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4 Detailed overview of APP

This chapter provides a detailed overview of the APP. It first presents the APP programme level focus and the programme set up and management. The chapter subsequently presents an overview of how the APP monitors and evaluates its results. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of the various programme phases by presenting the APP expenditures per phase, followed by a presentation of the support provided to the various APP partner organisations across these phases.

4.1 Programme level focus

The APSA has consistently served as a guiding reference for the APP. In fact, since APP Phase II, the APSA has provided an overarching framework to guide the programme’s activities. In APP Phase II,; the APP aimed to support relevant individual organisations in realising their mandate defined by the APSA, with a focus on enhancing their ability to prevent conflict through preventive diplomacy and mediation, including a focus on early warning mechanisms, and their ability to manage peacekeeping and peace support operations, including a focus on the African Standby Force (ASF).[117] Denmark chose to focus the APP efforts mostly on enhancing the institutional capacity of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD, with the AU being the overarching ‘agent’ for peace and security on the continent, and the founder of the APSA, and ECOWAS and IGAD being the mandated organisations for implementing the APSA in two of Denmark’s highest priority regions on the continent.[118] With APP Phase III, the AGA was more prominently added to this overarching framework, albeit from a perspective of where the AGA is to complement the APSA, adding democracy and human rights to the outcome and impact statements of the programme.[119] At the activity level, this should result in the incorporation of political order (through AGA) as a factor influencing conflict (through APSA), and hence a factor taken into account in the identification of APP priorities and subsequent programming.

At the programme component level, the APP focused on enhancing the abilities and capacities of the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD regarding preventive diplomacy and mediation, early warning, management of peacekeeping and peace support operations, free and fair elections, linkages with regional civil society/think tanks, and gender (including the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325).[120]

The inputs for achieving these outcomes were a constructive policy dialogue, financial support, and technical assistance. The APP III Programme Document stated that these three instruments were considered key in facilitating change of the organisations supported. Through financial support, Denmark aimed to enable organisations to implement their plans and thus foster the change needed. This was underpinned by technical assistance to support the change processes. Nevertheless, Phase III identified the policy dialogues and regular interaction with the organisations as the most important instrument.[121]

Throughout the various phases of the APP, support has been provided to a number of civil society organisations and think tanks to build their capacities to deliver key inputs and support to the AU and RECs. For instance, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) was considered the primary provider of capacity development to peacekeeping support operations in Africa.[122] Denmark supported this organisation under the APP with the expectation that KAIPTC would help promote greater effectiveness and improve the capacity of the various AU and REC missions.[123] In addition, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) was considered to be a key provider of early warning data in West-Africa (with a membership of over 500 West-African Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in all 15 of ECOWAS Member States), and as such Denmark supported the organisation under the APP as a key factor in facilitating early warning information and reaching out to civil society for response to crises.[124] Through the APP, Denmark also provided support to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), seeking to furthe develop and strengthen the APSA by providing timely analysis to the AU and the RECs.[125]

On the basis of its analysis, the evaluation constructed programme logic guiding the APP. This logic gradually became clearer through the evaluation. The evaluation review of documents found that Phases I and II did not rely on an explicit programme model. The Programme Document for Phase III, however, offered a semi-explicit logic model. As laid out in the Evaluation Inception Report, the reconstructed programme logic for Phases I through III suggested that by (1) supporting key African organisations with the appropriate policy dialogue, funding and technical assistance, (2) these organisations would have greater capacity to plan and execute, (3) the APSA and AGA activities would be implemented, and (4) the peace and security situation in Africa would be improved. The focus here was on institutional strengthening, in support of the ‘African solutions to African problems’ maxim. In practice, Danish officials complemented this theory of change with two additional elements that would run parallel to the formalised chain of logic. First, as an outcome of its assistance, Denmark would achieve better access to key African officials. Second, the assistance would enable Denmark to better pursue its national security and trade objectives. The evaluation found that the semi-explicit programme logic (gleaned from documents) and the implicit logic (expounded by officials) have both guided the implementation of the APP.

4.2 Programme setup and management

The APP follows a setup in which a multitude of documents constitutes the guiding framework for the programme. The APP Programme Documents set out the priorities and objectives of Danish funding for each phase.[126] On the basis of these Programme Documents, Development Engagement Documents are produced to specify Danish support to each individual partner organisation (breaking the APP down into separate ‘components’). Both the Programme and the Development Engagement Documents are developed in consultation with the APP partner organisations through inception and formulation missions. In addition, there are bilateral agreements between Denmark and its partner organisations, specifying the APP component outcomes for each phase and the specific obligations of each party. For a number of organisations, Denmark provides (non-earmarked) core funding in collaboration with other donors. In these cases, Joint Financing Agreements (JFAs) set out agreed terms and procedures for the support to the organisation as well as procedures on disbursement, reporting and auditing obligations. JFAs are also used for sub-component elements that Denmark supports in collaboration with other donors. For example, support to the AU’s Political Affairs Department is provided in collaboration with the United Kingdom, EU, Sweden, Germany, among others.

