests and bridging of dividing lines among different segments of society’[74]; and 2) operational prevention consisting of ‘actions designed to address the proximate or immediate causes of conflict, normally taken during the escalation phase of a given conflict.’[75]

AU institutions have help curbed the harmful trans-boundary effects of violent conflicts in Africa. However, the underlying causes of these political and security crises remain largely unresolved and that solutions in the sphere of peace operations are strongly militarised.[76] The establishment of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in 2011 is therefore complementary to the APSA, as it coincides with the rise in the number of attempts to remain in power through amendments to the constitution by an African sitting head of state. This has inspired attempts by the AU to promote a ‘shared values agenda’ in an attempt to develop frameworks across countries to promote a common approach and good practices to governance. These shared values include inter alia human rights and the rule of law, democratic governance, constitutionalism, gender equality, youth empowerment, development, environmental protection, popular participation democratic elections and durable solutions to humanitarian crises.[77] One of the objectives of the AGA is to facilitate joint engagement and deepen synergy with the APSA in strategic interventions: preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and post-conflict, reconstruction and development in Africa.[78]

Whereas previously the OAU and many of the RECs had already been involved in managing or resolving violent conflicts and some of the political crises on the continent, the effects of these efforts were limited due to the fact that most members strictly adhered to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference. The AU has a much stronger mandate, embracing the principle of non-indifference to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. It also has a voluntary mechanism that calls on the soft power of peer pressure on matters of good governance and democracy.[79] By the end of 2016, the AU was involved in most peace operations in the continent, gaining acknowledgement ‘for its capacity to conceptualise, plan and deploy conflict management tools that take the form of peace-support operations and peace enforcement.’ [80] However, the political and operational burden to take the first steps in managing escalating conflicts is still placed on regional lead countries and RECs, such as ECOWAS.[81]

Overall, the capacity and willingness of the AU and RECs to intervene in violent conflicts on the continent has increased; there is more active and visible engagement of African states and regional organisations in strengthening peace and security in Africa. This increased engagement is especially visible in the development and operationalisation of APSA’s (and AGA’s) central instruments for conflict prevention (mediation and early warning), conflict management (peace operations) and post-conflict reconstruction and development.[82]

The AU often welcomes initiatives aimed at tackling regional challenges, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) initiated by Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria aimed at neutralising Boko Haram. The AU also supports actions taken by individual members and often joins these initiatives, such as in the case of the Algeria-led mediation for Mali. However, the AU is powerless in face of new interventions being built on top of pre-existing ones. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) tried to remedy this situation in its statement on the so-called G5 Sahel (the EU-backed, five-nation joint counterterrorism taskforce on the Sahel, framed as an ‘alliance of the willing’), by requesting that references to the PSC Protocol, the AU Strategy for the Sahel Region and the Nouakchott Process be introduced before new interventions take place. However, it is unlikely that these additions will be enough to assert the AU’s authority, since the region has stopped being a priority on PSC’s agenda since 2016.[83] In light of these developments, the African Standby Force (ASF) and the ECOWAS Standby Force are often overshadowed by external interventions in the region.

Similarly, with regard to Mali, the AU followed up its efforts with a proposal for the creation of an intervention brigade that could engage in an anti-terrorist offensive in the country, which the UN-coordinated Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali’s (MINUSMA) classical peacekeeping mandate does not allow for.[84] Despite the timely nature of this proposal, Western powers stood in the way of its realisation. France, for example, has long worked outside the APSA mechanism to exert influence over the security aspects, as it considers the Sahel to be of strategic value.[85] Since the start of the conflict in Mali, France engaged militarily (upon Malian invitation) on a bilateral basis, rather than by strengthening the AU’s African-led International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA).[86] In addition, the G5 Sahel proposes itself as a parallel structure to the ASF, appropriating the APSA without being under any AU authority.

Finally, to address many of these challenges, upon the request of the AU Assembly (2016), President Kagame is currently overseeing a reform of the continental architecture (which is expected to be finalized by January 2019[87]). This reform addresses both the ‘crisis of implementation’ (i.e. the gap between the vast AU agenda and what actually gets implemented at national and regional levels) and the ‘over dependence on partner funding’ with yearly contributions from member states to the AU remaining far below what is budgeted, unpredictable and insufficient, as the AU ‘still has to be made fit for purpose’.[88] It will be important for future APP programming to take the outcomes of this reform process into account, as they are expected to affect the way in which the APP can work with the AU (and the RECs) going forward.

3.6 The ECOWAS response to conflict

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is the largest sub-regional organisation in Africa comprised of 15 member states.[89] When it was established in 1975 via the Treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS first and foremost was set up as an organisation mandated to promote economic integration in the region. However, ECOWAS increasingly also focused on addressing issues of conflict and instability in West Africa. As a REC recognised by the AU, ECOWAS is meant to be a region governed in accordance with the principles of democracy, rule of law and good governance – and is a formal partner in implementing the APSA and the AGA.[90]

ECOWAS has the ‘most sophisticated peace and security architecture on the African continent’ and is a pioneer in the supervision of political practices and the exercise of power in its member states.[91] ECOWAS shapes its peace and security mandate through the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). The ECPF defines conflict prevention in terms of operational prevention – such as early warning and response, mediation and peacekeeping through the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) – and more structural prevention consisting of peacebuilding through political and institutional reforms, peace education, etc.[92] Within the operational prevention line of work, ECOWAS has developed a sophisticated Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) that collects information on potential conflict dynamics from the member states, making use of formalised agreements with civil society organisations. However, the 2012 Malian crisis showed that collecting reliable information on conflict dynamics is of little use if governments are unwilling to act upon detected threats and to share relevant information. In the aftermath of this crisis, ECOWARN has therefore moved towards establishing national response centres to promote member state ownership over conflict prevention.[93]

ECOWAS has promoted peaceful electoral transitions and the enforcement of electoral results. Since 2004, ECOWAS acted as an observer in all West African elections but the 2011 presidential elections in The Gambia.[94] It has been noted that ECOWAS contributed significantly to peaceful transitions in countries such as Ghana (2008), Guinea (2010), Benin (2011) and Liberia (2011).[95] In addition, ECOWAS sanctions, mediation efforts and threats of military force resulted in the enforcement of electoral results in the cases of Ivory Coast (2010-2011) and The Gambia (2016).[96] In a similar vein, ECOWAS helped install an interim government in Burkina Faso following the ousting of long-time President Compaoré (2014-2015).[97] Although two-thirds of ECOWAS member states are considered less than fully democratic regimes, and good governance remains an issue,[98] a clear normative shift has been visible in the region towards the regular election of new presidents into office.[99]

When it comes to conflict resolution and conflict management, however, ECOWAS has shown that its diplomatic influence often lacks military weight and the ability to push through necessary governance and security reforms. Throughout the 2000s, for example, ECOWAS intervened in Guinea Bissau in a timely and effective manner. Its permanent presence in the country, which allowed for the mediation between political and military actors, and the facilitation of satisfactory and non-violent elections (2005, 2008, 2009, 2014), resulted in the diffusion of political tension before its escalation into lethal conflict. ECOWAS was less effective however, at progressing with security sector reform in the country.[100]

In the last five years, ECOWAS has seen itself confronted by new crises that extend beyond its geographic area (such as in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions) and in regions where it has limited impact, experience and influence (such as the desert terrain of Northern Mali).[101] The regional response to these security challenges has been mainly one of harnessing new regional multilateral security and counter-terror institutions and strategies (such as the eleven-nation, Algerian-led but African Union-coordinated Nouakchott Process; the EU-backed, Sahel regional coordination body G5 Sahel; the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in charge of securing the Lake Chad region’s borders against Boko Haram; and the Liptako-Gourma Authority, which was modelled after the MNJTF to secure the contiguous areas of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger).[102] A common criticism of these regional responses is that they address the violent symptoms of these dynamics rather than their underlying causes. The increased shift in G5 Sahel operations from development to security measures and the inability of ECOWAS to create an effective regional cooperation structure addressing transnational organised crime are cases in point.[103] At the same time, the militarised response to these dynamics has been rife with regional coordination problems and a proliferation of security initiatives – showing a strong mismatch between the ability of radical armed groups to organise across borders and the fragmented regional response.

There are several deficiencies ECOWAS suffers in relation to its peace and security mandate. First, ECOWAS’ actions are hampered when a conflict takes place on the outskirts of the ECOWAS region or is driven by the involvement of armed groups with ties that extend across borders, particularly those with ties outside the ECOWAS region. This is not only the case in northern Mali (as described above), but also in the Lake Chad Basin, where Boko Haram’s activities expand across the region’s and ECOWAS’s border areas.[104] Boko Haram has increasingly forced Nigeria to turn its attention inwards. Given that Nigeria is the hegemon of the ECOWAS bloc and has often functioned as the driving force behind the organisation’s interventions, this development has negatively affected ECOWAS’s ability to act.[105]

Second, funding and capacity issues remain prevalent. Although ECOWAS is the only REC that has established a formal Community Infrastructure Levy, ECOWAS still strongly depends on donor funding for its conflict prevention activities and needs to balance competing demands and priorities.[106] The formation of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) has been a slow process and its political framework, configuration and deployment capacities underperform when compared to the ESF’s formal objectives.[107]

Third, defective management and the informality of governance hamper the delivery of concrete results. ECOWAS itself identified many pervasive organisational deficiencies in its internal evaluation in the aftermath of the Mali crisis, finding that limits to its military capabilities, the rivalry with the AU over ownership of the intervention, and indecision had been some of the reasons that withheld ECOWAS from intervening.[108] Yet these same organisational deficiencies may well stand in the way of effective reform of the organisation.[109] In relation to this, it has been argued that the absence of solid compliance and accountability mechanisms within the ECOWAS structure may well be a deliberate choice, as ‘these flaws are not primarily linked to capacity issues. They reflect the existence of powers that have a vested interest in allowing many “grey zones” and space for ad hoc approaches to decision-making, resource allocation and accountability provision.’[110] As ECOWAS consists of an array of (semi-)fragile states with problematic governance practices, it will remain a challenge to make it more than a sum of its parts.

3.7 The IGAD response to conflict

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is one of eight RECs recognised by the AU and acts as a pillar of the African Union’s various continental architectures. The organisation dates back to 1993 when it was established by Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti as the Inter-Governmental Authority against Drought and Desertification (IGADD). Its mandate has since grown to include peace and security matters, although many claim this is more by chance than design.[111] IGAD currently consists of eight countries in the Horn of Africa[112] and supports its member states in their development efforts, particularly with regard to peace processes and food security. Moreover, IGAD acts as the principle regional institution for conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa. In October 2011, IGAD signed an agreement with the AU to guide the implementation of the APSA support programme in the region.

Overall, IGAD’s track record in regional peace and security matters has been fragmented, due to blurred lines between unwarranted interference and legitimate intervention, political sensitivity over sovereignty and governance issues, a deeply entrenched hard security mindset among member states, a history of mistrust and competition among member states, and capacity deficits that have not been conducive to donor perceptions. It has also not primarily been concerned with governance, even after its mandate was expanded in 1996. IGAD activities in the field of peace and security have been primarily focused on conflict prevention and early warning systems, mediation efforts, and some degree of peacebuilding, but governance, post-conflict reconstruction and development, and peacekeeping have remained the domain of the AU and other RECs.[113] It is important to note that out of all the current eight IGAD members, Somalia is the only member state that is not also a member of another REC. IGAD has thus been striving to identify its specific added value as a REC in the region, thereby focusing mainly on peace and security matters.

Two examples illustrate IGAD’s different roles on peace and security, namely the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan and the radical Islamic insurgency in Somalia.

IGAD became involved in facilitating peace negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army as early as 1993, when President Omar al-Bashir first asked neighbouring member states to help end the conflict. Between 1993 and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, which eventually paved the way for South Sudan’s independence in 2011,[114] IGAD witnessed the numerous support shifts. Support from different member states to various warring factions regularly changed, such as in 1994 and 1995 when Eritrea and Ethiopia broke off ties with Sudan and began supporting the SPLA. This contingent then together with Uganda became a regional block fighting a proxy war against Khartoum, and received significant military and financial backing of the US. A donor triumvirate comprised of the US, UK, and Norway, dubbed the ‘Troika’ kept IGAD’s Sudan peace process on the rails through the IGAD Partners Forum, and helped it secure the funding it needed, as well as an institutional home in the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With Kenya in the lead, under the auspices of IGAD, and backed by significant support and pressure of the US, a first protocol for the referendum on self-determination was negotiated in 2002, finally culminating to the signing of the CPA in January 2005. Despite the fact that regional alliances were extremely volatile throughout the period of 1993-2005, IGAD remained the institutional constant in the Sudan peace process, and thereby an attractive entry point for donor support. Many agree that without the sustained backing and pressure of the Troika, the CPA would never have materialized.[115] Conversely, the Troika would never have managed to broker the agreement without IGAD’s sustained involvement.

The world celebrated the birth of Africa’s 54th state on the 9th of July 2011; however, unfortunately South Sudan’s promising future proved to be short-lived. Gross mismanagement of the domestic economy and an economic warfare with Khartoum over oil pipeline fees devastated the fragile political settlement between rival factions. In December 2013, fighting broke out in Juba between various political and military groups, which rapidly spread to the rural areas. IGAD found itself in a familiar position with member states supporting different sides: Uganda immediately came to the political and military support of the government, while Sudan supported for the opposition (SPLM). IGAD relied on the support of the Troika once again for financial backing to bring the warring parties together. This renewed Western involvement was not welcomed by all parties however, and parallel peace talks in Tanzania brokered by South Africa and Ethiopia in particular undermined IGAD’s initial efforts. Eventually the two warring sides were brought together under the IGAD-led peace process, leading up to the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan in 2015 (ARCSS). But this again proved to be short-lived when violence broke out in Juba on July 9th, 2016, the day of South Sudan’s 5th birthday. Limited progress has been made thus far and the peace process appears to be at an impasse with economic conditions worsening and very few tangible results made by the High Level Revitalization Forum.

IGAD’s involvement in resolving the intra-state conflict in Somalia has been very different from its role in Sudan. In Somalia, the conflict resulted from total state collapse after the downfall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. The subsequent emergence of radical Islamism as a political force in Somalia brought about a regional dimension for Ethiopia and Kenya, both of whom are home to large Somali communities, and a global dimension with the US and other Western states’ concern over radical Islamist terror groups.

From 1991 to 1998 there were multiple attempts to bring warring factions together. Most notably the Ethiopia-backed Sodere process lead to the establishment of the National Salvation Council in 1997. This Council was however boycotted by the Aideed faction that controlled most of Mogadishu, and which was supported by Egypt and the Arab League. The latter parties in turn sponsored their own peace process leading to the Cairo Agreement of 1998, which undermined the Sodere process and condemned both to failure. The 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrean war further worsened the Somali prospect for peace, with both sides engaging in proxy warfare supporting different factions inside Somalia. The Djibouti-brokered Somali National Peace Conference, which lead to the establishment of the first Transitional National Government (TNG) was technically in the framework of IGAD, but was supported by external powers such as Egypt, Libya, and the Gulf States, and excluded a number of powerful Somali warlords. The TNG also did not receive the blessing from Ethiopia, which viewed the Islamist foundations and Arab backing of the TNG with suspicion.

In 2002, IGAD took a more institutional role in brokering a peace agreement in Somalia by commissioning Kenyan President Moi to work with Ethiopia and Djibouti to bring all the different factions to the table for the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, this time with financial aid of European development funds. Contrary to the Sudan peace process, the Somali process involved very limited political interference of Western powers, which was considered to be a positive factor contributing to the sustainability of positive outcomes. Finally, with the extra political support of Uganda and Eritrea, IGAD managed to broker the establishment of a Transitional Federal Charter and in 2004, the Transitional Somali Parliament elected Abdulahi Yusuf as president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Despite the fact that the TFG continues not to be recognised by the semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland in the north, and despite ensuing instability in the southern part of the country due to proliferation of radical Islamist groups like Al-Shabab, the establishment of the TFG remains one of IGADs major achievements.

In 2005, IGAD first entertained the possibility of coordinating a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), on behalf of the AU. Yet IGAD struggled to harmonise its approach with the different key players and faced a difficult time to muster the resources required. When in 2006 the US used the Security Council to oppose the deployment of regional peacekeepers, Kenya’s foreign minister declared IGASOM a failure. IGAD has not taken the lead in any peacekeeping mission since, mainly due to a lack of sustained political and financial backing. Nonetheless, IGAD member states including Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti still provide the bulk of peacekeepers for the AU Mission in Somalia.

In 2010, IGAD initiated the Peace and Security Strategy as a proactive measure to mitigate the insecurities around the region by:

  • Strengthening preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
     
  • Promoting cooperation on terrorism, maritime security, organised crime and SSR; and
     
  • Enhancing cooperation in other areas, including environmental protection, disaster management, water and energy resources, energy resources and IDPs.[116]

[38] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 9.

[39] Phase I: 2004-2009 / Phase II: 2010-2013 / Phase III: 2014-2017 / Phase IV: 2018-2021.

[40] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 2.

[41] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), available at http://ucdp.uu.se/.

[42] Barbara F. Walter, “Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59:7 (2015): 1242–72.

[43] See for instance: Jonathan Goodhand, Violent conflict, poverty, and chronic poverty, CPRC Working Paper 6 (2001). London: Chronic Poverty Research Centre, ODI / Frances Stewart, Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict, Bradford Development Lecture, University of Bradford, November 2009.

[44] Walter, “Why Bad Governance,” 1243. Ibid., 1263.

[45] Paul D. Williams, War and Conflict in Africa (Cambridge: Polity, 2nd edition, 2016), chapter 2.

[46] World Peace Foundation, Report for the African Union on African Politics, African Peace, July 2016, para. 41.

[47] Institute for Peace and Security Studies, APSA Impact Report 2016: Assessment of the Impacts of Intervention by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities in 2016 in the frame of the African Peace and Security Architecture, Addis Ababa University, October 2017, p. 15.

[48] Institute for Peace and Security Studies, APSA Impact Report 2016, p. 15.

[49] The APSA Impact Report 2016 for instance states that in 2016, nearly a fifth of all conflicts – or six out of the 28 high-level conflicts – revolved around or were influenced by resources. See: Institute for Peace and Security Studies, APSA Impact Report 2016, p. 19.

[50] Freedom in the World 2017, Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy (Washington DC: Freedom House, 2017), available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/ freedom-world-2017 / Freedom in the World 2009, The Annual Survey of Political Right and Civil Liberties (Washington DC: Freedom House, 2009).

[51] See for instance: Fransje Molenaar et al., A line in the sand: Roadmap for sustainable migration management in Agadez, Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, October 2017.

[52] With 13,488 terrorism-related incidents in 2016, versus 3,387 terrorism-related incidents in 1990 (see: https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism). Relevant for the APP, the number of terrorist attacks on the African continent has increased by more than 1,000% since 2006 (see: Africa at a tipping point, 2017 Forum Report. Mo Ibrahim Foundation).

[53] See for instance: Richard Gowan, Bordering on crisis – Europe, Africa and a new approach to crisis management, European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2017.

[54] ACLED. (2015). Sudan Leads in the Use of Rape as a Weapon of Violence in Africa. ACLED. (2015). Rape as a Weapon of Political Violence, Part 2: Where, When, and by Whom is This Tactic Used?

[55] UNFPA. 2014. State of the World‘s Population 2014: Factsheet—Youth in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 1, as quoted in Tana Forum Secretariat at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies. (2017). Tana Forum Report. No Retreat, No Surrender, p. 65.

[56] UN Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development. (2016). Young People’s Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note.

[57] OECD. 2014. An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel: Geography, Economics and Security, Paris, OECD Publishing.

[58] Omeje, K., year unknown, Conflicts in West Africa, Bundesheer, http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/sorting_out_the_mess_conflicts_west_africa_k_omeje.pdf; Annan, N. 2014. ‘Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 3(1), art. 3.

[59] Kuerschner, M. 2013. Conflict in West African States, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/15/conflicts-in-west-african-states/.

