This chapter presents the evaluation’s assessment of the coherence of the APP, focusing on one hand on the complementarity between the APP and other Danish actions and activities in Africa, and on the other hand on the complementarity between Danish programming and other donor programming in relation to the APP partner organisations. The chapter will present this assessment along the lines of the geographical focus areas of the APP: the African continent (focusing on the AU), West Africa (focusing on ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP) and East Africa (focusing on IGAD).
Parallel to the strategic and institutional development aims of APP, Den-mark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) provides support to (mostly regional) activities that directly target peace and stabilisation efforts in a given crises area. The PSF was established in 2010 under the Danish Defence Agreement. According to a senior Danish diplomat, in effect, the APP could be seen as Denmark’s first stabilisation programme and hence as a predecessor of the PSF. The PSF therefore was built around the knowledge and lessons learned from establishing the APP.
In practice, the PSF is a joint, cross-government, pooled fund that geographically focuses on the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and partly on West Africa through smaller programmes supporting maritime security. Interventions vary from immediate stabilisation efforts (such as finance for peace support missions and mediation efforts) to longer-term activities (such as the provision of capacity building for stabilisation). Example of longer-term capacity building activities include regional standby forces, Security Sector Reform processes and activities addressing longer-term drivers of fragility such as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and combatting transnational organised crime. Between 2011 and 2013, just over half of the Fund was allocated to security and justice engagements while nearly a quarter was allocated to maritime and counter-piracy activities.
The evaluation notes that synergies and coherence between the APP and PSF differ over time. One partial reason is the non-synchronized programming cycles of the two funding streams. The PSF works on three-year cycles while the average APP phase spans four to five years. Such different timings are not unusual in the APP; the JFAs for individual APP components run on different programming cycles to the APP Phases overall.
The PSF has evolved to be very operational and political, and its interventions are defined only partially in view of locally defined needs and interests. In addition, the PSF is critical for Danish military relations with the US, France, Germany, and the UK. The APP, on the other hand, supports African institutions, aiming to generate ‘African solutions to African problems.’ A Danish official described the PSF as very practical in terms of budgeting and responding to threats. The APP budgeting follows a more analytical approach, defining its interventions through a theory of change.
The evaluation concludes that while the two instruments are distinct, they have the same overarching objective to promote peace, security and stability, and might even work with the same organisations. One way of viewing the relationship is to see the APP as working at the ‘strategic normative’, continental and regional levels, and the PSF as working at the ‘strategic operational’, regional and country levels.
Importantly, while the coherence between the PSF and APP is adequate during operations, Danish officials suggest that more communication with a strategic focus could allow for more programme synergies, or at least improve complementarity, which may be a sufficient ambition.
Coherence may be assessed at various levels of engagement. The evaluation has assessed the coherence of the APP support to West Africa in terms of coherence between the various programme components, coherence between the APP support and the support provided by other donors, and coherence with other Danish activities in the region.
As for the coherence between various APP components, when analysing the various guiding documents for the activities (i.e. the APP Programme Document, the Component Documents, the JFAs, the organisations’ Strategic Plans and the MoUs) it is clear that the goalsetting of the APP documents is aligned with the objectives in the Strategic Plans and the MoUs. These objectives in turn form the basis for the JFAs. The APP Programme Documents do not refer to the MoUs between the partner organisations, but there is reference to these MoUs in the Component Documents. Understandably, the MoUs and the Strategic Plans do not refer to the APP. However, one would expect that the JFAs would refer to the APP, as this is the direct instrument through which Denmark engages with the partner organisations.
In practice, it is not clear that the APP is managed as one coherent programme (i.e. the ECOWAS Component is not managed in relation to the WANEP and KAIPTC Components, though these are supposed to provide support to ECOWAS in implementing the APSA). Notably WANEP and KAIPTC were not aware that the support they were receiving was part of a wider support effort in the region: the APP. A coherent strategy that brought these three entities together in a more complementary way was missing.
WANEP and KAIPTC are both rooted in West Africa and play a role in the regional peace and security architecture that ECOWAS cannot replace with resources of its own. Now that Denmark has decided to continue to support ECOWAS under the APP IV, it must clarify how the decision to stop (upfront) support to WANEP and KAIPTC under the APP affects its support to ECOWAS. One would expect this to have consequences in terms of the focus of its support to ECOWAS. These decisions should also be linked to the MoUs both organisations have with ECOWAS, and the role foreseen for them in those MoUs.
In terms of coherence between the APP support and the support provided by other donors in the West Africa region, there appears to be a lack of coordination with other donors supporting ECOWAS. Specifically, the EU, US and Germany provide substantial financial support to the ECPF; they are recognised by other donors as the lead donors, whereas Denmark is often not recognised as such. The other donors’ approach is more directive and is not coordinated with Danish support, which creates a risk of Danish support being used to fund activities that are also funded by other donors. One example of such overlap was explained to the evaluation team, where Danish and EU funding was used for the same activity, leading the EU to withdraw its contribution. Such issues waste opportunities for complementarity.