Organisations that receive support through the APP also have their own guiding documents. These include Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between the AU and the RECs delineating the collaborative relationship between the parties to achieve the objectives of the APSA. There are also MoUs supporting civil society organisations and think tanks. KAIPTC and WANEP, for instance, have both signed MoUs with the AU and with ECOWAS, making them an integral part of the APSA. Furthermore, each organisation has its own strategic plans and work plans, setting out the organisation’s objectives and priorities. Considering the overall objective of the APP, and Denmark’s ambition to support ‘African solutions to African problems’, the APP Programme and the Development Engagement Documents are supposed to follow the supported partner organisations’ priorities and strategies as closely as possible to ensure relevance and coherence. The setup of the APP therefore requires the alignment of various guiding documents.

The programme feature of the APP is particular and warrants a brief exploration. It falls within the dictionary definition of programme as “’a set of related measures or activities with a particular long-term aim’ but it is ambiguous to which extent the activities are interrelated.[127] The APP Programme Documents for each phase refer to overall ‘programme objectives’ and also ‘cross-cutting objectives’, giving the impression of a strategic, integrated set of organising features, weaving the support of several institutions into a unified whole. It is managed through a single office with a single person commanding authority over key issues, thereby furthering the image of a programme following a coherent set of management processes in pursuit of defined objectives. Through interviews, the evaluation found, however, that Danish officials engaged with the APP had somewhat contradictory views on the cohesiveness of the programme. Officials suggested the APP was simply a ‘funding stream’ that targeted institutions operating with similar objectives; the JFAs being a case in point. They rejected the notion that APP should serve as an ‘overarching programme’ bringing coherence to the individual components and support to the various institutions. At the same time, however, they maintained that all components, irrespective of their geographic location and institutional setup, should be managed from a single programme office in Addis Ababa. The rationale here was increased synergy and cohesion. Given the ambiguity found between verbal and the written accounts, the evaluation made a definitional choice in order to provide a consistent approach across the evaluation: the African Peace ‘Programme,’ for the purposes of this evaluation, would be understood as a unifying feature bringing together several activities under a single strategic, coherent ambition.

As stated in the APP I Programme Document, managing a major programme with components widely dispersed across the African continent, and in countries with no Danish representation, is not an easy task.[128] Given its continental and various sub-regional areas of focus, the APP is unique in the sense that there is no sector ministry or similar body that can assume overall responsibility for the programme as a whole. Each of the APP partner organisations contributes to the overall objective of the programme, with their own mandates and memberships and without clearly defined lines of command among them.[129]

To manage the programme, the newly established Danish embassy in Addis Ababa was given the lead role. This decision was driven by the central role the AU was expected to play in the APSA and thus also in the APP. The management objective was to achieve coherence and continuity in the process of dialogue and advocacy across the African security architecture. The embassy thus also was tasked to manage the other programme components like IGAD, ECOWAS, KAIPTC and WANEP through a one-stop management approach.[130] As such, the embassy manages and coordinates the APP and is the main interlocutor for each of the partner organisations. The embassy is supposed to participate in all relevant meetings in the organisations supported under the APP, including: 1) partner-donor dialogue meetings and progress review meetings; 2) budget planning meetings; 3) audit follow-up meetings and 4) donor coordination meetings.[131]

Specifically, in the Phase II and III Programme Documents, reference was made to the challenges of ensuring enhanced performance of the organisations in West Africa given the geographical distance from Addis Ababa.[132] The Mid-Term Review of the APP Phase III found that the access and leverage generated through the programme was mostly utilised in the AU due to the resources available from the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa. The Review Team noted that the relationship with ECOWAS could also be cultivated from Danish embassies in the region and from departments in Copenhagen, given the high level of engagement by Denmark on West African peace and security issues.[133] However, despite having an embassy in Accra, and since 2015 also having an embassy in Abuja, the APP continues to be managed out of Addis Ababa.[134] In relation to KAIPTC however, the embassy in Accra has assisted in day-to-day management.