[60] Marc, A., Verjee, N., Mogaka, S. 2015. The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa. Africa Development Forum, World Bank and Agence Française de Développement.

[61] Indeed, the 2007-2008 food price crisis, led to violent food riots in Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. Bossuyt, J. 2016. Political economy of regional integration in Africa: The Economic Community of West African States. (ECOWAS) Report, ECDPM.

[62] Bøås, M. Nigeria and West Africa: from a Regional Security Complex to a Regional Security Community? In E. Braathen et al. (eds.), Ethnicity Kills? Palgrave Macmillan. p. 141.

[63] Oyama, S. 2014. ‘Farmer-herder conflict, land rehabilitation, and conflict prevention in the Sahel region of West Africa’, African Study Monographs, Suppl. 50, 103-122.

[64] Oyama, S. 2014. Op. cit.; Maiangwa, B. 2018. ‘“Conflicting Indigeneity” and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Postcolonial Africa’, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 29: 282-288.

[65] Moreover, cross-border smuggling practices are tied to border communities and ethnic groups with transnational ties that depend on transnational trade for their livelihoods and that are usually quite distant from the central state project. This makes interventions in these regions a precarious affair. Lebovich, A. 2017. Bringing the desert together: How to advance Sahel-Maghreb integration. European Council on Foreign Relations; Maiangwa, B. 2015. ‘Assessing the Responses of the Economic Community of West African States to the Recurring and Emerging Security Threats in West Africa’, Journal of African and Asian Studies, 52:1, 103-120. This latter problem is compounded by the fact that the international community’s attention has been drawn to the proliferation of irregular migration in the region. Given that irregular migration is not necessarily seen as a criminal activity by local communities – that often also depend on the age-old practice of facilitating movement across borders for their livelihoods – current efforts to stop migration flows and reinstate formal borders in the West-African region may contribute to grievances and may strengthen potentially destabilizing forces. Molenaar, F., and El Kamouni-Janssen, F. 2017. Turning the tide, Clingendael Institute.

[66] Médecins Sans Frontières 2017. ‘Niger: The burden of violence in the Diffa region’, http://www.msf.org/en/article/niger-burden-violence-diffa-region.

[67] OECD 2014. op. cit.

[68] Gow, J., Olonisakin, F. and Dijxhoorn. E. (eds.) 2013. Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Religion, Politics and Radicalisation, Routledge.

[69] From its sources: Uganda (White Nile), Ethiopia (Blue Nile), South Sudan, and Sudan.

[70] Back, 2016.

[71] Swain, 2011.

[72] Biamah, Yabann & Biamah, 2016.

[73] Organization of African Unity, ‘Constitutive Act of the African Union’, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/au-constitutive-act/.

[74] African Union Peace and Security Council 2014. ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the follow-up to the Peace and Security Council Communiqué of 27 October 2014 on Structural Conflict Prevention’, 3.

[75] African Union Peace and Security Council 2014, op. cit., 1.

[76] Jan Vanheukelom, Understanding the African Union. How to become fit for purpose? European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), 2017, pp. 5-6.

[77] Faten Aggad et al., Understanding the African Union and its Governance Agenda; African Governance Architecture and the Charter for Democracy Elections and Good Governance, ECDPM, 2017, pp. 3-4.

[78] Faten Aggad et al., Understanding the African Union and its Governance Agenda; African Governance Architecture and the Charter for Democracy Elections and Good Governance, ECDPM, 2017, p. 5.

[79] Jan Vanheukelom, Understanding the African Union. How to become fit for purpose? ECDPM, 2017, p. 6.

[80] Dersso, S. 2014. Annual Review of the African Union Peace and Security Council 2013/2014, 43.

[81] Vanheukelom, J. 2016. ‘The political economy of regional integration in Africa’, The African Union Report, ECDPM, 32; Observatoire de l’Afrique 2011. ‘The African Union’s role in the Libya and Côte d’Ivoire conflicts’, Africa Briefing Report, Brussels.

[82] Institute for Peace and Security Studies, APSA Impact Report 2016.

[83] Institute for Security Studies 2017. ‘Challenges and opportunities for the G5 Sahel force’ https://issafrica.org/pscreport/situation-analysis/challenges-and-opportunities-for-the-g5-sahel-force.

[84] This is in line with the target “Silencing the Guns by 2020”, part of the AU Agenda 2063. Institute for Security Studies 2017. ‘A new African force for Mali?’, https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/new-african-force-mali.

[85] Gain, M. 2018. ‘Challenges to the African Union’s Security Engagement in North Africa and the Sahel’, Kujenga Amani, http://forums.ssrc.org/kujengaamani/2018/01/09/challenges-to-the-african-unions-security-engagementin-north-africa-and-the-sahel/#.Wq_3Mp3waM8.

[86] Oluwadare, A. 2014, op. cit.

[87] See: https://au.int/AUReforms/implementation.

[88] https://www.tralac.org/news/article/11228-address-by-president-paulkagame-at-the-retreat-of-the-au-heads-of-state-and-government.html.

[89] Member countries making up ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo. ECOWAS initially comprised 16 member states, with Mauritania withdrawing its membership in 2000 for a variety of political and strategic reasons.

[90] http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information/.

[91] International Crisis Group 2016. ‘Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (III): West Africa’, Africa Report N°234. Also, see Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.

[92] Lucey, A. and Arewa, M. 2016, op. cit.; Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.

[93] Lucey, A. and Arewa, M. 2016, op. cit.; ICG 2016, op. cit.

[94] ECOWAS did not send a team, stating that the country did not have an environment conducive to free and fair elections. Lucey, A. and Arewa, M. 2016, op. cit.

[95] Lucey, A. and Arewa, M. 2016, op. cit.

[96] Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.; Hartmann 2017.

[97] Tejpar, J. and Lins de Albuquerque, A. 2015. op. cit.; Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.; In this latter case, accusations did abound that ECOWAS has been too slow to intervene due to prevailing personal interests.

[98] Tejpar, J. and Lins de Albuquerque, A. 2015. op. cit.

[99] Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.; As shown by Hartmann (2017), ECOWAS member state heads of state have the lowest average years in office of all the African regional organisations.

[100] ICG 2016, op. cit.; Tejpar, J. and Lins de Albuquerque, A. 2015. op. cit.

[101] ICG 2016, op. cit.; Tejpar, J. and Lins de Albuquerque, A. 2015. Challenges to Peace and Security in West Africa: The Role of ECOWAS, FOI memo 5382. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.

[102] Lebovich, A. 2017, op. cit.

[103] ICG 2016, op. cit.

[104] Albert, I. 2017. ‘Rethinking the Functionality of the Multinational Joint Task Force in Managing the Boko Haram Crisis in the Lake Chad Basin’, Africa Development 42(3). These developments show that ECOWAS has achieved very little by way of countering terrorism. Maiangwa, B. 2015. op. cit.

[105] Maiangwa, B. 2015. op. cit., Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.; Tejpar, J. and Lins de Albuquerque, A. 2015. op. cit. Also, see Francis, D. 2009. ‘Peacekeeping in a bad neighbourhood: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in peace and security in West Africa’, African Journal of Conflict Resolution 9(3).

[106] Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.; Lucey, A. and Arewa, M. 2016, op. cit.

[107] ICG 2016, op. cit.

[108] ICG 2016, op. cit.

[109] ICG 2016, op. cit.; also see Bossuyt, J. 2016 op. cit.

[110] Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.

[111] Lucey & Mesfin, 2016.

[112] Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea as an inactive member.

[113] Such as the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

[114] Back, 2016.

[115] Cosmas, 2015.

[116] IGAD Peace and Security Strategy: 2010-2014 (Final Draft), 19 January 2010.

4 Detailed overview of APP

This chapter provides a detailed overview of the APP. It first presents the APP programme level focus and the programme set up and management. The chapter subsequently presents an overview of how the APP monitors and evaluates its results. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of the various programme phases by presenting the APP expenditures per phase, followed by a presentation of the support provided to the various APP partner organisations across these phases.

4.1 Programme level focus

The APSA has consistently served as a guiding reference for the APP. In fact, since APP Phase II, the APSA has provided an overarching framework to guide the programme’s activities. In APP Phase II,; the APP aimed to support relevant individual organisations in realising their mandate defined by the APSA, with a focus on enhancing their ability to prevent conflict through preventive diplomacy and mediation, including a focus on early warning mechanisms, and their ability to manage peacekeeping and peace support operations, including a focus on the African Standby Force (ASF).[117] Denmark chose to focus the APP efforts mostly on enhancing the institutional capacity of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD, with the AU being the overarching ‘agent’ for peace and security on the continent, and the founder of the APSA, and ECOWAS and IGAD being the mandated organisations for implementing the APSA in two of Denmark’s highest priority regions on the continent.[118] With APP Phase III, the AGA was more prominently added to this overarching framework, albeit from a perspective of where the AGA is to complement the APSA, adding democracy and human rights to the outcome and impact statements of the programme.[119] At the activity level, this should result in the incorporation of political order (through AGA) as a factor influencing conflict (through APSA), and hence a factor taken into account in the identification of APP priorities and subsequent programming.

At the programme component level, the APP focused on enhancing the abilities and capacities of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD regarding preventive diplomacy and mediation, early warning, management of peacekeeping and peace support operations, free and fair elections, linkages with regional civil society/think tanks, and gender (including the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325).[120]

The inputs for achieving these outcomes were a constructive policy dialogue, financial support, and technical assistance. The APP III Programme Document stated that these three instruments were considered key in facilitating change of the organisations supported. Through financial support, Denmark aimed to enable organisations to implement their plans and thus foster the change needed. This was underpinned by technical assistance to support the change processes. Nevertheless, Phase III identified the policy dialogues and regular interaction with the organisations as the most important instrument.[121]

Throughout the various phases of the APP, support has been provided to a number of civil society organisations and think tanks to build their capacities to deliver key inputs and support to the AU and RECs. For instance, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) was considered the primary provider of capacity development to peacekeeping support operations in Africa.[122] Denmark supported this organisation under the APP with the expectation that KAIPTC would help promote greater effectiveness and improve the capacity of the various AU and REC missions.[123] In addition, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) was considered to be a key provider of early warning data in West-Africa (with a membership of over 500 West-African Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in all 15 of ECOWAS Member States), and as such Denmark supported the organisation under the APP as a key factor in facilitating early warning information and reaching out to civil society for response to crises.[124] Through the APP, Denmark also provided support to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), seeking to furthe develop and strengthen the APSA by providing timely analysis to the AU and the RECs.[125]

On the basis of its analysis, the evaluation constructed programme logic guiding the APP. This logic gradually became clearer through the evaluation. The evaluation review of documents found that Phases I and II did not rely on an explicit programme model. The Programme Document for Phase III, however, offered a semi-explicit logic model. As laid out in the Evaluation Inception Report, the reconstructed programme logic for Phases I through III suggested that by (1) supporting key African organisations with the appropriate policy dialogue, funding and technical assistance, (2) these organisations would have greater capacity to plan and execute, (3) the APSA and AGA activities would be implemented, and (4) the peace and security situation in Africa would be improved. The focus here was on institutional strengthening, in support of the ‘African solutions to African problems’ maxim. In practice, Danish officials complemented this theory of change with two additional elements that would run parallel to the formalised chain of logic. First, as an outcome of its assistance, Denmark would achieve better access to key African officials. Second, the assistance would enable Denmark to better pursue its national security and trade objectives. The evaluation found that the semi-explicit programme logic (gleaned from documents) and the implicit logic (expounded by officials) have both guided the implementation of the APP.

4.2 Programme setup and management

The APP follows a setup in which a multitude of documents constitutes the guiding framework for the programme. The APP Programme Documents set out the priorities and objectives of Danish funding for each phase.[126] On the basis of these Programme Documents, Development Engagement Documents are produced to specify Danish support to each individual partner organisation (breaking the APP down into separate ‘components’). Both the Programme and the Development Engagement Documents are developed in consultation with the APP partner organisations through inception and formulation missions. In addition, there are bilateral agreements between Denmark and its partner organisations, specifying the APP component outcomes for each phase and the specific obligations of each party. For a number of organisations, Denmark provides (non-earmarked) core funding in collaboration with other donors. In these cases, Joint Financing Agreements (JFAs) set out agreed terms and procedures for the support to the organisation as well as procedures on disbursement, reporting and auditing obligations. JFAs are also used for sub-component elements that Denmark supports in collaboration with other donors. For example, support to the AU’s Political Affairs Department is provided in collaboration with the United Kingdom, EU, Sweden, Germany, among others.

Organisations that receive support through the APP also have their own guiding documents. These include Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between the AU and the RECs delineating the collaborative relationship between the parties to achieve the objectives of the APSA. There are also MoUs supporting civil society organisations and think tanks. KAIPTC and WANEP, for instance, have both signed MoUs with the AU and with ECOWAS, making them an integral part of the APSA. Furthermore, each organisation has its own strategic plans and work plans, setting out the organisation’s objectives and priorities. Considering the overall objective of the APP, and Denmark’s ambition to support ‘African solutions to African problems’, the APP Programme and the Development Engagement Documents are supposed to follow the supported partner organisations’ priorities and strategies as closely as possible to ensure relevance and coherence. The setup of the APP therefore requires the alignment of various guiding documents.

The programme feature of the APP is particular and warrants a brief exploration. It falls within the dictionary definition of programme as “’a set of related measures or activities with a particular long-term aim’ but it is ambiguous to which extent the activities are interrelated.[127] The APP Programme Documents for each phase refer to overall ‘programme objectives’ and also ‘cross-cutting objectives’, giving the impression of a strategic, integrated set of organising features, weaving the support of several institutions into a unified whole. It is managed through a single office with a single person commanding authority over key issues, thereby furthering the image of a programme following a coherent set of management processes in pursuit of defined objectives. Through interviews, the evaluation found, however, that Danish officials engaged with the APP had somewhat contradictory views on the cohesiveness of the programme. Officials suggested the APP was simply a ‘funding stream’ that targeted institutions operating with similar objectives; the JFAs being a case in point. They rejected the notion that APP should serve as an ‘overarching programme’ bringing coherence to the individual components and support to the various institutions. At the same time, however, they maintained that all components, irrespective of their geographic location and institutional setup, should be managed from a single programme office in Addis Ababa. The rationale here was increased synergy and cohesion. Given the ambiguity found between verbal and the written accounts, the evaluation made a definitional choice in order to provide a consistent approach across the evaluation: the African Peace ‘Programme,’ for the purposes of this evaluation, would be understood as a unifying feature bringing together several activities under a single strategic, coherent ambition.

As stated in the APP I Programme Document, managing a major programme with components widely dispersed across the African continent, and in countries with no Danish representation, is not an easy task.[128] Given its continental and various sub-regional areas of focus, the APP is unique in the sense that there is no sector ministry or similar body that can assume overall responsibility for the programme as a whole. Each of the APP partner organisations contributes to the overall objective of the programme, with their own mandates and memberships and without clearly defined lines of command among them.[129]

To manage the programme, the newly established Danish embassy in Addis Ababa was given the lead role. This decision was driven by the central role the AU was expected to play in the APSA and thus also in the APP. The management objective was to achieve coherence and continuity in the process of dialogue and advocacy across the African security architecture. The embassy thus also was tasked to manage the other programme components like IGAD, ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP through a one-stop management approach.[130] As such, the embassy manages and coordinates the APP and is the main interlocutor for each of the partner organisations. The embassy is supposed to participate in all relevant meetings in the organisations supported under the APP, including: 1) partner-donor dialogue meetings and progress review meetings; 2) budget planning meetings; 3) audit follow-up meetings and 4) donor coordination meetings.[131]

Specifically, in the Phase II and III Programme Documents, reference was made to the challenges of ensuring enhanced performance of the organisations in West Africa given the geographical distance from Addis Ababa.[132] The Mid-Term Review of the APP Phase III found that the access and leverage generated through the programme was mostly utilised in the AU due to the resources available from the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa. The Review Team noted that the relationship with ECOWAS could also be cultivated from Danish embassies in the region and from departments in Copenhagen, given the high level of engagement by Denmark on West African peace and security issues.[133] However, despite having an embassy in Accra, and since 2015 also having an embassy in Abuja, the APP continues to be managed out of Addis Ababa.[134] In relation to KAIPTC however, the embassy in Accra has assisted in day-to-day management.

To ensure synergy and complementarity with other Danish activities, the embassy in Addis Ababa participates in internal meetings in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Denmark when coordination and complementarity of the APP with bilateral and regional Danish programmes are discussed.[135] The MFA is responsible for reviews of the programme. In terms of programme level quality assurance and monitoring and evaluation, programme funds are allocated for consultancy support.[136]

The MFA Africa Department has long intended to host bi-annual coordination (video conference) meetings across the entities engaged in peace, stabilisation and migration in Africa. This includes embassies as well as departments in MFA Copenhagen and the Ministry of Defence. When deemed relevant, invitations could also be extended to other government entities focusing on different thematic areas under the programmes such as CVE (e.g. Ministry of Justice) police reform (e.g. Ministry of Justice and the National Police) and others. On paper, the meetings provide a platform for binding coordination across the units by allowing for updates on the implementation of the different programmes, ensuring synergies between engagements, securing a strong link to Danish foreign policy priorities as well as development engagements, and harmonising policy dialogue across the regions. In practice, however, these meetings seldom take place and the opportunities for coordination and increased synergy are not fulfilled.

4.3 APP results monitoring and evaluation

Phases I and II of the APP were set up along the lines of a Logical Framework approach, whereas Phase III was designed on the basis of a Theory of Change (ToC) approach, a shift that reflects a broader change in the Danish aid management guidelines. During both periods, the APP relied on the regional organisations themselves to monitor progress and provide insights in the results achieved. Yet, the evaluation notes that several Programme Documents, reviews, and evaluations point to the lack of capacity in these organisations to manage such complex endeavours. The Mid-Term Review of the APP III, for instance, found that the narrative reporting submitted by the AU is very activity-based, that IGAD’s narrative reporting lacks information on outcomes, and that it is difficult to assess the contribution of ECOWAS activities at outcome level.[137] This evaluation specifically sought to verify and confirm the results reported but found that information on outputs and outcomes was often missing or of a very general nature. The Mid-Term Review recommended that the partner organisations strengthen their outcome reporting, and that Denmark supplies technical assistance to improve this capacity.[138] The evaluation notes that while the APP has continuously sought to do exactly that, the capacity is still inadequate.

On overall APP reporting, the evaluation found that the completion report for Phase II is still outstanding, causing additional concern about accountability. It is also not clear how the unspent funds for SADC in Phase I were re-allocated.

In terms of monitoring, it is particularly challenging that several programme components have been managed through a JFA modality. As a result, the reporting is not tailored specifically to Danish needs. The APP III Mid-Term review noted that while the JFA continues to be the preferred option for engagement with partners, thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing predictability, the focus should continue to be thematic areas where Denmark can make a difference. This suggests soft earmarking within the overall JFA framework, where possible.[139]

The shift from a Logical Framework approach to a ToC approach is in line with a wider trend amongst donors to work with a more flexible and dynamic results framework – specifically in relation to their engagement in complex and volatile fragile and conflict-affected settings – because this requires a results framework that is less rigid and linear in its assumed causalities. The shift is also suitable to accommodate the challenges identified for reporting on APP results and the fact that the programme is in part aimed at strengthening exactly those capacities in the African partner organisations.[140] This evaluation has assessed the results of this shift in approach, in combination with the question how to attribute the results of the various sub-programmes at the higher-level programme outcomes.

4.4 APP expenditures

To assess expenditures, the evaluation appraised the extent to which the indicative budget of individual APP phases matched the ultimate expenditures. The intention was to gain a comprehensive overview of how the APP’s expenditures had evolved over time. To support this task, Danida shared an expenditure overview of the APP I, which provided the financial amounts between the APP I’s ‘Commitment Frame’ and ‘Actually Disbursed,’ but this was incomplete. The document notes that due to missing information the costs incurred under individual objectives and APP components do not sum up to the total amount Danida ‘actually disbursed’ under APP I.