Based on meetings with other ECOWAS donors, there is no sign of coordination or regular meetings taking place between donors on the issue of peace and security in the region (with the exception of a semi-regular meeting taking place in Abuja, chaired by the Swiss, which is mostly seen as an opportunity to receive updates rather than to set a joint agenda and strategy. Meetings to support organisations pursuing ECOWAS goals (such as KAIPTC) are also lacking. For KAIPTC, the Governing Board would provide a platform for such meetings. However, the Board is currently not functioning as it should. For WANEP, it is also unclear whether donors have a platform to coordinate their contributions – WANEP mostly deals with its donors at their respective Headquarters levels.
The need to strengthen coherence between APP support and other donors, as well as between APP support and other Danish activities in the region, shows that the growth of regional security institutions in response to the current security threats in West Africa makes it difficult to choose which efforts to support. Internally Danida seeks to ensure coherence between the APP and the PSF. When the Sahel Programme was under development, for example, the embassy team in Addis Ababa sought to forge synergies by including consultations and establishing a division of labour on the topic of funding ECOWAS.
Furthermore, support to various regional structures and bilateral government-to-government relations requires delicate balancing. Moreover, this proliferation of actors with often overlapping mandates complicates international coordination of interventions and raises questions as to their effectiveness and complementarity. The coordination of interventions is also hampered by the presence of entrenched regional rivalries, as the fragmentation of security initiatives ‘has been exploited by the great powers in and around the Sahel as a way of neutralizing the efforts of their rivals’. Indeed, one of the characteristics of security initiatives in West Africa is that the supply is not always and exclusively led by the demand of security, but also by the interests of external actors who try to protect their stakes or to counterbalance the actions of antagonist powers.
In terms of APP coherence with bilateral programming, the Somalia Country Programme for 2015-2018 is the only programme which references the APP. The Programme states that the APP provides a broad mechanism to support continental peacebuilding and political initiatives in Somalia, with some indirect initiatives on how the Somalia Country Programme can engage in different locations. Also, reference is made to the fact that Somalia engages interests in the AU and IGAD, which are partners to the APP. For other country programmes analysed, no reference was made to the APP. This may have been a result of how the 2014 Somalia Policy Paper was developed; according to the 2014 evaluation of the PSF, the Somalia paper offered an indication of how synergy among funding sources could be promoted. This evaluation also notes, however, that while there were attempts to increase coherence between the APP and the PSF due to a lack of strong political direction and incentives, there was a lack of institutional structure to forge such linkages between the APP and PSF.
However, these linkages may have now improved. Officials that have engaged with both programmes over several years confirm that the APP and the PSF have become far more linked over the past three years. For example, the APP supported building up the Bamako office, while the PSF funded their activities. The present evaluation also found several examples where the two programmes coordinated funding. The APP support to EASBRICOM was terminated at the end of the Phase II, as the support focus was too narrow and was not in line with the overall strategic support. The PSF later picked up the support to EASBRICOM due to its operational focus and support for individual on the ground activities.
Notably, Danish officials said that the decentralisation of the PSF to the Danish embassy in Nairobi improved the coherence between the APP and the PSF considerably. During the current programming cycle, a planning seminar in Addis Ababa at the beginning of 2017 allowed those responsible for the PSF and the APP to exchange information and coordinate planning. The importance of enhancing embassy inputs throughout the consultation period – for example via video links – was equally emphasized by the 2014 evaluation of the PSF. Thus, as noted in the AU section above, while the coherence between the PSF and APP may now be adequate during operations, Danish officials continue to say they could be further improved with regular communication.
On donor coordination, Denmark’s role in the JFA’s and as co-chair of the JFA on peace and security allows for close engagement with likeminded partners. There is a continued need for coordination, as was illustrated by an instance in which one JFA partner failed to properly consult with other JFA partners on a capacity building project. Importantly for Phase IV, and as recommended by the APP III Mid-Term Review, the EC’s contribution to IGAD needs to be closely monitored, especially if it changes IGAD’s role on peace and security. Denmark’s support in the APP IV would need to be aligned with the enhanced EU support, as this would ensure donor harmonisation and effectively improve the support to IGAD.
 Coffey, Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, August 2014, p. 16.
 Coffey, Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, August 2014, p. 16.
 Coffey, Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, August 2014, p. 25.
 Lebovich, A. 2017, op. cit.
 Lebovich, A. 2017, op. cit.; Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit. As a case in point, the deployment of a joint military mission in Mali suffered from tensions between the AU and ECOWAS over ownership over the mission and its funding arrangements. See: Bossuyt, J. 2016, op. cit.; Boserup R. and Martinez L. 2018. ‘Europe and the Sahel-Maghreb Crisis’, DIIS REPORT 2018: 03, Danish Institute for International Studies.
 Boserup R. and Martinez L. 2018, op. cit. Although backed by two UN Security Council resolutions, the establishment of G5 Sahel, for example, was not welcomed by Algeria and ECOWAS, who would have preferred the use of the existing institutions (Nouakchott and ECOWAS) to address security challenges in the Sahel. ICG 2017, op. cit.
 Somalia Country Programme, New Deal Compact Support – Country Programme Document 2015-2018, p. 7.
 The evaluation had access to the country strategy documents for South Sudan (2016-2018), Burkina Faso (2016-2020), Mali (2017-2022), and Niger (2017-2022).
 Coffey, Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, August 2014, p. 25.Top