To ensure synergy and complementarity with other Danish activities, the embassy in Addis Ababa participates in internal meetings in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Denmark when coordination and complementarity of the APP with bilateral and regional Danish programmes are discussed.[135] The MFA is responsible for reviews of the programme. In terms of programme level quality assurance and monitoring and evaluation, programme funds are allocated for consultancy support.[136]

The MFA Africa Department has long intended to host bi-annual coordination (video conference) meetings across the entities engaged in peace, stabilisation and migration in Africa. This includes embassies as well as departments in MFA Copenhagen and the Ministry of Defence. When deemed relevant, invitations could also be extended to other government entities focusing on different thematic areas under the programmes such as CVE (e.g. Ministry of Justice) police reform (e.g. Ministry of Justice and the National Police) and others. On paper, the meetings provide a platform for binding coordination across the units by allowing for updates on the implementation of the different programmes, ensuring synergies between engagements, securing a strong link to Danish foreign policy priorities as well as development engagements, and harmonising policy dialogue across the regions. In practice, however, these meetings seldom take place and the opportunities for coordination and increased synergy are not fulfilled.

4.3 APP results monitoring and evaluation

Phases I and II of the APP were set up along the lines of a Logical Framework approach, whereas Phase III was designed on the basis of a Theory of Change (ToC) approach, a shift that reflects a broader change in the Danish aid management guidelines. During both periods, the APP relied on the regional organisations themselves to monitor progress and provide insights in the results achieved. Yet, the evaluation notes that several Programme Documents, reviews, and evaluations point to the lack of capacity in these organisations to manage such complex endeavours. The Mid-Term Review of the APP III, for instance, found that the narrative reporting submitted by the AU is very activity-based, that IGAD’s narrative reporting lacks information on outcomes, and that it is difficult to assess the contribution of ECOWAS activities at outcome level.[137] This evaluation specifically sought to verify and confirm the results reported but found that information on outputs and outcomes was often missing or of a very general nature. The Mid-Term Review recommended that the partner organisations strengthen their outcome reporting, and that Denmark supplies technical assistance to improve this capacity.[138] The evaluation notes that while the APP has continuously sought to do exactly that, the capacity is still inadequate.

On overall APP reporting, the evaluation found that the completion report for Phase II is still outstanding, causing additional concern about accountability. It is also not clear how the unspent funds for SADC in Phase I were re-allocated.

In terms of monitoring, it is particularly challenging that several programme components have been managed through a JFA modality. As a result, the reporting is not tailored specifically to Danish needs. The APP III Mid-Term review noted that while the JFA continues to be the preferred option for engagement with partners, thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing predictability, the focus should continue to be thematic areas where Denmark can make a difference. This suggests soft earmarking within the overall JFA framework, where possible.[139]

The shift from a Logical Framework approach to a ToC approach is in line with a wider trend amongst donors to work with a more flexible and dynamic results framework – specifically in relation to their engagement in complex and volatile fragile and conflict-affected settings – because this requires a results framework that is less rigid and linear in its assumed causalities. The shift is also suitable to accommodate the challenges identified for reporting on APP results and the fact that the programme is in part aimed at strengthening exactly those capacities in the African partner organisations.[140] This evaluation has assessed the results of this shift in approach, in combination with the question how to attribute the results of the various sub-programmes at the higher-level programme outcomes.

4.4 APP expenditures

To assess expenditures, the evaluation appraised the extent to which the indicative budget of individual APP phases matched the ultimate expenditures. The intention was to gain a comprehensive overview of how the APP’s expenditures had evolved over time. To support this task, Danida shared an expenditure overview of the APP I, which provided the financial amounts between the APP I’s ‘Commitment Frame’ and ‘Actually Disbursed,’ but this was incomplete. The document notes that due to missing information the costs incurred under individual objectives and APP components do not sum up to the total amount Danida ‘actually disbursed’ under APP I.

It was not possible to reproduce a similar financial expenditure overview for APP II and APP III. While the evaluation intended to compare the indicative budget included within the APP programme documents with the financial donor reports of the individual APP components, this could not be completed due to two reasons: (1) Danish funding cannot be traced as individual partner institutions (e.g. the AU) often prepare joint reports to donors and therefore specific hard data on actively level and outputs of individual donor contributions cannot be extracted, and (2) while the APP’s indicative budget matches the objectives, output and activities set forth within the programme documents, the donor reports produced by partner institutions are based on their own cost centre structure and allocations (i.e. the objectives the AU sets out for itself to meet), and thus do not directly correspond with the objectives the APP has set.

In view of the above, the evaluation has thus exclusively used the indicative budgets found within the APP Programme Documents to preserve the ability to assess how APP expenditures have evolved under each APP phase.