It was not possible to reproduce a similar financial expenditure overview for APP II and APP III. While the evaluation intended to compare the indicative budget included within the APP programme documents with the financial donor reports of the individual APP components, this could not be completed due to two reasons: (1) Danish funding cannot be traced as individual partner institutions (e.g. the AU) often prepare joint reports to donors and therefore specific hard data on actively level and outputs of individual donor contributions cannot be extracted, and (2) while the APP’s indicative budget matches the objectives, output and activities set forth within the programme documents, the donor reports produced by partner institutions are based on their own cost centre structure and allocations (i.e. the objectives the AU sets out for itself to meet), and thus do not directly correspond with the objectives the APP has set.

In view of the above, the evaluation has thus exclusively used the indicative budgets found within the APP Programme Documents to preserve the ability to assess how APP expenditures have evolved under each APP phase.

Funding for the APP has remained relatively stable across its life cycle, i.e. DKK 248 million for Phase I; DKK 250 million for Phase II; and DKK 210 million for Phase III (or DKK 230 million if the DKK 20 million carry-over of funding from Phase II is included). For Phase IV however, funding decreased to DKK 200 million, as shown by Figure 1.

Figure 1 APP Funding for Phase I-IV (DKK million)

Figure 1 Source: MFA. Annex A.
Note: APP III the shaded area represents an additional DKK 20 million carried over from APP II, under the ECOWAS component.

Regardless of the phase, the bulk of the funding has always been allocated to the AU,[141],followed by the two principal RECs across West and East Africa: ECOWAS and IGAD respectively. These organisations are also the only ones that have received funding under each programme phase.

The following sections provide a financial overview and programme account of each APP phase. Each financial diagram presents how the respective programme expenditure was split between organisations and by thematic focus[142]. The final section captures the programme expenditures across the entire life cycle of the APP, allowing the evaluation to reflect on if and how the strategic focus has changed over time.

APP Phase I 2004-2009

Financials

Figure 2 APP I 2004-2009. Indicative Budget (DKK million)

Figure 2 Source: Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) 2005-2009 Programme Document, May 2004, p. 88.

Phase overview

The APP I sought to support building the African security architecture and enhancing peace and security in Africa across four regional organisations. In addition, three distinct activities guided the strategic direction of the APP I. The Programme Document stated that the choice of strategic focus is a function of immediate challenges, African priorities, interventions by other partners and most urgent needs. These were:

  • Support for operationalising conflict prevention in Africa;
     
  • Support for building the African security architecture, in particular establishment of the African Standby Force;
     
  • Support for operationalising the cooperation between civil society and the regional organisations in conflict interventions.

Each strategic focus guided the programming of all four APP components, with each component dedicated to a single organisation (e.g. Component 1 links solely to the African Union). While the APP I’s indicative budget was not sufficiently clear-cut to effectively split individual expenditures by thematic focus, Figure 2 provides a first view on how, nevertheless, the three strategic directions were reflected within programming. For example, each component included a sub-component on ‘operational support’ for either conflict prevention or peace and security. Additionally, the AU and ECOWAS components included sub-components dedicated entirely to civil society.

The APP I typically built upon existing support to relevant regional organisations across Africa. For example, the financially largest component (SADC) built on Danish support for the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM), the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS).[143]

APP Phase II 2010-2013

Financials

Figure 3 APP II 2010-2013. Indicative Budget (DKK million)

Figure 3 Source: Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) 2010-2013 Programme Document, September 2009, p. 30.
Note: Other* - includes programme monitoring, reviews etc.

Phase overview

The APP II’s overall objective was to channel support to four key African inter-governmental organisations (AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and EASBRICOM). The programme provided additional funding to several associated organisations with niche expertise on peace and security issues.

Crucially, the Programme Document stated that the formulation of the APP II was based on a broader view of peace and security than its predecessor.[144] In line with the evolving agendas of partner organisations, the programme supported their conflict prevention role beyond the previous focus on operational prevention to address more structural aspects. The APP II’s strategic focus therefore built upon two thematic areas and a crosscutting programme-related element:

  • Theme 1: Support to the further development and application of the APSA;
     
  • Theme 2: Support to institutional capacity building efforts;
     
  • Cross-cutting: Reducing the transaction costs of assistance.

The APP II was influenced by the application of the principles contained within the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. As such, the APP II dedicated itself to simplifying its programming, for example, by use of joint approaches such as Joint Partnership Agreements (JPAs), between regional organisations and their international donors.

The two thematic areas were reflected in the indicative budget of the APP II, as shown by Figure 3. It is clear that a balance had to be achieved between the provision of support to peace and security issues to enhance the development and application of the APSA, while equally improving the institutional capacity of each regional organisation.

The end of SADC funding is the most significant example of change within APP programming. The APP II’s Appraisal Report mentioned that direct support to SADC, ‘did not materialize’, given the political problems in SADC – not least Zimbabwe’s role within the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.[145] Hence the APP II shifted its geographic scope towards West and East African organisations. These were chosen based on past experience and the perceived opportunities for synergy effects with other Danish development assistance across the respective sub-regions (i.e. the Horn of Africa for IGAD and the Sahel for ECOWAS).[146]

APP Phase III 2014-2017

Financials

Figure 4 APP III 2014-2017. Indicative Budget (DKK million)

Figure 4 Source: Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) 2014-2017 Programme Document, June 2013, p. 22.
Note: ECOWAS* - Shaded area reflects the DKK 20 million (DKK 18 million + DKK 2 million) carry-over from APP II; Other** - Includes programme monitoring, reviews etc.

Phase overview

The APP III was built upon the foundations laid by its two predecessor programmes. Similar to the APP II, the third phase also sought to strengthen the capacity of the AU and key African regional organisations (IGAD and ECOWAS) to implement the APSA. Also, the geographical scope set out under the APP II (West and East Africa), remained the same. The leadership role of the AU as the paramount African organisation with the primary responsibility within the APSA was reinforced under APP III – as was the AU’s leadership role vis-à-vis the AGA. A considerably larger amount was therefore allocated to the AU compared with the APP II and the other individual organisations.

In addition, the APP III focused on three strategic outcomes at the thematic level. These outcomes were based on the AU Strategic Plan and included:

  • Enhanced implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture;
     
  • Improved capacity of the AU and RECs to deliver against their mandate;
     
  • Improved human rights and democratic governance election support (linked to the AGA).

Figure 4 splits the APP III’s indicative budget across these three strategic outcomes. Compared to the APP II, greater focus was placed on peace and security. Additionally, funding for capacity building activities decreased, not only due to the inclusion of a third strategic focus but also a shift towards more operational support.

APP Phase IV 2018-2012

Financials

Figure 5 APP IV 2018-2021. Indicative Budget (DKK million)

Figure 5 Source: Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) 2018-2021 Approved Budget, 2018.
Note: Other* includes unallocated funds (DKK 8 million) and expenditures for programme monitoring, reviews etc. (DKK 10 million).

Phase overview

Under the APP IV, funding focuses on areas that demonstrated good traction and showed results in earlier phases, e.g. funding for preventative diplomacy, mediation, election support and to a certain extent gender.[147] Figure 5 shows how these areas are captured under the APP IV; preventive diplomacy and mediation fall under peace and security, while election support remains as a standalone category and gender is categorized under cross-cutting issues.

As opposed to its predecessors, the APP IV focuses on funding targeted assistance towards thematic areas rather than organisational capacity building. The decrease in funding for capacity building, as shown in Figure 5 bears testament to this. The APP IV Inception Report justifies this decrease as due to the ‘substantial funding’ available from other donors, ‘especially the EU.[148]

The APP III Mid-Term Review identified that current partners (AU, ECOWAS, and IGAD) remain the crucial parts of the APSA and AGA.[149] By striking a greater funding balance between peace and security on the one hand, and election support on the other, the APP IV straddles the APSA and AGA sphere, encouraging greater interaction between these two frameworks. Furthermore, while peace and security remain the prime area of focus, election support has become a key objective of the AU, ECOWAS and to a certain extent IGAD, providing additional justification for their support.[150]

The APP IV Inception Report observed that under the APP III the role of civil society and think tanks had become less clear.[151] Rather than identifying them as separate programme components, under the APP IV, smaller organisations are supported through a single component aimed at providing niche expertise on peace and security. The division of this budget line is not set up front, allowing for more flexibility in terms of identifying the required niche expertise, but also affecting the predictability of funding for the expert organisations. Finally, the budget of the APP IV remains substantially in the AU’s favour, which reconfirms the importance Denmark places on the AU with regard to peace and security.

APP Overview Phases I-IV

Based on the financial review of the individual phases, this section assesses whether the thematic priorities and the choices of partners combine into a coherent programmatic narrative and logic across the life cycle of the APP. Figure 6 below provides an overview of the thematic choices.

Figure 6 APP Phases II-IV – Budget distribution by thematic focus

Figure 6 Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases II-IV.
Note: for phase I, the indicative budget was not defined enough to split expenditures across specific thematic focuses; Other* includes unallocated funds and expenditures for programme monitoring, reviews etc.

Even when omitting the APP I in the diagram above, it is clear that the APP mainly focused on three thematic areas throughout its lifetime: peace and security, capacity building, and election support. While peace and security has remained the core focus, funding emphasis across these overarching themes has become increasingly balanced as the programme has matured. The considerable increase in funding for election support underlines this, even as the overall funding for the APP has decreased over time.

In a practical sense, the support to ‘structures and processes’ means that the APP focuses on enhancing the capacity of selected regional organisations that together form the pan-African peace and security architecture. Ideally, the AU and the RECs work together to achieve their joint objectives under the concept of subsidiarity.[152] Figure 7 below highlights the commitment the APP has made to what it sees as the critical regional organisations (the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD) to develop a strong continental architecture.

With regard to funding for the management of the programme, including funding for reviews, programme coordination, and monitoring, it is worth noting that this budget line was nearly tripled from Phase I (DKK 5 million) to Phase II (DKK 14 million) and then lowered again for Phase III (DKK 8 million). For this budget line, the graphs show only DKK 2 million for Phases III and IV because they were then fully incorporated into the engagement with AUC. These funds were fully at the disposal of the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa.

Figure 7 APP Phases I-IV – Budget distribution by recipient organisation

Figure 7 Source: MFA. Annex A.
Note: AU* - For phase III, excludes the technical assistance and reviews (DKK 8m); ECOWAS** - for Phase III, includes DKK 20 million carry-over from APP II; Other*** includes unallocated funds and expenditures for programme monitoring, reviews etc.

In the Programme Documents, it is argued that the AU and the RECs provide platforms for advocacy and dialogue, contribute to norm-setting in the field of peace and security, and actively intervene on governance issues (election observation) and – in specific cases – on active violent crises. Furthermore, the AU and RECs are expected to be able to cut across national boundaries and add value to national and international processes in a range of topics, deriving their legitimacy from their membership and their ability to deliver on their mandates.[153] The financial analysis bears out a consistent focus on three key organisations, providing a considerable level of funding predictability to help them deliver on the APSA and AGA ambitions. Thus, while the Programme Documents underline the uniqueness of each of the organisations and the regions in which they operate, making the APP appear as a collection of programmes with separate funding channels (and separate agreements with each of the organisations), the consistent organisational and thematic focus generates the programme-unity of the APP, guided by the APSA and AGA frameworks, as illustrated by Figure 8 below.

Figure 8 APP Phases I-IV – Budget distribution to APSA and AGA activities

Figure 8 Source: MFA. Annex A. Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) 2018-2021 Approved Budget, 2018.
Note: APP III includes the additional DKK 20 million carried over from APP II, under the ECOWAS component. In this graph, the DKK 16.5 million expenditure for APP IV Cross-cutting issues is presented as if allocated in equal measure to APSA and AGA activities.

Whereas the AU had not yet established AGA at the onset of APP Phases I and II, Denmark began supporting AGA activities in Phase III with 7% of the APP budget and plans to support these activities with 27% of the total APP budget during Phase IV.

4.5 APP support to continent-wide organisations

Support to the African Union

Throughout its life cycle, the APP has continuously supported the operationalisation of the APSA. Danish support initially focused on the AU’s PSC protocol, particularly the establishment and development of the continental early warning system. Another main focus has been the development of the AU’s preventative diplomacy role, e.g. assisting the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit (Phase II) and supporting the work of the AU’s Liaison Offices (AULOs) in crisis areas. Since Phase III, in order to contribute to the goal of embedding a more responsive approach to peace and security, the APP has included a focus on the AGA, i.e. on election support and the political diplomacy surrounding elections. An important Danish focus has also been on the AU’s gender policy as a cross-cutting theme of the APP. Finally, as the organisation matured, the APP’s support for institution and capacity building has lessened.

Figure 9 Focus areas of APP support for AU Component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP I (2004-2009) 72 Peace Fund of AU
  • Operationalise AU Peace and Security Council Protocol;
  • Enable civil society to play a stronger role in conflict prevention, in particular through forging stronger ties with the AU.
APP II (2010-2013) 90.5 Mixed incl. JFA for AULiaison Offices
  • AU Programme on Peace and Security:
  • Support the operationalisation of the APSA;
  • Facilitate programme development on conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
  • Promote and coordinate programmes on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD);
  • Promote the development and stabilisation of security, political and economic systems.
  • Promote the development of effective implementation of gender policies in member states, RECs, and AU;
  • Support Institution and Capacity Building.
APP III (2014-2017) 125 (incl. 8 for Technical Assistance (TA) and reviews) Mixed incl. JFAs for Electoral support and Capacity building
  • Support the operationalization of APSA;
  • Enhancing post conflict reconstruction and peace-building mechanisms;
  • Electoral Support on good governance and democracy;
  • Institutional capacity building.
APP IV (2018-2021) 115 (incl. 8 for M&E, Reviews, and TA) Mixed incl. JFAs for Electoral support and Capacity building
  • Preventive diplomacy/mediation;
  • Elections;
  • Cross-cutting issues.

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

Support to the Institute for Security Studies

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is an African organisation which aims to enhance human security on the African continent through evidence-based policy advice, technical support, and capacity building.

It does independent and authoritative research, provides expert policy advice, and delivers practical training and technical assistance, not least to the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD. It is registered in South Africa and has additional offices in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Senegal. The ISS’s areas of work cover transnational crimes, migration, maritime security and development, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, crime prevention and criminal justice.

Under the APP, the ISS did not receive funds directly; it has never been an individual programme component of the APP but is included in the upcoming Phase IV. Denmark has, however, been providing direct support to the organisation through an African think tank support programme, which ended as the APP Phase IV was starting. For the APP Phase I-III, services and activities provided by the ISS have been funded on a case-by-case basis, in line with the APP priorities. For example, throughout the APP I, the ISS received support under the SADC sub-component supporting civil society relations within SADC security structures.[154] Interestingly, according to the APP I completion report, only partial results were achieved.[155] Under the APP II, support to ISS continued, yet as the AU wanted to maintain freedom to work together with a number of CSOs on a subject basis, so therefore funds were not earmarked for the ISS.[156] Rather, the ISS was listed as a possible CSO partner for the AU to work with.[157]

During the APP III, the ISS received direct support from the Danish embassies in Pretoria and Addis Ababa. For example, the ISS received a grant of DKK 3.3 million from the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa between 2015 to 2016 to ‘Support […] ISS’ work with the African Union, ECOWAS and IGAD’. While not part of direct APP funding, the grant was justified on the grounds that ISS activities were, ‘in line with the priorities and objectives of the Danish Africa Programme for Peace III.’[158] Under the think tank component of the APP IV, the ISS is set to receive funds allowing it to continue to contribute valuable analysis and training to the AU for the APSA and AGA.

Support to the Institute for Peace and Security Studies

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), established in 2007, is an Ethiopian think tank linked to the Addis Ababa University (AAU). The IPSS offers various educational programmes in cooperation with the AAU focusing on peace, security, human rights and global studies. The IPSS also hosts conferences and forums with the aim to disseminate their research and expertise on peace and security in Africa. The Tana High-Level Forum, established in 2009, meets annually and brings leadership from all sectors to work on an African-led security agenda. Additionally, in cooperation with the AU the IPSS leads the Africa Peace and Security Programme, which seeks to resolve Africa’s peace and security issues through an intellectual approach with African-centred solutions.

The IPSS is not funded by the APP directly. Rather, services and activities provided by the IPSS are funded on an individual basis. For example, in 2012 the IPSS provided long-term training on peace and security issues to the AU. Under APP IV, IPSS has been allocated DKK 650,000 under a newly established think tank component.

Support to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Established in 1958 by the UN’s Economic and Social Council as one of the UN’s five regional commissions, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)’s mandate is to promote the economic and social development of its member states, foster intra-regional integration and promote international cooperation for Africa’s development. Made up of 54 member states and playing a dual role as a regional arm of the UN and as a key component of the African institutional landscape, UNECA is well positioned to make unique contributions to address the continent’s development challenges.

Danish funding to UNECA began external to the APP. Denmark, together with Sweden and the United Kingdom established a JFA to support the UNECA Business Plan (2007-2009). In addition, Denmark contributed DKK 8.2 million to the JFA and in 2006 granted an additional DKK 4.7 million in support of UNECA’s programmes for strengthening of the African countries’ negotiations with regard to global trade regimes (e.g. the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations). UNECA received funds only under the APP II. Within this phase, support to UNECA would allow the organisation to provide technical advisory services to the AU related to the interface between peace and security on the one hand and economic integration and development on the other hand. The available allocation was DKK 8 million for a two-year period (2010-2011) administered both as a bilateral agreement between the embassy and UNECA and later channelled through the JFA.[159]

When assessing UNECA’s provision of technical advisory services to the AU, the 2011 APP II Mid-Term Review found that it was difficult to establish whether this happened in a systematic way.[160] The Mid-Term Review noted that the AU seemed a reluctant partner, as services provided often did not match the AU’s absorption capacities and UNECA’s pace seemed too fast to truly have an added value. It was therefore recommended that the UNECA support as defined under the APP II should be reassessed when the agreement with UNECA lapsed. As a result, UNECA did not receive APP funding beyond Phase II.[161]

Support to the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), established in 1992, is a southern African regional intergovernmental organisation headquartered in Botswana. It was established with the objectives to enhance socio-economic cooperation as well as political and security cooperation among its 15 member states.[162] The main decision-making bodies and institutions are the Summit of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. SADC is led by a chair on an annually rotating principle and uses Troika formations.

In the run up to the APP I, Danish support in the Southern African region focused on the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, and the Institute of Security Studies. This support was gradually integrated into the APP and under APP Phase I, SADC was the largest recipient of funds (DKK 80 million of the total DKK 248 million budget). The support, however, soon ended. The APP I project completion report highlights the difficulties Danida had regarding the implementation of the SADC component. Of the component’s three immediate objectives, only one was implemented with satisfaction. The other two proved either to be unsatisfactory or less than satisfactory.[163]

Furthermore, the support made available for a more systematic involvement with civil society was deemed ineffective, confirming the difficulties SADC had in working with civil society at the regional and continental level.[164] At the end of the APP I, only DKK 34.7 million had been disbursed to SADC. Yet, importantly, the completion report does not mention what happened to the remaining budget (DKK 55 million).[165] In light of the above, and given the political problems in SADC – particularly the role of Zimbabwe – APP support to SADC was terminated at the end of the APP I.[166]

4.6 APP support to West African organisations

Support to ECOWAS

ECOWAS has consistently received support from the APP, aiming to strengthen ECOWAS’s capacity to provide effective leadership regarding peace and security issues affecting the West African sub-region.[167] Throughout the lifecycle of the APP, the contributions to ECOWAS have been more or less consistent in terms of size. However, contributions dropped considerably for Phase III due to the fact that ECOWAS operations were increasingly hampered by management turbulence in the ECOWAS Commission, and funding constraints (especially due to funding arrears from its major member, Nigeria). Unspent funds from APP Phase II were then carried over to Phase III.

Danish support has consistently focused on the development and implementation of the ECPF (focusing on mediation, electoral support, security governance, ECOWARN and the role of women in peace and security). In addition, support has consistently been geared towards capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission, with a specific focus on the bodies of the ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) that are involved in the development and implementation of the ECPF (such bodies include the ECPF Secretariat and the Mediation Facilitation Division). The APP contribution to ECOWAS capacity development dropped considerably for the APP III (DKK 4 million – including a DKK 2 million carry-over from Phase II) compared to the contribution made under the APP II (DKK 15.6 million). For the APP IV the contribution for capacity development increased again (DKK 12.5 million). Given the management difficulties that the ECOWAS Commission faced during the APP II, Denmark could have opted to specifically focus its support on strengthening the capacities of the Commission to deal with these difficulties, rather than mostly pulling out.

Figure 10 Focus areas of APP support for ECOWAS Component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP start-up phase (2002-2004) 7 Bilateral agreement (grant basis)
  • Support for the ECOWAS Peace Fund.
APP I (2004-2009) 66 Bilateral agreement (grant basis)
  • Operationalize ECOWAS Mechanism
    for Conflict Prevention Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping, and Security (DKK 30 million);
  • Support ECOWAS implementation of NEPAD initiative (incl. capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission) (DKK 18 million);
  • Enable civil society to play stronger role in conflict prevention (forging stronger ties with ECOWAS via West Africa Civil Society Forum) (DKK 12 million).
APP II (2010-2013) 60,1 Bilateral agreement (grant basis)
  • Implementation of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (including Early Warning support to WANEP – DKK 6m) (DKK 44.5million);
  • Capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission (DKK 15.6 million).
APP III (2014-2017) 20
(excl.
DKK 20m carry-over from APP II)
Mixed – incl. JFA for capacity building
  • Implementation of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (DKK 18 million – excl. DKK 18 million carry-over from APP II);
  • Capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission (DKK 2 million – excl. DKK 2 million carry-over from APP II).
APP IV (2018-2021) 38 Bilateral agreement (grant basis)
  • Implementation of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (with specific focus on political dialogue & mediation; and support to elections) (DKK 25.5 million);
  • Capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission (DKK 12.5 million).

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

Support to KAIPTC

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) received APP funding in Phases II and III. KAIPTC was established in 2003 as an international centre of excellence for peacekeeping training and gradually developed itself in the fields of individual and collective training and research support towards integrated Peace Support Operations (PSOs). KAIPTC was established by the Government of Ghana but operates as part of a regional group of peacekeeping institutions to serve ECOWAS, AU, and the international community. In 2007, KAIPTC signed a MoU with the ECOWAS Commission through which its role as a provider of operational peace support training in the APSA framework was recognised. In addition, the Centre recently signed a similar type of MoU with the AU in 2018.

Denmark has been supporting KAIPTC since 2005 and has provided core funding since the APP Phase II.[168] The APP contributions are based on the Strategic Plans (for 2010-2013 and for 2014-2018) that have been endorsed by the KAIPTC Governing Board (of which Denmark is a member). Support is provided via a JFA between Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and KAIPTC. The objectives identified in the JFA are in line with those of the APP. Danish funding to KAIPTC cannot be used for the military components of the Centre’s activities, as funds made available are ODA as defined by DAC. The APP documents acknowledge that the support to KAIPTC is challenged by the lack of adequate information of the organisation’s results at outcome level. Nonetheless, it is stated that the demand for PSO training remains high due to the number of peacekeeping missions on the continent. KAIPTC is considered to be the most competent organisation in West Africa in this area and the primary provider of capacity development to PSOs in Africa.[169]

Figure 11 Focus areas of APP support for KAIPTC component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP II (2010-2013) 25 JFA
  • Support to operationalization of the ECOWAS ECPF through realisation of the KAIPTC Strategic Plan 2010-2013. Key objectives of Strategic Plan:
  • Contribute to the development of a regional and sub-regional capacity in the delivery of integrated peace support operations;
  • Enhance capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution and peacebuilding;
  • Enhance understanding of critical peace and security in West Africa and the continent as a whole;
  • Create an effective management and support arrangement for KAIPTC.
APP III (2014-2017) 25 JFA
  • Enhance capacity of ECOWAS, AU, UN and other relevant actors in multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Integrated PSOs). Key objectives of Strategic Plan:
  • Enhance capacity of ECOWAS, AU, UN and other relevant actors in multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding (integrated PSOs);
  • Deepen understanding of and discourses on critical peace and security issues in Africa through research and policy engagements;
  • Contribute to knowledge creation that informs best practice in conflict prevention, management, and resolution in Africa;
  • Ensure an efficient, effective, and responsive governance and management system in the Centre.

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

Support to WANEP

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) received APP funding in Phases II and III. WANEP was founded in 1998 in response to the West African civil wars in the 1990s. Over the years, WANEP has succeeded in establishing national networks in every member state of ECOWAS with over 500 member organisations across West Africa, making WANEP a key organisation for facilitating early warning information as well as reaching out to civil society for response to crises. As such, WANEP entered into a partnership with ECOWAS in 2002 to support the implementation of ECOWARN. A MoU between WANEP and ECOWAS was signed in 2004 for five years and has continuously been renewed for five years. At the continental level, WANEP is a member of the Peace and Security cluster of the AU’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council representing West Africa.

Denmark has been supporting WANEP since 2009 with soft earmarking to its early warning programme. At first, this support was provided under the ECOWAS Component of the APP II (in which DKK 6 million was earmarked for the mobilisation of community-based resources for early warning and early response through WANEP).[170] Under the APP III WANEP became a separate APP Component. The APP III contributions to WANEP were provided on the basis of a JFA and linked to the organisation’s Strategic Plans for 2010-2014 and for 2015-2020. Up until the 1 January 2017, the JFA included Denmark and Sweden as partners to WANEP. In March 2017, Denmark signed a new JFA for WANEP, this time incorporating Austria as a new donor partner in addition to Sweden. This JFA covers the financial years 2017-2020 (with the agreement ending on 31 December 2020, unless otherwise agreed in writing between WANEP and the signatory contributing partners). The objectives identified in the JFAs are in line with those of the APP.

The APP support to WANEP was expected to enable the organisation to function as an important counterpart and partner to ECOWAS in the field of early warning and mediation. With WANEP providing the foundation for the data collection and reporting to ECOWARN, the support was considered to be linking up the APSA structure with civil society organisations.[171]

Figure 12 Focus areas of APP support for WANEP component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP II (2010-2013) (6) JFA
  • Early Warning component of APP support to ECOWAS (under Implementation of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework):
  • Provision of early warning data to ECOWARN;
  • Active civil society contribution to conflict risk reduction and resolution.
APP III (2014-2017) 10 JFA
  • Operationalize national conflict prevention mechanism in West Africa to ensure regular monitoring, analysis and responding to conflicts. Key objectives of Strategic Plan 2015-2020:
  • Strengthen capacity of peacebuilding organisations and practitioners in West Africa to engage actively in the transformation of violent conflicts through the use of non-violent strategies;
  • Develop a conflict prevention mechanism in West Africa to monitor, analyse and respond to conflicts;
  • Engender peacebuilding policy and practice in West Africa;
  • Promote a culture of non-violence and social responsibility among young people in West Africa;
  • Enhance policy formulation and influence on peace and security through regional and international linkages and advocacy;
  • Build the justice lens of conflicts to create a synergy between peacebuilding and human rights as integral to national reconciliation, conflict prevention and the protection of human security;
  • Promote and deepen democracy, governance, and human security in West Africa;
  • Strengthen WANEP’s research capacity on Peacebuilding, Early Warning, peace, and conflict prevention;
  • Strengthen WANEP programmes through documentation and Monitoring & Evaluation.

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

4.7 APP support to East African organisations

Support to IGAD

Throughout Phases I-III, the APP support to IGAD sought to strengthen the normative and institutional framework for its work in peace and security. Meanwhile, by supporting capacity building, Denmark aimed to operationalise IGAD’s role in peace and security. In Phase I, APP has also supported the African Standby Force Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (ASF EASBRICOM) support also came from the APP; it was later shifted to the PSF. In Phase IV, as IGAD has slightly matured, the APP focus on institution-building has diminished and its focus on programming has strengthened.

Figure 13 - Focus areas of APP support for IGAD component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP I (2004-2009) 20 Direct
  • Support for Operationalising IGAD Conflict Prevention;
  • Conflict Prevention Fund;
  • Support to ASF EASBRICOM Development;
  • Peace Fund Contribution.
APP II (2010-2013) 42.5 Mixed incl. JFA for Capacity building
  • Support to institutional transition;
  • Reducing pastoralist conflict;
  • Operationalize preventative diplomacy framework;
  • Broaden institutional security framework.
APP III (2014-2017) 30 JFAs for Peace & Security and Capacity building
  • Operationalize a more active IGAD role in relation to conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
  • Improving IGAD’s systems, including results-based management, resource mobilisation, communications, and interaction with member states and other stakeholders.
APP IV (2018-2021) 17 Mixed incl. JFA for peace and security
  • Preventive diplomacy/mediation;
  • Elections;
  • Cross-cutting issues.

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

Support to the East African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM)

EASBRICOM was established in 2005 in order to develop the Eastern Africa and Horn of Africa element (commonly known as the Eastern Africa Standby Force[EASF]) of the African Standby Force. The EASF is a regional mechanism consisting of military, police and civilian standby forces. Since late 2014, the EASF was considered to be fully operational with a Secretariat, with 5,000 military personnel, 700 police personnel, and 100 civilian employees. Its current mandate is to carry out the following functions: observation, monitoring and peace support missions; intervention in a member state in situations of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state; preventive deployment; humanitarian assistance; and post-conflict disarmament.[172]

During APP I, the EASF was funded through IGAD (DKK 5 million) as the REC held an interim coordination role of the force. This function, however, was transferred to EASBRICOM in January 2007, prompting Denmark to separate out this IGAD sub-component and directly channel funds to EASBRICOM. Under the APP II, Denmark continued its funding of the coordination mechanism, formulating the support as an individual programme component with the overall objective to ‘strengthen civil and police capacity within EASF’. A total of DKK 9.9 million was funded to EASBRICOM, with the force’s civilian component being allocated DKK 4.4 million and the police component DKK 5.5 million.[173] Prior to the start of the APP III, Danish support to the EASF moved from the APP to the PSF (Horn of Africa), which focuses on more immediate stabilisation and security needs and thus was a better fit compared to the APP.[174]


[117] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 2.

[118] In Phase I of the APP, support was also provided to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), in line with the fact that this was a priority region for Denmark in the 2000s. This support was cancelled in APP Phase II, partly due to the fact that Southern Africa was no longer a priority region for Denmark, and partly due to a lack of results in SADC support in APP Phase I.

[119] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 6.

[120] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 2.

[121] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 9.

[122] The other main African training centre that focuses on peacekeeping is ACCORD, based in South Africa.

[123] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 7.

[124] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 7.

[125] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 34.

[126] For each Phase, the Programme Document is preceded by a Concept Note. Given the timing of the evaluation, for Phase IV, the evaluation only had access to the Concept Note.

[127] Oxford Dictionary. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com.

[128] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Programme Document, May 2004, p. 86.

[129] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 34.

[130] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Programme Document, May 2004, p. 86.

[131] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, pp. 24-25.

[132] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 34 / Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, pp. 24-25.

[133] Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire (July 2016), p. 4.

[134] While the fact that the embassy in Abuja is not yet accredited to ECOWAS is a practical obstacle in this regard, interviews have made clear that there are no intentions to hand-over management responsibility of the West-African components of the APP to Abuja even if the embassy is accredited in due time.

[135] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, pp. 24-25.

[136] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 34.

[137] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 6 / p. 8 / p. 10.

[138] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 33.

[139] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 12.

[140] Which relates to the fact that more adaptive programming on the basis of ToCs requires a higher degree of monitoring skills and capacity, though both on the side of the recipient organisation and on the side of the managing organisation.

[141] The exception being the Southern African Development Community (SADC) component under APP I.

[142] This was only possible for Phases II-IV. For Phase I, the indicative budget was not defined enough to split expenditures across specific thematic focuses.

[143] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Programme Document, May 2004, p. 74.

[144] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 7.

[145] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Appraisal Report, June 2009, p. 14.

[146] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 10.

[147] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) – 2018-2021 – Inception Report, April 2017, p. 2.

[148] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016.

[149] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) – 2018-2021 – Inception Report, April 2017, p. 6.

[150] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) – 2018-2021 – Inception Report, April 2017, p. 6.

[151] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) – 2018-2021 – Inception Report, April 2017, p. 5.

[152] The UN Charter chapter VIII, art. 52.2 and 53.1 stipulate the subsidiarity option, whereby the Security Council may utilise, where appropriate, regional arrangements or regional agencies to deal with security issues.

[153] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 12.

[154] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Programme Document, May 2004.

[155] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report.

[156] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Appraisal Report, June 2009, p. 15.

[157] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Appraisal Report, June 2009, p. 16.

[158] Danida, signed grant agreement for DKK 3.3 million between ISS and Royal Danish Embassy in Ethiopia, October 2015, p. 3.

[159] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace – Phase II (APP III) – Review Aid memoire, April 2012. Note: The 2011 APP II Mid-Term Review noted that there was some ‘unclarity’ on the part of UNECA with regard to the integration of the Danish contribution into the ‘common’ JFA. It was later confirmed by the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa that hereinafter Danish support was channelled through the JFA.

[160] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace – Phase II (APP III) – Review Aid Memoire, April 2012, p. 17.

[161] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, November 2013, p. 71.

[162] The SADC member states are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[163] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report – p. 26-28.

[164] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report – p. 6.

[165] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report.

[166] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Appraisal Report, June 2009, p. 14.

[167] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace Phase III; 2014-2017 – Component Description: ECOWAS, Annex B (2013), p. 1.

[168] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, November 2013, p. 17.

[169] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, November 2013, p. 7.

[170] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 24.

[171] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, November 2013, p. 10.

[172] African Union. Protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and security council of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002.

[173] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 33.

[174] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 75.

5 Relevance

This chapter presents the evaluation’s assessment of the relevance of the APP, focusing on the extent to which the APP partner organisations (and through them the APSA and AGA) were suited to the (geo)political and development priorities of Denmark, and the extent to which the APP partner organisations were suited to the conflict and stability needs in Africa. The chapter will present this assessment along the lines of the geographical focus areas of the APP: the African continent (focusing on the AU), West Africa (focusing on ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP), and East Africa (focusing on IGAD).

5.1 Relevance of APP support to the AU

Danish senior officials note that it was ‘against the backdrop of a deadly decade’ with the incidence of violent conflict steadily increasing in Africa since the end of the Cold War that the APP was conceived in the early 2000s. There was real concern over protracted violence or repeat civil wars, and the creation of the AU with its strong mandate in terms of conflict management was viewed with hope from Copenhagen amidst the perception of general despair.

Meanwhile, the AU was celebrating that the continent was fully liberated from colonial influence (except for Western Sahara) but was aware that it needed to build institutional capacity to engage nations with very diverse interests. A senior AU official said that the 2002 vision was intently ‘on the institution itself and its relations with other institutions,’ and much less a longer-term strategic vision that the more mature organisation now proposes, i.e. Agenda 2063 sets bold ambitions for the continent as a whole.[175]After the establishment of the AU, Denmark was ready to support the organisation, and its pioneering stance was demonstrated in 2003 when Denmark was the first non-African state to obtain AU organisation accreditation status.

Danish investment in the AU also made sense from a larger geopolitical perspective. Denmark became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council during 2005 to 2006 and in retrospect, some Danish officials hint that this may have prompted the engagement with the AU. Though the timing of the decisions does not support this hypothesis, engagement may subsequently have further justified the increased focus on conflict prevention in Africa, while Denmark had increased influence over global conflict management through its UN seat.

Looking back over the past 15 years, APSA institutions, civil society experts and development partners, including Denmark, recognise a growing AU capacity to mitigating, reducing and preventing violent conflicts, although the continent continues to suffer from instability in many regions. The AU continues to provide critical stability in Somalia, primarily through AMISOM, but increasingly also by strengthening the AGA, most tangibly related to elections. Already in 2012 in Sierra Leone, for example, elections were cancelled, ostensibly due to the budget problems, but this caused tension and risk of unrest. In a first such governance and conflict prevention effort, the AU, in concert with ECOWAS, fundraised for the election, which subsequently was conducted peacefully. The AU has also shown success as convener. When the incumbent in the 2016 presidential elections in The Gambia refused to step down, the AU and ECOWAS facilitated talks backed by credible threats of Nigerian intervention. This resulted in a peaceful transition of power.

The AU has started to address some of the new threats to peace and stability in Africa, but so far primarily through timid statements, not action, due to the largely consensual approach in the Peace and Security Council. This function was foreseen in the APP III Mid-Term Review. The Review noted that in countering violent extremism, the AU role as a norm setter, particularly emphasising the importance of human rights and solutions involving civil society, would indeed be relevant provided that it includes mechanisms for follow-up with member states. This has not yet materialised.

Thus, while the relevance of the AU is confirmed by this evaluation, it is less clear that the APP, through its support to the AU, covers the relevant spectrum of relevant peace and security priorities. The nature of conflict has changed considerably on the African continent and it is not yet evident that the AU can lead the charge to effectively counter the threats.

5.2 Relevance of APP support to ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP

Overall, the APP support to the West African region – through ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP as its support organisations – has been closely in line with Danish development assistance and foreign policy objectives. The APP has supported the peace and security priorities identified by the organisations (as reflected in their Strategic Plans and in the various MoUs that exist between organisations). By providing longer-term, flexible funding the APP enabled the partner organisations to build capacity and develop tools and instruments (the type of activities that are increasingly difficult to fund through project-funding). The need for a regional approach to peace and security issues is increasingly relevant considering the increase of cross-national threats, and as such the APP support to ECOWAS is considered to have been highly relevant.

Now in 2018, ECOWAS shapes its peace and security mandate through the ECPF, which respondents underline has been developed in large part thanks to the Danish support. Through the provision of financial support and technical assistance, Denmark has been a driving force behind the process of developing the ECPF and its component action plans, as well as setting up a dedicated ECPF Secretariat, which is mandated to coordinate the process of operationalizing the ECPF. The APP funding currently pays for the full staff capacity of that Secretariat. With other donors coming in to support the implementation of the ECPF, one can conclude that Danish support has provided the credibility and trustworthiness need to inspire other external partners to join.

Yet when broken down into various subcomponents of the APP support to ECOWAS, a more mixed picture emerges. APP support to setting up the Mediation Facilitation Division within the ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (with APP funding currently paying for the bulk of the staff capacity of that Division) is considered relevant given the fact that mediation is considered as one of the areas where ECOWAS has proven its added value. The same would apply for the APP support to improved democracy and political governance, with a specific focus on electoral support – though it would be worthwhile to consider what Denmark’s niche is in this regard given the fact that there are many other donors active in the field of electoral support. In terms of the APP support to security governance, APP funding has been used to support the civilian components of the ESF. With the bulk of the costs of the ESF being covered out of the ECOWAS member states’ contributions, and with other donors providing substantial technical support, one can question if the APP support was complementary to these efforts. Taking into account that the formation of the ESF has been a slow process and that its political framework, configuration and deployment capacities underperform when compared to the ESF’s formal objectives,[176]and taking into account that ECOWAS has proven not to be well-equipped to deal with modern-day security challenges in the West African region, it would seem to be more relevant for support to focus on strengthening the diplomatic and conflict prevention elements of ECOWAS’s mandate.

ECOWAS officials raised the question whether the APP funding – given its flexibility and higher risk tolerance compared to other donor funding – was best used for issues like strengthening the role of women in peace and security. This criticism stemmed from the fact that Denmark is but one of many donors supporting these types of activities – with Denmark being a relatively small donor compared to USAID and the EU. Interviewees indicated that they would find it more useful for APP funding to focus on the more urgent peace and security challenges in the region – like the farmer-herder conflicts, migration, and terrorism.