Funding for the APP has remained relatively stable across its life cycle, i.e. DKK 248 million for Phase I; DKK 250 million for Phase II; and DKK 210 million for Phase III (or DKK 230 million if the DKK 20 million carry-over of funding from Phase II is included). For Phase IV however, funding decreased to DKK 200 million, as shown by Figure 1.

Figure 1 APP Funding for Phase I-IV (DKK million)

Figure 1 Source: MFA. Annex A.
Note: APP III the shaded area represents an additional DKK 20 million carried over from APP II, under the ECOWAS component.

Regardless of the phase, the bulk of the funding has always been allocated to the AU,[141],followed by the two principal RECs across West and East Africa: ECOWAS and IGAD respectively. These organisations are also the only ones that have received funding under each programme phase.

The following sections provide a financial overview and programme account of each APP phase. Each financial diagram presents how the respective programme expenditure was split between organisations and by thematic focus[142]. The final section captures the programme expenditures across the entire life cycle of the APP, allowing the evaluation to reflect on if and how the strategic focus has changed over time.

APP Phase I 2004-2009

Financials

Figure 2 APP I 2004-2009. Indicative Budget (DKK million)

Figure 2 Source: Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) 2005-2009 Programme Document, May 2004, p. 88.

Phase overview

The APP I sought to support building the African security architecture and enhancing peace and security in Africa across four regional organisations. In addition, three distinct activities guided the strategic direction of the APP I. The Programme Document stated that the choice of strategic focus is a function of immediate challenges, African priorities, interventions by other partners and most urgent needs. These were:

  • Support for operationalising conflict prevention in Africa;
     
  • Support for building the African security architecture, in particular establishment of the African Standby Force;
     
  • Support for operationalising the cooperation between civil society and the regional organisations in conflict interventions.

Each strategic focus guided the programming of all four APP components, with each component dedicated to a single organisation (e.g. Component 1 links solely to the African Union). While the APP I’s indicative budget was not sufficiently clear-cut to effectively split individual expenditures by thematic focus, Figure 2 provides a first view on how, nevertheless, the three strategic directions were reflected within programming. For example, each component included a sub-component on ‘operational support’ for either conflict prevention or peace and security. Additionally, the AU and ECOWAS components included sub-components dedicated entirely to civil society.

The APP I typically built upon existing support to relevant regional organisations across Africa. For example, the financially largest component (SADC) built on Danish support for the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM), the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS).[143]

APP Phase II 2010-2013

Financials

Figure 3 APP II 2010-2013. Indicative Budget (DKK million)

Figure 3 Source: Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) 2010-2013 Programme Document, September 2009, p. 30.
Note: Other* - includes programme monitoring, reviews etc.

Phase overview

The APP II’s overall objective was to channel support to four key African inter-governmental organisations (AU, ECOWAS, IGAD and EASBRICOM). The programme provided additional funding to several associated organisations with niche expertise on peace and security issues.

Crucially, the Programme Document stated that the formulation of the APP II was based on a broader view of peace and security than its predecessor.[144] In line with the evolving agendas of partner organisations, the programme supported their conflict prevention role beyond the previous focus on operational prevention to address more structural aspects. The APP II’s strategic focus therefore built upon two thematic areas and a crosscutting programme-related element:

  • Theme 1: Support to the further development and application of the APSA;
     
  • Theme 2: Support to institutional capacity building efforts;
     
  • Cross-cutting: Reducing the transaction costs of assistance.

The APP II was influenced by the application of the principles contained within the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. As such, the APP II dedicated itself to simplifying its programming, for example, by use of joint approaches such as Joint Partnership Agreements (JPAs), between regional organisations and their international donors.

The two thematic areas were reflected in the indicative budget of the APP II, as shown by Figure 3. It is clear that a balance had to be achieved between the provision of support to peace and security issues to enhance the development and application of the APSA, while equally improving the institutional capacity of each regional organisation.

The end of SADC funding is the most significant example of change within APP programming. The APP II’s Appraisal Report mentioned that direct support to SADC, ‘did not materialize’, given the political problems in SADC – not least Zimbabwe’s role within the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.[145] Hence the APP II shifted its geographic scope towards West and East African organisations. These were chosen based on past experience and the perceived opportunities for synergy effects with other Danish development assistance across the respective sub-regions (i.e. the Horn of Africa for IGAD and the Sahel for ECOWAS).[146]

APP Phase III 2014-2017

Financials

Figure 4 APP III 2014-2017. Indicative Budget (DKK million)

Figure 4 Source: Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) 2014-2017 Programme Document, June 2013, p. 22.
Note: ECOWAS* - Shaded area reflects the DKK 20 million (DKK 18 million + DKK 2 million) carry-over from APP II; Other** - Includes programme monitoring, reviews etc.