As for the APP support to ECOWAS’s early warning activities, the APP has supported baseline data collections and capacity development within ECOWAS. In light of the recognition that collecting reliable information on conflict dynamics is of little use if governments are unwilling to act upon detected threats and share relevant information, ECOWAS is currently working on establishing national response centres to promote member state ownership over conflict prevention. This process has been heavily supported by USAID, next to the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and Switzerland, and one can therefore question whether the Danish support has been very relevant in this regard (in light of the needs of the organisation). However, the bulk of the APP support for early warning has been channelled to WANEP. Their activities in terms of early warning and Track II mediation are considered highly relevant to the needs in the region, with interviewees underlining that WANEP is a core element of ECOWARN (and therefore, the APSA), playing a key role in the operationalization of the system. As found by the APP III Mid-Term Review, value is particularly placed on the synergies that are being created between WANEP and ECOWAS through the APP support in terms of enhanced cooperation between non-state actors, member states and ECOWAS. Whereas the Review found that this should remain the preferred option for Danish support,[177] WANEP is no longer included in the APP IV as a separate partner organisation. However, the organisation can still receive APP funding under the budget line that has been created for civil society organisations.

With regard to the relevance of the support to KAIPTC, in general most of the trainings have been – in one way or another – relevant for the strengthening of the APSA. Though stakeholders say that KAIPTC trainings are supply-driven rather than demand-driven (as a result of donors earmarking their funding for specific courses that they themselves partly develop and implement), the APP support should in principle be demand-driven. The APP funding is indeed to be core funding for providing courses that are demanded. In practice, however, it is not clear whether KAIPTC uses the APP support solely for such trainings (which is partly due to the fact that the administrative capacity of the Centre is very weak). The mixed picture underlines the need for a more engaged and functioning Governing Board (of which Denmark is a member – represented by the ambassador in Accra and supported by the APP contract manager from the embassy in Addis Ababa). It also underlines the importance of getting to a more focused and ‘restrictive’ Strategic Plan for KAIPTC (in the sense that the plan should be drafted in a way that does not allow KAIPTC and the donors to stray from the set priorities). The new Strategic Plan is being developed now and should serve as the basis for Danish decision-making on continuation of funding (with KAIPTC no longer being included in Phase IV of the APP).

5.3 Relevance of APP support to IGAD

IGAD has played a pivotal role in the conflict resolution processes regarding two of the bloodiest and longest-running conflicts in Africa. While neither of the two conflicts has been resolved as such, IGAD’s role has been critical and thus relevant in bringing regional powers together to broker a regional response. In conversations with the evaluation, IGAD officials highlighted the regional nature of conflicts in the Horn, which in recent decades have often related to climate change and thus require regional, not national or bilateral, solutions. IGAD was established expressly to deal with such issues and thus continues to be relevant to the peace and security challenges in the Horn. This view was echoed by several senior diplomats and aid officials in Addis: ‘If IGAD did not exist, it would need to be invented.’

Throughout its lifetime, APP’s contributions to IGAD have aligned closely with the organisation’s own priorities, such as those set out in the 2010 Peace and Security Strategy. These priorities largely remain, although there is an increased focus on IGAD’s member states. Today the organisation carries out three types of activity, each relevant to the situation in East Africa and to Danish policies. Firstly, the organisation promotes coordination between its member states, which continues to be relevant in a region with trans-border conflicts. Secondly, IGAD seeks to enhance the institutional capacity of member states, a task which is more relevant for some states than others. Thirdly, IGAD promotes ratification and implementation of instruments. Again, this is a very relevant ambition in a region with low adherence to international agreements, although the results have been lacking (details in the effectiveness section below). The Danish contributions through the JFA have directly focused on the three strands of activities, and several IGAD officials have noted not just the relevance but also the positive institutional outcomes of the APP support.

While the APP has fully met the relevance criterion with regard to Danish policies, the evaluation found that Danish support to IGAD specifically – and also APP support generally – currently generate only limited interest in the MFA in Copenhagen. Danish officials suggested that the APP has very low visibility, it is difficult to show results because (1) it does not fit into results framework, (2) counter-factual scenarios are seldom explored and (3) there is a lack of personal interest in institutional strengthening efforts. ‘It is not sexy to work on long-term capacity-building issues,’ noted one official. Oddly, the current Danish focus on migration does not fully appreciate that the APP could indeed mitigate issues contributing to migration. To address these concerns, APP Phase IV includes a dialogue mechanism for annual meetings between African institutions and Danish stakeholders. This is expected to highlight the links between African and European security issues and thus the broader relevance of the APP.

The EU has recently decided to increase its funding to IGAD to EUR 40 million, which underlines that the organisation and its activities continue to be relevant to the region, to Africa, and beyond. One aid official in Addis Ababa noted that there is ‘political interest in Brussels to get the situation under control.’ The official referred to EU strategic papers which state that IGAD is the most critical organisation to be strengthened in order to improve the situation in the Horn of Africa.


[175] See: https://au.int/en/agenda2063.

[176] ICG 2016, op. cit.

[177] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 9.

6 Effectiveness

This chapter presents the evaluation’s assessment of the effectiveness of the APP, focusing on the extent to which the programme attained its objectives. As presented in Section 4.1 above, the main objective of the APP was to strengthen the institutional capacity of the APP partner organisations in support of the ‘African solutions to African problems’ maxim. In addition, two elements have run parallel to the formalised chain of logic. First, as an outcome of its assistance, Denmark was expected to achieve better access to key African officials. Second, the assistance would enable Denmark to better pursue its national security and trade objectives. This chapter will present the effectiveness assessment along the lines of the geographical focus areas of the APP: African continent (focusing on the AU), West Africa (focusing on ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP), and East Africa (focusing on IGAD).

6.1 Effectiveness of APP support to AU

Overall, APP support enabled the AU to increase its capacity across a range of functions that are relevant to the APSA and AGA. The Mid-Term Reviews of each APP phase, excluding the ongoing APP IV, pointed to AU institutional progress achieved. For example, under Phase I, the Mid-Term Review noted that substantial progress was made by the AU against its PSC mandate.[178]The Review stated that while it was difficult to follow the flow of events and the rationale for each individual activity (e.g. workshops), visible improvements were made as a result of the overall engagement. The Review highlighted that several concepts had been developed to guide the ASF, that the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) was in place, and that MoUs had been signed between the AU and RECs.[179]

Throughout Phase II, the JFAs employed were considered by both the AU and partners to be highly relevant, efficient and instrumental for the strengthening of the AU Peace and Security Department and its liaison offices in conflict areas. The Danish embassy in Addis Ababa also played an instrumental role as chair of the JFA for the liaison offices. Yet, the Review noted the continued difficulty in tracing the results of Danish APP II funding. Joint donor reporting made it impossible to extract data on the activity level of individual donor contributions. The bulk of the funds were provided to liaison offices and activities under the operationalisation of the APSA, especially the CEWS.

The APP III Mid-Term Review stated that the newly established Mediation Support Unit fits well with the AU’s preventative diplomacy and crisis response roles. It also noted that a considerable body of experience was developing around senior and credible African figures, and that a support function would make this more operational and effective. APP support has subsequently been used to set up such a support function.

The APP III Mid-Term Review also pointed out that a substantial AU role in post-conflict reconstruction and development remains remote despite the political wish from PSC members for the AU to be visible on the ground in crisis countries. The AU’s funding and capacity constraints are still too significant to compete with other qualified actors, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and NGOs. On the topic of liaison offices, some progress has been shown under the APP III. The offices continue to provide a necessary, visible political presence in crisis countries and linkage to the AU’s political role, despite being under-resourced in staffing areas. Finally, on the AU’s role in election observation, APP III support has been relevant and useful, e.g. the engagement with African civil society. However, across other areas of the AGA (including linkages to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism) the AU’s effectiveness is less evident and requires further attention.

In sum, with the APP support the AU has made progress across a range of programming, despite the AU’s continuing capacity constraints. As each Programme Review highlights, the AU has continuously required capacity building for administrative and financial staff on project and financial management.[180] Under the APP III, this was the case even as the AU introduced a new procurement manual (providing greater delegated authorities), sought steps to speed up recruitment processes, and brought in individuals from outside the AU to head up the Administration and Human Resources and the Programming, Budgeting and Accounting divisions.

Critically, narrative reports lack clear indicators, such as actual numbers, quantity, and completion rates. While AU activities are in alignment with their own annual work plans, it is not possible to validate AU narrative reporting against the overall results framework for the APP III. The APP III Mid-Term Review thus ends by stating that the poor quality of reporting is disappointing and surprising given the impression gained following consultations with AU staff that good results at the outcome level had been achieved.

In terms of the APP providing access to AU officials to engage in a constructive policy dialogue, it is clear that – given the decentralised management of the APP from the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa – the premises of AU are more frequented by Danish officials by any of the APP partner organisations’ officials. Danish officials emphasise that they have been able to gain access to key AU staff when necessary, and that they have achieved influence, for example, through discussions with the Strategy and Policy Planning unit. This is somewhat in contrast to other international donors, who struggled to schedule meetings with key AU staff members, even if they were a considerably larger donor, e.g. the EU delegation in Addis Ababa has been unable to set up monthly meetings with the AU Peace and Security Department. However, Denmark did not get specific points on the agenda EU-AU Summit in 2017, putting into question the tangible outcomes Denmark’s influence with AU officials.

6.2 Effectiveness of APP support to ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP

Overall, the APP support to the West African region has enabled the partner institutions to increase their capacity across a range of functions that are relevant from the perspective of implementing the APSA and AGA. Danish funding has allowed ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP to continue critical work on the one hand, and to expand and grow on the other.

The APP has enabled ECOWAS to increase its capacity across a range of functions related to the ECPF – most notably the ECPF Secretariat and the Mediation Facilitation Division (with salaries being paid for by Danida funding through ECOWAS recruitment schemes). Still, the staff capacity (both in terms of quality and quantity) remains weak compared to the organisation’s ambitions, and expectations fall short in terms of ECOWAS being an effective player in conflict management in the region. The organisation also remains weak from an administrative management standpoint, with ECOWAS not passing the EU’s ‘Pillar Assessment’, which indicates a weak ‘professional’ status of the organisation, resulting in other donors not putting their money through the ECOWAS system due to concerns of mismanagement.[181] Notwithstanding this fact, the APP support did allow ECOWAS to develop the ECPF and its subsequent action plans, and to bring in additional donors to fund these on the back of initial Danish support.

The APP contributions have allowed both WANEP and KAIPTC to strengthen their capacity. The core contributions have been used to pay salaries and to ensure implementation of the organisations’ Strategic Plans. Both organisations have also managed to bring in additional donor support on the basis of the core funding provided by Denmark (and Sweden and Norway), which established a level of trust for other donors to also invest. As is the case for ECOWAS, for KAIPTC there are questions regarding the effectiveness of the capacity that has been built. For example, despite the fact that the APP has allowed the Centre to build its core management capacity, financial administration and management challenges remain (as underlined by the various reviews that have been undertaken throughout the years). Other donors bypass the issue by bringing in their own staff (secondments) to get a specific job done. This does not solve the issues at the core of the organisation though, and in light of a lacking solid financial overview, it is difficult to assess where the issues lie. The current governance setup and linkages to the Ghana Ministry of Defence reportedly hinders progress in this regard, resulting in an abundance of external consultants while that money could be used to strengthen the capacity of KAIPTC’s own staff. This situation underlines the need for a more strategic engagement of the Centre’s partners – including Denmark (in the Governing Board, which should be better structured, more strategically focused, and with a more coherent approach of partners). The Danish embassy in Accra (which in practice acts as the main point of contact for KAIPTC) has raised some of these points to KAIPTC and is ready to engage with KAIPTC on the basis of a mandate from the APP management team in Addis Ababa.

For WANEP, the APP support has been used to improve the implementation of their Strategic Plans. They have made good progress in this regard, supported by positive reporting results, showing the effectiveness of the support. Notwithstanding these results, it was decided not to include WANEP as a separate partner organisation in the APP IV, but instead to make it eligible for unallocated funding (which does not provide a longer-term guarantee for support). The evaluation found that WANEP was only informed of this decision in the fall of 2017, and that other expectations were raised by the fact that Denmark signed a new JFA for WANEP in March 2017 (valid until 2020). As the WANEP Strategic Plan runs from 2015 to 2020, they were left with a funding gap in relation to their Strategic Plan. Denmark therefore undermined not only the effectiveness of WANEP – and its own achievements over the years – but also its reputation of being a trustworthy donor.

On the question of whether support has enabled more effective access to African officials to exert policy influence, there are mixed results. For the West Africa region, the support may have enabled better access, but it has yet to be determined whether this has been leveraged to deliver policy influence. For ECOWAS, there are no clear indication that the Danish support has enabled better access to African officials. On the contrary, it seems that Denmark has missed opportunities to engage in strategic dialogue with ECOWAS. ECOWAS officials indicated that Denmark could have, and according to them should have, interfered when ECOWAS was faced with management challenges during the APP II and specifically during the APP III – with the President of the ECOWAS Commission blocking expenditures on programme activities. Given Denmark’s core support to the Commission, it was expected that they would have engaged in a political dialogue (at ministerial level) to break open the impasse, which was hindering the success of the Danish support as much as it was hindering the success of ECOWAS activities. Yet Denmark did not engage in such a dialogue. By being mostly absent from the partner dialogues in Abuja, and with dialogues with ECOWAS (and now specifically the ECPF Secretariat) focusing mostly on administrative and management issues related to the APP contributions, the predominant feeling is that Denmark does not exert the policy influence it potentially has vis-à-vis ECOWAS. The effectiveness of the APP support to ECOWAS as such seems to be affected by the fact that the APP is managed out of Addis Ababa, with Danish officials not engaging with ECOWAS officials on a day-to-day basis as they do with AU officials, and with Danish officials not being able to visit Abuja as often (and as ad hoc) as a strategic partnership would require.

For KAIPTC, the embassy in Accra indicates that the provision of core funding to KAIPTC allows more direct access to the Ghana Ministry of Defence and national security actors (such as police and law enforcement). They use this access to get information (security assessments) and to discuss security concerns (including the use of violence in suppressing popular protests). However, the embassy cannot provide concrete examples of impact in this regard. As for WANEP, Denmark does not use WANEP for access to African decision makers (even though WANEP’s vast network across the region would provide opportunities for this). Conversely, WANEP did make use of the access provided by Denmark to the AU (with the Danish embassy facilitating conversations for WANEP), when they were setting up an office in Addis Ababa. KAIPTC has just signed an MoU with the AU (after seven years of negotiations), but there are no indications that Denmark played a facilitating role in this process.

6.3 Effectiveness of APP support to IGAD

Whereas the evaluation found that APP’s support to IGAD was clearly relevant, it is questionable whether its funding has led to discernible outcomes. IGAD officials point to a range of activities they have engaged in, including a series of conferences, seminars, and trainings. Some of these initiatives have been pursued with the purpose of increasing internal or member states capacity, and others in the context of the peace processes on Somalia and South Sudan. With approximately 100 staff members in the Peace and Security Department, the officials assert that their presence promotes stability in the region and that they have increased the capacity of member states. IGAD cannot point to actual results, however; only member states would be able to measure any changes in capacity. Similarly, on its compliance pillar, IGAD officials note that they have sensitised member states towards ratifying international agreements. Results are not yet evident, however, as member states are sovereign and ultimately decide whether to ratify agreements.

Aid officials have been more critical of IGAD’s results. They lament that IGAD is still unable to document that they have increased capacity, despite years of investment in exactly institutional capacity. IGAD reports on workshops, events and trainings but does not link such activities to strategic priorities. Part of the challenge is that IGAD has been unable to define its strategy and thus has not allocated responsibility to those who should deliver results. Denmark has sought to invest directly in this issue, for example in APP Phase III, supporting results-based management, resource mobilisation, communication and interaction with member states. Yet IGAD capacity is still lacking, a condition acknowledged by Danish officials and consultants in Africa and in Copenhagen.

IGAD can demonstrate better results on early warning, an area that APP has focussed on in several of its phases. IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is highly developed in comparison to similar systems of other RECs. The system has received much praise for its design and methodology, which has a broad reach of thematic and geographic areas. Like other early warning systems, however, CEWARN has uneven quality and limited data collection capabilities in all areas. Another shortcoming is that it is a very state-biased mechanism in its institutional setup, suggesting a very marginal role for other non-state actors and civil society organisations in the analysis.[182] Finally, although CEWARN operates with state-of-the art technology, it falls short in how its reports are translated into action by member states. Critics have expressed frustration at IGAD’s inability to prevent conflict.[183]

IGAD’s mediation work has a strong record on facilitation. The organisation has been critical in its ability to convene parties on both the Somalia and the Sudan-South Sudan peace processes, as noted in the case studies in earlier chapters of this report. Foreign officials in Addis Ababa highlight that IGAD’s convening function is its real strength. Impact, however, is also difficult to discern, as discussed below.

The main obstacle to a more effective organisation, aside from institutional capacity, is the political relationship between the IGAD Secretariat and its member states. According to an aid official, it is not clear who should deliver what. Given such poor results, it is questionable whether Denmark was correct in continuing APP funding into Phase IV, especially under the JFA where donor is different to that of a bilateral funding relationship: only with joint, sustained efforts will the synergies materialise. Sweden has recently pulled out of the JFA, whereas Norway remains a member. The pooled funding mechanism was set up in 2012 and was focused on specific budget lines, not just budget support. Intended as an incentive for IGAD, the organisation has not yet delivered fully on its promise to fulfil these institutional requirements.

The evaluation noted a sense of inertia in the manner that the APP now funds IGAD. Given the indispensable nature of the organisation, and given Denmark has a long history of support, it has become nearly inconceivable to not continue the funding into Phase IV. Discussions among donors to IGAD include ideas on engaging directly with IGAD member states, who may hold the key to a better functioning regional organisation. Danish officials appear open to such engagement but have not yet felt compelled to leverage the years of investment and help to coordinate a joint donor approach across the region. According to other donors, to influence IGAD member states and generate political will for a stronger IGAD, the Scandinavians in particular could use their embassy networks, their position as co-chair of the JFA on peace and security, and the overall access to IGAD officials created by APP support. The EU model that is being rolled out now might be the mechanism to get real progress on the political level, but Denmark is no longer leading the way.


[178] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report – p. 15.

[179] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report – p. 15

[180] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace – Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016.

[181] ECOWAS is working to pass the assessment by addressing the shortcomings identified by the EU.

[182] Fisher 2014.

[183] Lucey & Mesfin, 2016.

7 Efficiency

This chapter presents the evaluation’s assessment of the efficiency of the APP, aiming to measure the programme’s outputs in relation to its inputs. The evaluation has broken this down in efficiency from a cost perspective and efficiency from a management capacity perspective. The chapter will present the efficiency assessment along the lines of the geographical focus areas of the APP: the African continent (focusing on the AU), West Africa (focusing on ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP) and East Africa (focusing on IGAD).

7.1 Efficiency of APP support to AU

The cost-effectiveness of AU APP programming is difficult to assess given the insufficient reporting over the years, not least because of the APP’s funding modalities through JFAs. The establishment of a dedicated finance unit within the AU Peace and Security Department is likely to improve reporting. Specifically, PSD Finance officials stated that the introduction of the results-based management tool AMERT (Africa Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Tool) is expected to improve reporting.

The AU has made good progress on accountability and has improved its financial reporting to such an extent that it is now undergoing the EU’s Pillar Assessment.[184] If passed, the AU is entrusted to carry out budget implementation tasks, which means that the AU will be given greater independency, can take advantage of streamlined procurement processes, and may engage in harmonised grant management.

Across the board, AU officials were very positive about Denmark’s funding modalities, which were characterised as very flexible. The evaluation also took note of the amiable perception of Denmark by all AU staff. The finance unit of the AU Peace and Security Department, for example, count Denmark as a constructive partner which engages at an equal level with AU offices. Other donors were perceived as applying more stringent conditionally and reporting requirements. Danish officials confirmed this perception of other donors and noted that Denmark actively pursued an equal partnership rather than a traditional donor-client relationship. Danish officials have sought to create a special relationship with AU officials since the start of the APP, based on personal relations and a strong understanding of the technical framework. Ambassadors and technical advisers reported instances where they had ‘special access’ to key AU officials and were invited to discuss policy issues in advance of the AU sharing these with the broader donor community.

APP staff resources have remained at a much lower headcount those of the other Scandinavian embassies in Addis Ababa. Denmark employs around 20 personnel, of which less than 10 are diplomats. The Norwegian embassy in Addis Ababa, meanwhile, which is responsible for significant parts of the Norwegian engagement with the AU, employs 13 diplomats. The Swedish embassy, while responsible for the whole regional development cooperation in Africa, has a staff of more than 50 people, with plans to expand. Senior Danish officials confirm that the Danish setup in Addis Ababa is ‘meagre,’ but that a viable solution would not be to hire more international staff. The preferred option would be more local appointees with expert knowledge on certain topics, which therefore would have more influence on the development of the AU.

7.2 Efficiency of APP support to ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP

The efficiency of the APP support to the West Africa region can be broken down in efficiency from a cost perspective and efficiency from a management capacity perspective. No new full financial analysis of ECOWAS, WANEP and KAIPTC was conducted. The assessment is based on existing reviews and an overall analysis of the financial information made available to the evaluation. On this basis, the cost-effectiveness of the support varies for the individual West African APP partners.

The cost-effectiveness of ECOWAS APP programming is hard to establish, given the insufficient and fragmented reporting over the years, which makes it difficult to actually track the money against the APP outcomes. As stated by the APP III Mid-Term Review, there have regularly been delays in ECOWAS submitting overall financial reporting, including annual external audits and interim financial statements on the progress of utilization of funds according to agreed work plans. Overall, the Mid-Term Review finds that ECOWAS should ensure that gaps between the programme directorates and central administration are minimized. There is continued concern that quality and capacity of ECOWAS staff is inadequate to manage a grant like the APP efficiently.

The Review recommends that ECOWAS is supported on capacity building for administrative and financial staff on project management (especially Results-Based Management) and financial management to ensure and enhance the capacities, skills and capabilities to support on financial overview, including uniformed approaches, standards, budget, accounting and reporting and thereby ensure more harmonisation, transparency and accountability within ECOWAS.[185] Some improvement has been made in this regard since the establishment of the ECPF Secretariat in 2015. However, one of the benefits of the setup of the APP support (i.e. going through the ECOWAS system) can also result in the undermining of the cost-effectiveness of the support. This happens when ECOWAS partners (like the Mediation Facilitation Division) want to hire a consultant to undertake APP related work but their efforts are halted by the ECOWAS internal financial and procurement processes (in recent cases, a complete ‘hiring freeze’ makes it impossible to spend the APP funding). In those instances, ECOWAS partners are forced to go through other partners who can hire a consultant for them.

The cost-effectiveness of WANEP programming receives good marks in existing reviews, and other donors interviewed assess WANEP’s cost-effectiveness as high. The financial reports are clear and show a high value for money, with WANEP having a wide outreach and impact in the region with a relatively small staff. WANEP has high-quality staff in terms of required skillsets.

There is, however, room for improvement in terms of the cost-effectiveness of KAIPTC programming. It is difficult to truly assess this, given the fact that all donors interviewed indicate that the financial reports provided by the Centre do not provide a full overview and contain mistakes. The efficiency of the Centre’s staff capacity has been questioned for many years now – both in terms of quantity and quality. In relation to this, the balance between budget for the Centre’s own staff capacity and external consultants is put into question (as mentioned above). Also, KAIPTC’s supply-driven approach means that they are not cost-effective in relation to their own Strategic Plan (and hence the JFA), as they are pulled into too many different directions.

As for the cost-effectiveness of the APP management set-up: from a cost perspective, it is efficient to manage the programme as a whole out of one embassy. However, this impacts the effectiveness of the programme in West Africa when it comes to Denmark exerting the policy influence it potentially has vis-à-vis the APP partner organisations. It is also not clear that the current management setup strengthens the APP coherence, as it is not evident that the various programme components are being managed as components of one overarching programme. WANEP and KAIPTC were, for instance, not even aware of the fact that they were part of a larger endeavour. This is not only a missed opportunity in terms of more efficiently managing the two organisations (who partner on many activities, including those supported by the respective JFAs), but also in terms of managing their relationship with ECOWAS (and vice versa). One key issue in this regard is the fact that both organisations indicated that money is supposed to trickle down through ECOWAS to them (as key partners in the implementation of ECOWAS activities – i.e. Early Warning system and ECOWAS Standby Force – as indicated in the respective MoUs between the organisations and ECOWAS). This does not happen in practice, due to the internal management issues in ECOWAS. Both WANEP and KAIPTC are sometimes forced to use part of their core contributions to fill the gaps that follow from ECOWAS money not trickling down. If they would have known about the full APP setup, they could have used the Danish connection to chase the ECOWAS money (e.g. engage in dialogue on this issue together with Denmark).

Overall, the evaluation finds that there is a need to reassess the division of labour between the embassies in Addis Ababa, Accra and Abuja when it comes to the APP support in West Africa. The communication between the embassies in Accra and in Addis Ababa has been inefficient in the sense that – specifically for KAIPTC – there has been duplication and a lack of follow through. It was the embassy in Accra that was involved in the initial conversations on the new Strategic Plan for KAIPTC. But as Accra does not manage the APP, the embassy had to check in with Addis and get them to take the lead in order to actually move forward. In practice, Addis lacked the capacity to follow up, so there is now no concrete Danish engagement in the process. And for ECOWAS, Denmark has started to increase its engagement with ECOWAS since the opening of the Danish embassy in Abuja, allowing for some level of ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground for the embassy in Addis Ababa. However, as the embassy in Abuja is not accredited to ECOWAS, and as it does not have dedicated capacity to engage in a strategic dialogue with ECOWAS, for the moment the engagement is ad hoc and comes down to the good will of individuals rather than being tackled in a structural manner. As also indicated by the APP III Mid-Term Review, it would be advisable to have the embassy in Abuja more structurally involved in the management of the APP ECOWAS Component.

7.3 Efficiency of APP support to IGAD

The cost-effectiveness of the APP’s programmes with IGAD is difficult to establish given the quality of IGAD reporting thus far. According to the APP reviews, the financial statements report items’, rather than activities, which in the past has reduced Denmark’s ability to efficiently assess the projects. IGAD officials in Addis Ababa offer little help, simply pointing to the upcoming impact assessments, which would – once again – aim to improve such reporting. APP is behind the effort expecting narrative reporting to ‘improve knowledge-sharing on financial management.’

[186]Meanwhile, IGAD officials noted that the JFA, of which Denmark is a party, was not as efficient as the previously direct programme level support to individual IGAD units. Under the current JFA arrangement, IGAD units need to compete internally for the same resources, making this arrangement cumbersome and less effective. This risked duplication of efforts and more coordination was recommended. Conversely, aid officials, including Denmark, were pleased with the JFA, as this lowered transaction costs for donors, and they welcome the merit-based allocation of funds. Previously, the IGAD units with the greatest fundraising budgets attracted most funds, irrespective of their performance.

Compared to other donors, Denmark employs a low number of staff to manage its programming to IGAD and to the APP as a whole. Along with the ambassador in Addis Ababa, a single counsellor and a senior programme officer are responsible for the relationships with IGAD, ECOWAS, and AU among others. Other Nordic embassies invest more in human resources and claim greater impact as a result. The larger Swedish and Norwegian presence allow dedicated focus and engagement with IGAD officials at a level that Denmark cannot achieve. Danish officials note, however, that the small team ensures better coherence and no division between the Danish political and development initiatives: Sweden, for example, employs aid officials in parallel to policy officials who are not accredited to engage on the same issues and thus need to coordinate internally. The Danish embassy in Addis Ababa also confirmed that they were satisfied with the current human resource allocation.

Danish officials in Copenhagen and at the embassy consider themselves key supporters and frontrunners for IGAD engagement. This does not, however, include taking on greater responsibility. While offered by the European Commission, Denmark did not accept the role of delegated authority for its EUR 40 million contribution. Instead, Austria, a country with a briefer history on the Horn, took on the role through the Austrian Development Agency. Danish officials are content with this decision and do not consider it a missed opportunity. Meanwhile, the APP III Mid-Term Review recommends that Denmark’s support in the APP IV would need to be aligned with the enhanced EU support, as this would ensure donor harmonisation and effectively improve the support to IGAD.

Relations between the Danish embassy and IGAD are very positive. The IGAD Executive Secretary and other senior officials note that communications and relations are very friendly and accommodating. The consistent and predictable support allows for planning, and the flexible terms allow for shifting priorities. Yet other aid officials question whether the flexible Danish approach has partially distracted the overall donor effort to keep IGAD accountable and delivery-focused on its convening mandate and capacity-building efforts. Many recognise Denmark’s leadership on peace and security issues but are less patient in their desire to see results.


[184] Danish officials expect the AU to pass the assessment in 2018 whereas AU officials are more sceptical. The EU can entrust budget implementation tasks to certain countries, organisations and bodies. These entities must meet requirements in up to seven areas relating to the internal control system, the accounting system, an independent external audit and rules and procedures for providing financing from EU funds through grants, procurement and financial instruments and Sub-Delegation. Entities wishing to work with EU funds under the indirect management mode must successfully pass the so-called Pillar Assessment.

[185] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 11.

[186] APP Mid-Term Review III 2016.

8 Impact

This chapter presents the evaluation’s assessment of the impact of the APP, focusing on the affect of APP on the key driving factors and actors in the African security and governance environment. The chapter will present this assessment along the lines of the geographical focus areas of the APP: the African continent (focusing on the AU), West Africa (focusing on ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP) and East Africa (focusing on IGAD).

8.1 Impact of APP support to AU

The APP’s programme logic has largely played out in relation to the AU: the AU has demonstrated impact with the development of both the APSA and AGA on peace and security issues across the region. This can be partially attributed to Danish assistance.

The establishment of the AU’s CEWS facilitated conflict prevention efforts and thus had a demonstrable impact on the AU’s conflict management capacity. AU officials point to an example in the Central African Republic where CEWS helped alert the relevant stakeholders. Upon request Denmark allocated USD 200,000 to the AU, which allowed it to respond to the immediate violence and constructively engage with 14 armed groups in Bangui. Denmark funded regular horizon scanning, monthly meetings and bi-annual meetings with the PSC, and ad hoc specific allocations that contributed to the establishment of CEWS. Separately, the establishment of the AU Liaison Offices, supported by Denmark, has allowed various intelligence stakeholders to come together to discuss threats.

Since Phase II, the APP has supported AU’s effort on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and has gradually gained prominence. For example, during the 2016 post-election crisis in The Gambia, the AGA provided a platform for the relevant organs of the AU and the RECs to convene in Abuja. This type of coordination provided a better framework for the PCRD to remain engaged in the aftermath of the situation.

The APP support for the establishment of the AU Liaison Offices (AULOs) is symbolic of the APP’s aim to create meaningful and sustainable impact across the African continent. AU officials highlight the AULOs ability to do quick impact projects on AU missions, including those missions supported by Denmark – e.g. the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In addition, the Offices have extensively contributed to closing the information and confidence gap between the RECs and the AU.

Prior to 2013, the AU’s activities under the Africa Charter, e.g. Chapter 18 on supporting members states with technical assistance surrounding elections, limited itself to two-month election observation missions. Yet with a strengthened role for the AGA, an AU electoral process system has been developed. When fully implemented, the process will include a pre-election assessment done by the AU, an independent electoral mission six months prior to the election, short-term observer missions during the election depending on the stability of the electoral process, and a post-electoral process analysing the lessons learned after the elections are implemented. In 2017, the AU’s Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit implemented this process for 11 elections, and in 2018 the Unit is preparing to undertake 19 missions.

One year before the last national election in Sierra Leone, the government in Freetown had refused to take meetings with representatives of the AU, UN or ECOWAS. It took another six months for a meeting to materialize, at which time the sitting president confessed to have no funding for the elections. In response, the AU asked donors to cover the costs, thus ensuring that the elections went ahead. According to AU officials, such coordination would not have happened before, underlining how far the Electoral Unit had come and equally, how well the AU, UN, RECs and international donors had worked together to ensure the essence of democracy and stability.

These examples show that as the largest beneficiary of funding throughout the APP’s lifetime, the AU has evolved as convenor for political exchange. The greater role of the AGA is a testament to this, allowing the AU to engage member states across a wider array of topics with greater legitimacy. In 2018, the AU is convening a summit with the RECs, pointing to the coordinating ambitions of the AU and the RECs.

8.2 Impact of APP support to ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP

The programme logic of the APP has largely played out for the programme components in West Africa. ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP have all demonstrated impact in relation to peace and security issues in the region, and their role in the implementation of the APSA and the AGA. These are partly attributable to Danish assistance. However, the APP partner may not have adequately adapted their response systems to the new conflict trends in West Africa.

The ECOWAS impact is most clear in relation to the ECPF. ECOWAS is in particular recognised as a norm-setting organisation in the region – particularly when it comes to political governance issues – and has mostly impacted the fields of mediation, early warning, and electoral support. Regarding the appearance of current threats in the region (such as terrorism, migration and farmer-herder conflicts), ECOWAS has so far not proven itself to be capable. On one hand, this can be explained by the fact that although some issues are transboundary and can be considered as regional threats, no political agreement has been reached on a (regional) division of labour to approach these issues. On the other hand, ECOWAS does not have the capacity to directly act upon the emergence of a violent situation. The ESF is not really a Standby Force, since ECOWAS does not have enough capacity to ensure that there is a military unit available at all times.

There is clearly a need for a more cross-border approach in light of the current peace and security issues in West Africa. The question is at what level such an approach is most relevant, particularly considering individual member states developing ad hoc coalitions depending on the issue at hand (e.g. G5 Sahel and MJTF in northeast Nigeria). ECOWAS needs to re-think its role in such processes, as it is limited in terms of quick responses due to a lack of (standing) capacity. ECOWAS likes to refer to their successes in conflict management, but the key examples provided are from the 1990s (Liberia, Sierra Leone), begging the question of if ECOWAS can still play a role at that scale. The Gambia example was a case where ‘the stars aligned’ in that the Gambia is a small political player in the region, and the big players all agreed on the same course of action (with Nigeria playing a lead role). ECOWAS provided a diplomatic cover and supported (very relevant) diplomatic interventions. The relevance of ECOWAS in the present is seen mostly as a norm-setting entity, and in the fields of early warning, mediation, and electoral assistance. All these are elements of the prevention agenda – with a focus on politics and diplomacy. This puts into question whether Denmark would be willing to support more politically focused support on issues like terrorism and migration, and would be willing to engage in a discussion on these issues with its partners under the APP.

With ECOWAS moving from the development of guidance and frameworks towards the actual implementation of these at the level of individual member states, its impact will be hindered by the fact that ECOWAS does not have the mandate (or capacity) to ‘intervene’ in individual member states beyond the central state level – and even its central intervention capabilities are limited. To effectively implement ECOWARN in member states, civil society organisations have to be involved, which goes beyond the ECOWAS mandate and capacity. Organisations like WANEP could provide assistance in this regard.

To assess the impact of WANEP and KAIPTC as Components of the APP, one should also consider the impact of the ECOWAS Component – given that the APP relevance of both WANEP and KAIPTC is linked to their roles in supporting ECOWAS in its role as a regional peace and security actor. WANEP is an important player vis-à-vis ECOWAS. WANEP is key regarding electoral support (training and monitoring), as a Track II mediator, and its contribution to the ECOWAS Early Warning mechanism is fundamental (with interviewees stating that without WANEP, ECOWARN would collapse). WANEP has also actively assisted in the development and design of the ECPF. WANEP impact is supported by the key implementing role that has been assigned to them (through an MoU with ECOWAS) in two of the most successful elements of ECOWAS’ peace and security work (early warning and electoral assistance). WANEP has also set up programmes in response to the new regional security threats and has included these in its Strategic Plan (ensuring the use of core funding to this end).

Along the same lines, one could argue that KAIPTC has also had a substantial impact when it comes to its role as a Training Centre of Excellence in relation to the ESF and supported by an MOU. However, according to KAIPTC itself as well as interviewees, it is more difficult to measure direct impact when it comes to the KAIPTC trainings due to the fact that the Centre does not control if, where or how military staff that have participated in the courses are actually deployed. One issue in this regard is also that the Centre increasingly focuses on training CSO staff (driven by financial considerations), rather than putting the training of military staff front and centre. A core element in the current discussions in relation to the new KAIPTC Strategic Plan is therefore to put ECOWAS and the AU in the driver’s seat in terms of developing courses and identifying course participants – demanding that participants will be deployed in the near future. Donors (including Denmark) could play a stronger role in demanding this connection between the courses and the APSA deployment. Another element that needs to be tackled in the discussions on the new KAIPTC Strategic Plan is the role of KAIPTC in light of both the trend in the region to respond to outbreaks of violent conflict with smaller ad hoc coalitions (e.g. the G5 Sahel and the MJTF) and the new regional security threats.

8.3 Impact of APP support to IGAD

Through its continued funding to IGAD, APP has contributed to developing an incipient regional conflict resolution capacity in a very volatile neighbourhood. However, given the lack of documented results at the outcome level, the evaluation cannot establish a causal link between Danish funding and IGAD’s eventual impact.

On impact, despite periods of volatile relationships between member states who are often involved in proxy warfare with one another, IGAD’s position as a platform for negotiation and mediation has been central to the establishment of the Somali Transitional Federal Government and in brokering the CPA in 2005 and the ACRSS in 2015. Especially in situations where there are multiple ongoing peace processes, many of which exclude one faction or another, IGAD can bring these processes together in a more inclusive overarching process.

Additionally, IGAD has demonstrated its ability to mobilize outside financial and political support, and on some occasions use this to pressure member states where necessary to reach a consensus. When negotiations stall, and when the interests in the regional political marketplace form a deadlock, IGAD can form an entry point for outside support to revive negotiations. This was the case with the IGAD Partners Forum where the Troika provided IGAD with the financial and political leverage to push the Government of Sudan and the SPLA towards an agreement. However, this can also backfire, as not all member states will appreciate what may be perceived as a breach of the ‘African solutions for African problems’ principle.

Separately, and seemingly converse to the second strength identified above, IGAD also has the ability to protect from foreign influences that are less conducive to reaching a regional consensus on the resolution of a conflict. As demonstrated in the Somali case study, IGAD managed to mitigate the influences of Egypt and other Arab states, thereby securing the legitimacy and buy-in of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, all of whom viewed the Arab influence with suspicion. IGAD’s role in the regional response has arguably therefore helped keep foreign influences at bay, principally those of Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

[187]On the secondary APP objective, the evaluation noted that Danish officials were very pleased with their ability to access IGAD officials, as noted in Chapter 4 on the AU. This reinforces the APP I review, which stated that Denmark’s support to IGAD has had substantial implications through political leveraging. Same officials, however, had given little strategic thought to the overall purpose of access: influencing officials to pursue particular objectives or policies. For Copenhagen, it remains important to access officials in an ad hoc manner to gain intelligence on security-related issues on the Horn. While the evaluation could not independently assess this aspect due to its confidential nature, it is likely that this objective was indeed achieved given the satisfaction noted by Danish officials.

The evaluation notes a limited awareness of how well-placed Denmark is to simultaneously enhance impact on both its objectives; both goals could be achieved with an improved strategic approach. IGAD is in need of stronger political coherence while Denmark is one of the lead donors and claims to have unhindered access to top officials. As such, Danish officials could initiate a strategic, coordinated dialogue with IGAD officials and member states to help the institution deliver more effectively on its objectives.


[187] Healy, 2011.

9 Sustainability

This chapter presents the evaluation’s assessment of the sustainability of the APP, focusing on the question whether the benefits of the APP are likely to continue after APP funding is (or has been) withdrawn. Specifi-cally, this assessment focuses on long-term benefits of the APP, resilience to risk and ownership. The chapter will present this assessment along the lines of the geographical focus areas of the APP: the African continent (focusing on the AU), West Africa (focusing on ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP) and East Africa (focusing on IGAD).

9.1 Sustainability of APP support to AU

The sustainability of APP-supported AU programmes has continuously been undermined by the high level of donor dependency. In fact, aid officials in Addis Ababa characterised the AU a donor organisation rather than a member state organisation, portraying it as ultimately controlled by external parties and not directly involved stakeholders. The APP Reviews noted, however, that the establishment of the JFAs created more independence (and thus ownership). Additionally, the AU Reform process is bringing forward several innovative ideas for funding.

The Agenda 2063 is presented by AU officials as the vision that will carry the continent and the AU forward towards more integration, not only in the area of peace and security but also regarding economic and social issues. The early statements from the AU reform process and the recent Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa (April 2018) are supportive of this stronger, integrated vision. The APP’s investment in the AU seems sustainable in the sense that there is political backing for the organisation and a future-oriented agenda. Officials in Addis Ababa proposed that in the past five years the AU had surpassed the EU in developing as an intergovernmental organisation, despite continuous transparency and accountability challenges. Officials also noted that the AU now tackles a much broader set of issues with renewed energy. The forthcoming pillar assessment of the AU will serve as a critical evaluation for its future development.

9.2 Sustainability of APP support to ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP

The sustainability of the APP support to the West Africa region is undermined by the high dependency of its partner organisations on external funding. While the APP has managed to support capacity building in all three partner organisations, it is not clear that this capacity will remain in place if Danish support ends.

ECOWAS in theory has the financial means to carry its peace and security staff capacity, but for now the bulk of its member states’ contributions is used for the non-peace and security agenda of ECOWAS (with the exception of the military components of the ESF and the electoral monitoring missions). However, these contributions have been diminishing due to financial crises. One may question whether the payment of salaries within ECOWAS and PAPS (most notably the ECPF Secretariat and the Mediation Facilitation Division) is sustainable if ECOWAS does not take over the contracts at some point (which up until now has not happened due to a hiring freeze in the organisation). According to the agreements made, salaries should be taken over by ECOWAS by the end of 2018, but for now, no progress has been made in terms of ECOWAS acting to tackle its own internal administrative issues.

One conclusion is that ECOWAS still is not structurally putting money against the ECPF. As one interviewee stated: ‘If you want donors to support it, you must also commit your own resources.’ Even if all ECOWAS Directorates involved in the ECPF had committed just 5% of their budgets, the ECPF would have gone much further. Interviewees underline that even though it is not in the Danish culture to flex its muscles on these types of issues, Denmark should not underestimate its importance as a funder to the ECPF. While the EU may be the biggest donor in terms of budget, it also have the largest amount of money returned due to the fact that often EU rules and regulations are too difficult for ECOWAS to work with. Denmark could ask for more in return on its investment, as the ECPF would not be where it is today if it were not for the Danish support provided. The flagship projects of ECOWAS and PAPS are all heavily supported by Denmark, including mediation and elections. This links back to having Danish capacity in Abuja in the embassy, and the need to build a relationship that allows for a more strategic dialogue.

As for KAIPTC and WANEP, Denmark’s decision not to include these organisations as pre-determined partners under the APP IV undermines the sustainability of its efforts. In theory, core funding provides a flexible and sustainable way to fund institutions; by going through the system rather than bypassing it, one can strengthen capacities and systems. However, this only works if institutions have a substantially strong enough basis in terms of being able to generate their own income (or have a realistic outlook in this regard in the near future). While WANE is making progress, it was still an unfortunate and unforeseen decision (from their perspective) for Denmark to reconsider their support in the middle of the implementation of the WANEP Strategic Plan 2015-2020. By only allowing WANEP to be eligible for unallocated funding under the APP IV, Denmark does not provide a longer-term guarantee for support. This has left WANEP with a gap in terms of its ability to implement its Strategic Plan. WANEP has approached the other JFA partners (i.e. Austria and Sweden) for assistance but has not yet found a way to fill this gap in its budget. As for KAIPTC, Denmark’s decision not to continue its support for the organisation under the APP is the result of the Centre not showing enough progress in terms of its effectiveness and internal management capabilities. However, one might question whether or not such progress could have even been achieved, given the hands-off approach applied. For both WANEP and KAIPTC – in their role as supporting ECOWAS in the implementation of the APSA – a larger part of their funding should come from ECOWAS (and its member states), making them less dependent on donor funding. This is not something that Denmark could tackle on its own, but something that should be addressed by a group of donors (both in terms of aligning efforts vis-àvis ECOWAS and aligning efforts vis-à-vis WANEP and KAIPTC). There is a need to balance the core funding with the projected and earmarked contributions from other donors).

9.3 Sustainability of APP support to IGAD

Given the continued state of conflicts in the Horn of Africa, regional cooperation mechanisms are likely to be required for several decades ahead. IGAD member states have not been contributing substantially to the organisation and seem unlikely to do so soon. For IGAD to continue its functions, it will require external funding. Meanwhile, this evaluation assesses that Denmark’s security commitments to the region are likely to continue given Copenhagen’s interests in secure shipping lanes and controlled migration.

While Denmark was a pioneer in its support to IGAD, today other donors recognise the importance of IGAD regarding peace issues. Norway, for example, continues to be engaged in IGAD’s mediation activities. Starting in 2018, the EU will contribute EUR 40 million to IGAD to better control the situation in the Horn. This will ensure continuation of the efforts Denmark has initiated and may also lead to a more concerted effort to increase the organisation’s impact. By co-chairing the JFA on peace and security, Denmark could use this new funding momentum to guarantee a stronger political member state engagement. But this requires vision, time allocation, and coordination by Danish officials, features that have not been fully developed thus far.

The continuous support by external partners has meant that IGAD has become largely ‘donor-driven’ in its focus, which has created chasm between the organisation’s technical and political levels. The APP III Mid-Term Review notes that IGAD’s dependency on donor funding to maintain its Secretariat and implement its projects has prevented it from being proactive in its activities and thus diminishes its ability to become a sustainable regional organisation. Member states are not invested in IGAD’s programming both because they are not donors and because IGAD activities are dictated by foreign donors. Denmark, with its inclusive partner approach, could help facilitate a stronger commitment from member states to guide programming. Aid officials in Addis Ababa noted that this type of conversation would result in IGAD realising that it is not an implementing agency, but a political body, and that the technical activities should be in support of its convening role rather than vice versa.

Recent political developments may contribute to a more resilient IGAD. Changes in Eritrea and the affiliation of the new Ethiopian Prime Minister suggest that the future may hold more cordial relations between the two countries. The UN and the EU have also declared themselves prepared to engage when member states are ready for broader integration within the Horn of Africa.

10 Coherence

This chapter presents the evaluation’s assessment of the coherence of the APP, focusing on one hand on the complementarity between the APP and other Danish actions and activities in Africa, and on the other hand on the complementarity between Danish programming and other donor programming in relation to the APP partner organisations. The chapter will present this assessment along the lines of the geographical focus areas of the APP: the African continent (focusing on the AU), West Africa (focusing on ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP) and East Africa (focusing on IGAD).

10.1 Coherence with the Peace and Stabilisation Fund

Parallel to the strategic and institutional development aims of APP, Den-mark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) provides support to (mostly regional) activities that directly target peace and stabilisation efforts in a given crises area. The PSF was established in 2010 under the Danish Defence Agreement. According to a senior Danish diplomat, in effect, the APP could be seen as Denmark’s first stabilisation programme and hence as a predecessor of the PSF. The PSF therefore was built around the knowledge and lessons learned from establishing the APP.

In practice, the PSF is a joint, cross-government, pooled fund that geographically focuses on the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and partly on West Africa through smaller programmes supporting maritime security. Interventions vary from immediate stabilisation efforts (such as finance for peace support missions and mediation efforts) to longer-term activities (such as the provision of capacity building for stabilisation). Example of longer-term capacity building activities include regional standby forces, Security Sector Reform processes and activities addressing longer-term drivers of fragility such as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and combatting transnational organised crime.[188] Between 2011 and 2013, just over half of the Fund was allocated to security and justice engagements while nearly a quarter was allocated to maritime and counter-piracy activities.[189]

The evaluation notes that synergies and coherence between the APP and PSF differ over time. One partial reason is the non-synchronized programming cycles of the two funding streams. The PSF works on three-year cycles while the average APP phase spans four to five years. Such different timings are not unusual in the APP; the JFAs for individual APP components run on different programming cycles to the APP Phases overall.

The PSF has evolved to be very operational and political, and its interventions are defined only partially in view of locally defined needs and interests. In addition, the PSF is critical for Danish military relations with the US, France, Germany, and the UK. The APP, on the other hand, supports African institutions, aiming to generate ‘African solutions to African problems.’ A Danish official described the PSF as very practical in terms of budgeting and responding to threats. The APP budgeting follows a more analytical approach, defining its interventions through a theory of change.

The evaluation concludes that while the two instruments are distinct, they have the same overarching objective to promote peace, security and stability, and might even work with the same organisations. One way of viewing the relationship is to see the APP as working at the ‘strategic normative’, continental and regional levels, and the PSF as working at the ‘strategic operational’, regional and country levels.

Importantly, while the coherence between the PSF and APP is adequate during operations, Danish officials suggest that more communication with a strategic focus could allow for more programme synergies, or at least improve complementarity, which may be a sufficient ambition.

10.2 Coherence of APP support to ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP

Coherence may be assessed at various levels of engagement. The evaluation has assessed the coherence of the APP support to West Africa in terms of coherence between the various programme components, coherence between the APP support and the support provided by other donors, and coherence with other Danish activities in the region.

As for the coherence between various APP components, when analysing the various guiding documents for the activities (i.e. the APP Programme Document, the Component Documents, the JFAs, the organisations’ Strategic Plans and the MoUs) it is clear that the goalsetting of the APP documents is aligned with the objectives in the Strategic Plans and the MoUs. These objectives in turn form the basis for the JFAs. The APP Programme Documents do not refer to the MoUs between the partner organisations, but there is reference to these MoUs in the Component Documents. Understandably, the MoUs and the Strategic Plans do not refer to the APP. However, one would expect that the JFAs would refer to the APP, as this is the direct instrument through which Denmark engages with the partner organisations.

In practice, it is not clear that the APP is managed as one coherent programme (i.e. the ECOWAS Component is not managed in relation to the WANEP and KAIPTC Components, though these are supposed to provide support to ECOWAS in implementing the APSA). Notably WANEP and KAIPTC were not aware that the support they were receiving was part of a wider support effort in the region: the APP. A coherent strategy that brought these three entities together in a more complementary way was missing.

WANEP and KAIPTC are both rooted in West Africa and play a role in the regional peace and security architecture that ECOWAS cannot replace with resources of its own. Now that Denmark has decided to continue to support ECOWAS under the APP IV, it must clarify how the decision to stop (upfront) support to WANEP and KAIPTC under the APP affects its support to ECOWAS. One would expect this to have consequences in terms of the focus of its support to ECOWAS. These decisions should also be linked to the MoUs both organisations have with ECOWAS, and the role foreseen for them in those MoUs.

In terms of coherence between the APP support and the support provided by other donors in the West Africa region, there appears to be a lack of coordination with other donors supporting ECOWAS. Specifically, the EU, US and Germany provide substantial financial support to the ECPF; they are recognised by other donors as the lead donors, whereas Denmark is often not recognised as such. The other donors’ approach is more directive and is not coordinated with Danish support, which creates a risk of Danish support being used to fund activities that are also funded by other donors. One example of such overlap was explained to the evaluation team, where Danish and EU funding was used for the same activity, leading the EU to withdraw its contribution. Such issues waste opportunities for complementarity.

Based on meetings with other ECOWAS donors, there is no sign of coordination or regular meetings taking place between donors on the issue of peace and security in the region (with the exception of a semi-regular meeting taking place in Abuja, chaired by the Swiss, which is mostly seen as an opportunity to receive updates rather than to set a joint agenda and strategy. Meetings to support organisations pursuing ECOWAS goals (such as KAIPTC) are also lacking. For KAIPTC, the Governing Board would provide a platform for such meetings. However, the Board is currently not functioning as it should. For WANEP, it is also unclear whether donors have a platform to coordinate their contributions – WANEP mostly deals with its donors at their respective Headquarters levels.

The need to strengthen coherence between APP support and other donors, as well as between APP support and other Danish activities in the region, shows that the growth of regional security institutions in response to the current security threats in West Africa makes it difficult to choose which efforts to support. Internally Danida seeks to ensure coherence between the APP and the PSF. When the Sahel Programme was under development, for example, the embassy team in Addis Ababa sought to forge synergies by including consultations and establishing a division of labour on the topic of funding ECOWAS.[190]

Furthermore, support to various regional structures and bilateral government-to-government relations requires delicate balancing.[191] Moreover, this proliferation of actors with often overlapping mandates complicates international coordination of interventions and raises questions as to their effectiveness and complementarity.[192] The coordination of interventions is also hampered by the presence of entrenched regional rivalries, as the fragmentation of security initiatives ‘has been exploited by the great powers in and around the Sahel as a way of neutralizing the efforts of their rivals’.[193] Indeed, one of the characteristics of security initiatives in West Africa is that the supply is not always and exclusively led by the demand of security, but also by the interests of external actors who try to protect their stakes or to counterbalance the actions of antagonist powers.

10.3 Coherence of APP support to IGAD

In terms of APP coherence with bilateral programming, the Somalia Country Programme for 2015-2018 is the only programme which references the APP. The Programme states that the APP provides a broad mechanism to support continental peacebuilding and political initiatives in Somalia, with some indirect initiatives on how the Somalia Country Programme can engage in different locations. Also, reference is made to the fact that Somalia engages interests in the AU and IGAD, which are partners to the APP.[194] For other country programmes analysed, no reference was made to the APP.[195] This may have been a result of how the 2014 Somalia Policy Paper was developed; according to the 2014 evaluation of the PSF, the Somalia paper offered an indication of how synergy among funding sources could be promoted. This evaluation also notes, however, that while there were attempts to increase coherence between the APP and the PSF due to a lack of strong political direction and incentives, there was a lack of institutional structure to forge such linkages between the APP and PSF.[196]

However, these linkages may have now improved. Officials that have engaged with both programmes over several years confirm that the APP and the PSF have become far more linked over the past three years. For example, the APP supported building up the Bamako office, while the PSF funded their activities. The present evaluation also found several examples where the two programmes coordinated funding. The APP support to EASBRICOM was terminated at the end of the Phase II, as the support focus was too narrow and was not in line with the overall strategic support. The PSF later picked up the support to EASBRICOM due to its operational focus and support for individual on the ground activities.

Notably, Danish officials said that the decentralisation of the PSF to the Danish embassy in Nairobi improved the coherence between the APP and the PSF considerably. During the current programming cycle, a planning seminar in Addis Ababa at the beginning of 2017 allowed those responsible for the PSF and the APP to exchange information and coordinate planning. The importance of enhancing embassy inputs throughout the consultation period – for example via video links – was equally emphasized by the 2014 evaluation of the PSF. Thus, as noted in the AU section above, while the coherence between the PSF and APP may now be adequate during operations, Danish officials continue to say they could be further improved with regular communication.

On donor coordination, Denmark’s role in the JFA’s and as co-chair of the JFA on peace and security allows for close engagement with likeminded partners. There is a continued need for coordination, as was illustrated by an instance in which one JFA partner failed to properly consult with other JFA partners on a capacity building project. Importantly for Phase IV, and as recommended by the APP III Mid-Term Review, the EC’s contribution to IGAD needs to be closely monitored, especially if it changes IGAD’s role on peace and security. Denmark’s support in the APP IV would need to be aligned with the enhanced EU support, as this would ensure donor harmonisation and effectively improve the support to IGAD.


[188] Coffey, Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, August 2014, p. 16.

[189] Coffey, Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, August 2014, p. 16.

[190] Coffey, Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, August 2014, p. 25.

[191] Lebovich, A. 2017, op. cit.

[192] Lebovich, A. 2017, op. cit.; Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit. As a case in point, the deployment of a joint military mission in Mali suffered from tensions between the AU and ECOWAS over ownership over the mission and its funding arrangements. See: Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.; Boserup R. and Martinez L. 2018. ‘Europe and the Sahel-Maghreb Crisis’, DIIS REPORT 2018: 03, Danish Institute for International Studies.

[193] Boserup R. and Martinez L. 2018, op. cit. Although backed by two UN Security Council resolutions, the establishment of G5 Sahel, for example, was not welcomed by Algeria and ECOWAS, who would have preferred the use of the existing institutions (Nouakchott and ECOWAS) to address security challenges in the Sahel. ICG 2017, op. cit.

[194] Somalia Country Programme, New Deal Compact Support – Country Programme Document 2015-2018, p. 7.

[195] The evaluation had access to the country strategy documents for South Sudan (2016-2018), Burkina Faso (2016-2020), Mali (2017-2022), and Niger (2017-2022).

[196] Coffey, Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, August 2014, p. 25.

11 Summary of findings

This chapter presents the evaluation’s main findings per evaluation criteria, focusing mostly on providing an ex-post assessment of the support provided under the APP Phases I, II and III, but also providing an ex-ante assessment of the support that is foreseen under the APP Phase IV.

11.1 Relevance

Each of the three main APP partner organisations has been involved in conflict prevention, conflict management or conflict resolution processes that were critical to peace, stability and governance in Africa. As a funder to these APSA and AGA organisations, Denmark deserves credit for investing in initiatives that are highly relevant. In addition, the APP has been closely in line with Danish development assistance and foreign policy objectives. The programme initially met a pressing need for core funding to multilateral institutions and organisations supporting these institutions. The need for regional approaches is increasingly relevant due to the increase of cross-national threats.

While the relevance of APP and its partner organisations are confirmed by this evaluation, it is less clear that the programme and the organisations cover an adequate spectrum of relevant peace and security priorities. The nature of conflict in Africa has changed considerably, and it is not evident that the APP’s focus and approach have adequately adapted to the new threats. This is related to the fact that the APP partner organisations have been slow in re-assessing their functions relative to their mandates and the changing landscape. The key question is where the added value of regional organisations lies, in relation to not only the changing nature of conflict in Africa, but also changing stakeholders and geopolitical agendas. Similar to other international organisations, the AU, IGAD and ECOWAS all face the challenge of balancing the national interests of individual member states on one hand with a supranational agenda in which external powers and institutions step in when decision-making is stalled on the other. The obstacles to consensus between member states is compounded by low financial and institutional capacity for intervention. As a result, actions tend to be delayed in crisis situations, and conflict management is most often taken on by individual member states or small coalitions. The relevance of the AU, IGAD and ECOWAS then seems to be more linked to their norm-setting roles than to their ability to develop and implement transnational policies and operations (except in specific instances such as the AU mission in Somalia or post-election negotiations in the Gambia). The norm-setting function has primarily focused on the conflict prevention and mediation agenda, providing a supportive political backdrop for interventions in an effort to come to a more versatile peace architecture in the region. This norm-setting function is indeed a crucial element of the partner organisations’ mandate.[197] Adjusting the APP in Phase IV to increasingly support the AGA is a good first step in this regard, but supporting regional organisations in these roles would also require Denmark to provide more targeted and politically focused support and engagement. This adjustment would both enable and stimulate the APP partners to continuously develop their agendas and identify their roles in response to the most urgent needs in their regions, particularly those such as terrorism and migration.[198]

11.2 Effectiveness

While the evaluation found the APP and its partner organisations relevant, the intermediate results (outcomes) of APP funding have been less clear. Whereas some of the smaller organisations funded by the APP provided acceptable evidence of results, the reporting on outcomes by the AU, IGAD and ECOWAS has been unsatisfactory throughout the evaluation period. This has been confirmed by Danish officials and APP reports. The consequence is a broken results chain where it is unclear whether the impact of the organisations can indeed be partially attributed to Danish APP funding. The clearest connection seems to have been made in the case of ECOWAS where, through the provision of financial support and technical assistance, Denmark has been a main driving force behind the process of developing and operationalizing the ECPF which guides the ECOWAS peace and security mandate.

The APP contributions have allowed each of the three main APP partner organisations and the supporting organisations to increase their capacity across a range of functions that are relevant to the APSA and AGA. The evaluation concludes that the APP has contributed to developing the AU’s general capacity to engage on peace and security issues in Africa. The organisation has increased decision-making capacity and has made good on its intention to engage more broadly in conflict prevention. ECOWAS has proven itself to be the main driving force behind conflict prevention and mediation in the West African region – with WANEP and KAIPTC in key support roles. Finally, IGAD has continuously engaged on peace and security issues in the Horn of Africa, making a forum available for regional dialogues. Danish funding has allowed the organisations to continue critical work on the one hand, and to expand and grow on the other. Overall, the longer-term and flexible nature of the funding has been crucial in allowing the organisations to respond quickly to opportunities as they arose. Still, the capacity (both in terms of quality and quantity) of the organisations remains weak, and there is a continued need to strengthen the organisations’ financial, organisational and technical capacity.

In addition to institutional capacity, another major obstacle to a more effective organisation is the political relationship between the APP partner organisations and their member states. This underlines the need for Denmark to engage in a political dialogue with the APP partners. However, whereas policy dialogues and regular interaction with the organisations have been identified as the most important instruments to the APP, the evaluation has found that these dialogues and interactions have mostly taken place in Addis Ababa in relation to the AU. The evaluation concludes that the daily presence of Danish officials at the AU offices ensures an effective engagement for technical-level initiatives. Yet for other organisations such as ECOWAS, for instance, a structural political dialogue has been largely absent (outside of regular communications with the direct fund manager on ECOWAS side). As such, Denmark does not exert the policy influence it potentially has vis-à-vis ECOWAS, which negatively affects the effectiveness of the APP support to ECOWAS. It seems that while the APP contributions may have enabled access to African officials, it has yet to be determined whether this has been leveraged for policy influence.

Particularly given the overall weak capacity of the APP partners, more guidance and steering is required from an effectiveness (and efficiency) point of view. The fact that Denmark continues to work through, rather than around, the APP Partner organisations despite capacity limitations is commendable, and probably the only way to enable real change and development. However, it is clear that such an approach should be accompanied by regular strategic dialogue and technical assistance. Specifically for the West African region, such accompaniment has been lacking. For this reason, the evaluation concludes that there is a need to reassess the division of labour between the embassies in Addis Ababa, Accra and Abuja when it comes to the APP support to West Africa.

11.3 Efficiency

The efficiency of the APP support can be broken down in terms of efficiency from a cost perspective and efficiency from a management capacity perspective. In terms of cost-effectiveness, no new full financial analysis was conducted. The assessment is based on existing reviews and an overall analysis of the financial information made available to the evaluation.

The cost-effectiveness of APP programming is hard to establish, given the insufficient reporting over the years and not least because of the fact that a large part of the APP’s funding goes through JFAs. The choice to manage all APP components out of Addis Ababa makes sense from an efficiency standpoint, as in theory this allows Denmark to bring all the various components together and ensure coherence between them. However, it is not clear how these potential benefits have materialised in practice. This is partly linked to the fact that there is no clear framework that explains how the various APP components connect, and to the ambiguity found between the verbal and the written accounts on the programme feature of the APP, as noted in Section 4.2 (i.e. with officials engaged with the APP on the one hand arguing that the APP was simply a ‘funding stream that targeted institutions operating with similar objectives, while on the other hand maintaining that all components, irrespective of their geographic location and institutional setup, should be managed from a single programme office to increase synergy and cohesion).

Compared to other donors, particularly the other Nordic donors, Den-mark employs a relatively low number of staff to manage the APP. Along with the ambassador in Addis Ababa, a single counsellor and a Senior Programme Officer are responsible for managing the full programme, consisting of relationships with the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and others. Other Nordic embassies invest more in human resources and claim greater impact as a result. The larger Swedish and Norwegian presence allow dedicated focus and engagement with officials at a level that Denmark does not achieve. Danish officials noted, however, that the small team ensured better coherence and no division between Danish political and development initiatives.

The APP is perceived as flexible by the partner organisations. Partners considered Denmark to be a constructive partner that operates on a level of equality, particularly compared to other donors such as the EU, which was deemed a micromanager with stringent conditionality and reporting requirements that were ‘not in the essence of results-based management,’ according to experienced AU officials. The consistency and predictability of the APP support allowed for planning, and the flexible terms allowed for shifting priorities. Yet other aid officials questioned whether the Danish approach has undermined the overall donor effort to maintain (specifically ECOWAS and IGAD) accountability and focus on delivery of the convening mandates or capacity building efforts.

11.4 Impact

The APP programme logic has largely played out for the individual programme components, although partner organisations may not have adequately adapted their response systems to new conflict dynamics. The APP partners have demonstrated impact in specific cases across Africa, and these are partly attributable to Danish assistance. But, as noted above, given the lack of documented results at the outcome level, this evaluation cannot establish a causal link between Danish funding and the APP partners’ eventual impact.

On the secondary APP objective (for the APP to provide access to African officials so as to exert policy influence), the evaluation notes that while Danish officials were very pleased with their ability to access AU and IGAD officials, there are no clear indications that the access has been leveraged to engage in a policy or political dialogue. A clear strategic framework identifying the overall purpose of access, e.g. influencing officials to pursue particular objectives or policies, has so far been lacking. For Copenhagen, it remains important to access officials in an ad hoc manner to gain intelligence on security-related issues on East Africa specifically (as APP access is not exerted in the case of West Africa). While the evaluation could not independently assess this aspect due to its confidential nature, it is likely that this objective was indeed achieved given the satisfaction noted by Danish officials.

The evaluation also notes a lack of awareness of how well Denmark is placed to simultaneously enhance impact on both its objectives, although this could be remedied by an improved strategic approach. The AU, ECOWAS and IGAD are in need of stronger political coherence, while Denmark as one of the lead donors claims to have unhindered access to top officials. As such, Danish officials could initiate a strategic, coordinated dialogue with officials and member states to help the organisations deliver more effectively on their objectives.

11.5 Sustainability

The sustainability of the APP support is weakened by the high level of dependency of the APP partners on external funding. While the APP has managed to support the building of capacity in all main partner organisations, it is not clear that this capacity will remain in place if Danish support ends.

Of the three main APP partners, ECOWAS in theory has the financial means to carry its peace and security staff capacity, but for now, the bulk of member state contributions is not put towards its peace and security agenda. One can conclude that ECOWAS still is not structurally using funds for the ECPF. Interviewees underline that even though it is not in the Danish culture to ‘flex its muscles’ on these types of issues, Denmark should not underestimate its importance as a funder to the ECPF. Denmark could ask for more in return on its investment, as the ECPF would not be where it is today if it were not for the Danish support provided.

As for the smaller organisations supported under the APP, and particularly KAIPTC and WANEP, Denmark’s decision not to continue support to these organisations as separate components (with pre-determined funding) undermines the sustainability of both Denmark’s and these organisations’ efforts. In addition, the lack of transparency and timeliness of this particular decision affects Denmark’s reputation as a good donor.

11.6 Coherence

Coherence can be assessed at various levels. In terms of coherence between the AU and the RECs, and in terms of establishing a more solid division of labour between these organisations based on their comparative advantages and abilities, this evaluation finds that the APP setup has not been conducive. By managing the various APP components as individual programmes rather than as elements of an overarching programme, Denmark did not stimulate or facilitate further cooperation between organisations. The counterargument provided by Danish officials engaged with the APP was that the APP was never set up as an overarching programme, and that it should be seen as mere construct to provide funding to various African organisations. However, this argument does not align with the way in which the APP is presented in all of its Programme Documents considering APP ‘programme objectives’ and ‘cross-cutting objectives’. Furthermore, it does not align with another argument of those same officials that all APP components, irrespective of their geographic location and institutional set up, should be managed from a single programme office (Addis Ababa) as that would ensure increased synergy and coherence. At the very least, the evaluation can conclude that there is ambiguity between the way in which the APP is presented on paper and how it is being managed in practice. This ambiguity should be tackled in order to allow for a shared set of expectations vis-à-vis the APP across the range of stakeholders involved, and to allow for a clear and realistic results framework for the programme.

In terms of coherence, the evaluation notes that synergies and coherence between the APP and PSF have been variable. One reason is the non-synchronized programming cycles of the two funding streams. Another reason is that the PSF is primarily an operational and political instrument, with interventions that are defined to also serve Danish interests. The APP, on the other hand, aims to support organisations vis-à-vis the goal to support ‘African solutions to African problems.’

The evaluation concludes that while the two instruments are distinct, they have the same overarching objective – to promote peace, security and stability – and might even work with the same organisations. One way of viewing the relationship is to see the APP as working at the ’strategic normative’, continental and regional levels, while the PSF works at the ‘strategic operational’, regional, and country level.

The need to strengthen coherence between APP support and other donors, as well as between APP support and other Danish activities in the region, shows that the growth of regional security institutions in response to for instance the current security threats in West Africa makes it difficult to choose which efforts to support. Specifically for this region, there has been a lack of coordination with other donors supporting ECOWAS. With other donor funding coming in to support elements of the ECPF like electoral support and mediation, Denmark should consider where Danish support could have the greatest added value if Denmark wants to maintain its pioneering role in pushing the organisation in its development (as it did in supporting the establishment of the ECPF). The same applies to IGAD, where given the EU’s large increase of funding to the organisation in 2018, results in Denmark facing a choice: Either Denmark justifiably ends its pioneering support to IGAD or Denmark uses the opportunity to engage jointly with the EU and other donors in an intense and political manner to help IGAD member states embrace the institution and allow it a greater regional cooperation role.

Coherence with other donors is important also from a perspective of the need for complementarity between Denmark’s approach of channelling its support through the system, and other donor approaches (such as that of the EU) bypassing the system. Denmark needs to coordinate its efforts more with these donors in order to mitigate the risk of Danish support being used to fund activities that are also funded by other donors.


[197] The first or four AGA components is “Norms and Standards.” (AGA Framework, www.aga-platform.org/about.)

[198] The 2016- IGAD Strategy convincingly analyses nine global ‘megatrends’ which influence the Horn of Africa region, including the war on terror, migration, and the geo-political power shifts from east to west.

12 Recommendations

Given the findings of the evaluation, the evaluation recommends (1) that Denmark continues to fund African institutions that contribute to peace and stability in Africa. In order to meet these ultimate objectives, the evaluation recommends that Denmark take the following actions.

A. Strengthen the analytical foundations

Institutional capacity building is inherently difficult, and a future APP must be clear on the challenges this involves. The APP is built on the assumption that peace and security in Africa is best ensured if there is a strong continental architecture of organisations and capabilities preventing and reacting to conflicts and building peace.[199] Furthermore, Denmark has employed an open, flexible, eye-to-eye approach with its partner institutions. This approach is aligned with the AU’s own ‘African solutions to African problems’ and is additionally sustained by the literature on international institution-building: effective interventions are locally driven and allow for learning (making mistakes) and growing (adjusting to increasing levels of capacity).[200] Denmark, however, could be clearer on the conscious choice of approach and the consequent lack of intermediate, measurable results. Whereas the approach encourages flexibility in outcomes, the APP reviews note dissatisfaction with the paucity of results. As a first step, the evaluation recommends (2) that Denmark expounds the programme logic to specify how transmission effects occur or do not occur.

This can be achieved through two interlinked exercises. Firstly, the APP could helpfully combine the explicit (as listed in the Programme Documents) and the implicit (Danish officials’ verbal accounts) theories of change. If access to African officials and the furthering of Danish national interest on trade and security are commonly agreed objectives, the APP would benefit from a clear description of these elements. This would facilitate (a) a clearer understanding of Denmark’s interest among APP partners, and (b) a more adequate assessment of Denmark’s overall objectives. Secondly, the expanded programme logic would help clarify the apparent mismatch between the Danish flexible approach and the results expected. Researchers have long advocated that the Danish partner approach is indeed the solution for avoiding capability traps: by creating an authorising environment, Denmark allows its partners to grow at an adequate pace. Yet, to be effective, this approach must be combined with a programme logic that allows the expected outcome-level results to be limited for a considerable time period while the institutions learn and grow. In other words, there is a need to manage expectations in terms of the actual results of institutional capacity building.

B. Innovate monitoring methods

A critical challenge in designing and evaluating the APP is how to measure institutional success. What are the key indicators that would demonstrate progress towards a more capable institution? Is there a path of organisational development, which is suitable to particular institutions in specific circumstances? Can the progress of an organisation be benchmarked to help set target timelines and assess its performance? Given that the APP is broadly defined as an institution-building programme, such an institutional success measure is strangely absent. This evaluation has assessed the APP against the traditional OECD-DAC criteria, as required by the ToR. The evaluation recommends (3) that the ongoing monitoring and future assessments view the programme through an organisational development lens. The box below presents a model that the evaluation has developed over the course of the APP evaluation for this purpose.

Box 1 Measuring Institutional Performance

To better assess progress on institution-building, the evaluation expanded on a model developed by the World Bank.* At its core, for an institution to be considered successful it must it satisfy three criteria: ‘(i) it is able to deliver positive results with respect to its core mandate; (ii) it possesses broad legitimacy within the country of operation; and (iii) its operation is durable and resilient.’ These success dimensions of results, legitimacy and resilience are interdependent. The World Bank has proceeded to assess institutional success across a range of domestic institutions in fragile and conflict affected states. For multilateral institutions, however, the evaluation proposes a model that places stronger emphasis on norms development, as this is a critical measure in generating international acceptance and engagement.

In order to build a comprehensive institutional structure to address policy and operational issues, the evaluation proposes that any organisation must develop legitimate capability. This implies a capacity to engage effectively within its geographic and thematic domain in a manner that is deemed credible and acceptable to its stakeholders. Such capability relies on two aspects. Firstly, the institution must act as the arbiter of a set of norms that specify its range of acceptable actions. This relates to both legal frameworks that create more reified institutional boundaries and to the dynamics of day-to-day politics that keep those boundaries flexible. Secondly, the institution should be a capable operational actor delivering results on its mandate. The primary operational conditions are the institution’s financial management and civil service capacity.

Figure 14 Measure of legitimate capability
Legitimate Capability
Normative arbiter Operational actor
Legal frameworks Financial management
Day-to-day politics Civil service capacity

Given such definitions of institutional capacity, Danida could make an initial assessment of the partner organisation and agree on targets for organisational developments. This would enable the APP Programme Manager to have more informed conversations about outcomes, instead of considering only the activities undertaken by the relevant organisation. At the time of reviews and evaluations, the initial assessment could be revisited, and the capacity could be measured anew, revealing changes over time. Finally, such a capacity measure would fill the missing link in the results chain between APP inputs and the impact of partner organisations.

*Barma, Naazneen H., Huybens, Elisabeth; Vinuela, Lorena. 2014. Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts. New Frontiers of Social Policy. World Bank Group, Washington, DC.

C. Invest in people and relationships

The evaluation found that Denmark’s moment as a ‘pioneering and special friend’ of the APSA and AGA institutions has passed. This development is partly due to the greater maturity of the organisations, and partially to the increasing number of donors who support the institutions. These are positive developments and Denmark should take credit for being a frontrunner and accepting the risks that this entailed. Yet Denmark has not fully leveraged the opportunities that risky investments generally offer: in this case, turning access into influence. Danish officials continue to have good access to African officials but seem to pursue few strategic ambitions. The access is also not utilised to advance broader donor community interests, e.g., facilitating stronger IGAD member state engagement. Now is the time to redefine Denmark as a wise and experienced friend, building on the pioneering and special status it has acquired in years past.

The evaluation thus recommends (4) that Danish officials reengage with a more proactive approach, particularly in light of the need to accompany institutional capacity building with strategic dialogue and technical assistance. Such a reengagement does not require greater control over programming or processes but a more energetic focus on making tangible progress. In order to ensure the strategic success of the programme, and to ensure the sustainability of its institution-building efforts, Denmark should exert more influence and ensure that the partner organisations co-fund APP activities, e.g. in the case of staff positions that have been created with APP support.

The evaluation also recommends (5) that Denmark strengthens coordination with other donors to help monitor and strengthen the partner organisations’ administrative and financial capacity and to build coalitions to jointly advance political-level collaboration within and among partner institutions. This is particularly likely to lead to results on ECOWAS, but also on IGAD where Nordic donors could increase coordination, and on the AU where Denmark could help advance some of the conversations that the EU is finding difficult to make progress on.

Finally, the evaluation recommends (6) that the Africa Department more actively engages in regional Africa programmes by facilitating regular communication among embassies and Copenhagen and by effectively advocating that African conflict prevention is in Denmark’s strategic interest.

D. Consolidate programme focus and adjust programme management set-up

The evaluation found that the various APP components have been managed as individual projects rather than as elements of an overarching programme, possibly as a result of different interpretations of the need for cohesion and coherence within the overall programme. As such, Denmark purposely did not stimulate or facilitate cooperation between the APP organisations in relation to their roles and responsibilities in implementing the APSA and the AGA. While external observers and Danish officials agree that the AU and the RECs need to establish a more solid division of labour, Denmark maintains that this is a matter internal to the APSA and AGA organisations.

Consequently, as the various APP elements do not form a unified whole and are not intended to, the choice of managing all components from one location is not effective. While the decision can be defended from a cost-efficiency perspective, the result is that the current programme management setup reduces the effectiveness of the APP. It also means that the APP, with its relatively limited resources given the broad objectives of the programme and the wide variety of partner organisations, requires continuous strategic decision-making. The evaluation thus recommends (7) to strengthen the strategic focus of the APP, including in its choice of partner organisations. This should follow not only an overarching and coherent theory of change for the APP, but also a renewed political analysis of the organisations and their capacity to deal with new threats to stability, including violent extremism and migration.

Finally, if Denmark decides to continue to support both the AU and the RECs relevant to the Danish priority regions in Africa (i.e. ECOWAS and IGAD), then the evaluation recommends (8) to place the management responsibility, including the responsibility for political dialogue, with the embassies located in physical proximity to the relevant organisations. The embassy in Addis Ababa could act as the overall programme manager for the APP.


[199] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 9.

[200] Andrews, M., Pritchett, L., Samji, S., and Woolcok, M. (2015) Building capability by delivering results: putting problem-driven iterative adaption (PDIA) principles into practice, In: OECD (2015) A Governance Practitioner’s Notebook: Alternative Ideas and Approaches. p. 123-133.


Colophon

Title:
Evaluation of the Africa Programme for Peace 2004-2017

Subtitle:
November 2018

Summary:
Since 2004 over 900 million DKK has been allocated for the “Africa Programme for Peace” (APP). A fourth phase of the programme began 2018, maintaining the focus on support for African peace, security and governance efforts through regional organisations, including the African Union. An evaluation of the programme was considered opportune as a means of thoroughly assessing both progress and the difficulties encountered.

The evaluation had three main aims: to document and assess the results of the APP, 2004-17; to analyse the Danida contributions made to African peace, security and governance initiatives in terms of the value added to processes of conflict prevention and resolution; and to determine focused and targeted recommendations for enhancing the impact of the Africa Programme for Peace (in the fourth phase). Noting that many challenges have been faced by the regional organisations, the evaluation recommended renewed support for institutional capacity strengthening on the basis of clearly defined strategic objectives.

Notes:
Responsibility for content and presentations of findings and recommendations rests with the authors

Publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Responsible institution:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Copyright:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

Author:
Ecorys B.V.

Contributors:
IncluDoc (HTML version)
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Language:
English

URL:
http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/evaluation_africa_programme_for_peace_2004-2017/index.html

ISBN HTML:
978-87-93616-86-8

ISBN PDF:
978-87-93616-85-1

Version:
1.0

Version date:
2018-12-13

Publication standard no.:
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