Phase overview

The APP III was built upon the foundations laid by its two predecessor programmes. Similar to the APP II, the third phase also sought to strengthen the capacity of the AU and key African regional organisations (IGAD and ECOWAS) to implement the APSA. Also, the geographical scope set out under the APP II (West and East Africa), remained the same. The leadership role of the AU as the paramount African organisation with the primary responsibility within the APSA was reinforced under APP III – as was the AU’s leadership role vis-à-vis the AGA. A considerably larger amount was therefore allocated to the AU compared with the APP II and the other individual organisations.

In addition, the APP III focused on three strategic outcomes at the thematic level. These outcomes were based on the AU Strategic Plan and included:

  • Enhanced implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture;
     
  • Improved capacity of the AU and RECs to deliver against their mandate;
     
  • Improved human rights and democratic governance election support (linked to the AGA).

Figure 4 splits the APP III’s indicative budget across these three strategic outcomes. Compared to the APP II, greater focus was placed on peace and security. Additionally, funding for capacity building activities decreased, not only due to the inclusion of a third strategic focus but also a shift towards more operational support.

APP Phase IV 2018-2012

Financials

Figure 5 APP IV 2018-2021. Indicative Budget (DKK million)

Figure 5 Source: Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) 2018-2021 Approved Budget, 2018.
Note: Other* includes unallocated funds (DKK 8 million) and expenditures for programme monitoring, reviews etc. (DKK 10 million).

Phase overview

Under the APP IV, funding focuses on areas that demonstrated good traction and showed results in earlier phases, e.g. funding for preventative diplomacy, mediation, election support and to a certain extent gender.[147] Figure 5 shows how these areas are captured under the APP IV; preventive diplomacy and mediation fall under peace and security, while election support remains as a standalone category and gender is categorized under cross-cutting issues.

As opposed to its predecessors, the APP IV focuses on funding targeted assistance towards thematic areas rather than organisational capacity building. The decrease in funding for capacity building, as shown in Figure 5 bears testament to this. The APP IV Inception Report justifies this decrease as due to the ‘substantial funding’ available from other donors, ‘especially the EU.[148]

The APP III Mid-Term Review identified that current partners (AU, ECOWAS, and IGAD) remain the crucial parts of the APSA and AGA.[149] By striking a greater funding balance between peace and security on the one hand, and election support on the other, the APP IV straddles the APSA and AGA sphere, encouraging greater interaction between these two frameworks. Furthermore, while peace and security remain the prime area of focus, election support has become a key objective of the AU, ECOWAS and to a certain extent IGAD, providing additional justification for their support.[150]

The APP IV Inception Report observed that under the APP III the role of civil society and think tanks had become less clear.[151] Rather than identifying them as separate programme components, under the APP IV, smaller organisations are supported through a single component aimed at providing niche expertise on peace and security. The division of this budget line is not set up front, allowing for more flexibility in terms of identifying the required niche expertise, but also affecting the predictability of funding for the expert organisations. Finally, the budget of the APP IV remains substantially in the AU’s favour, which reconfirms the importance Denmark places on the AU with regard to peace and security.

APP Overview Phases I-IV

Based on the financial review of the individual phases, this section assesses whether the thematic priorities and the choices of partners combine into a coherent programmatic narrative and logic across the life cycle of the APP. Figure 6 below provides an overview of the thematic choices.

Figure 6 APP Phases II-IV – Budget distribution by thematic focus

Figure 6 Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases II-IV.
Note: for phase I, the indicative budget was not defined enough to split expenditures across specific thematic focuses; Other* includes unallocated funds and expenditures for programme monitoring, reviews etc.

Even when omitting the APP I in the diagram above, it is clear that the APP mainly focused on three thematic areas throughout its lifetime: peace and security, capacity building, and election support. While peace and security has remained the core focus, funding emphasis across these overarching themes has become increasingly balanced as the programme has matured. The considerable increase in funding for election support underlines this, even as the overall funding for the APP has decreased over time.

In a practical sense, the support to ‘structures and processes’ means that the APP focuses on enhancing the capacity of selected regional organisations that together form the pan-African peace and security architecture. Ideally, the AU and the RECs work together to achieve their joint objectives under the concept of subsidiarity.[152] Figure 7 below highlights the commitment the APP has made to what it sees as the critical regional organisations (the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD) to develop a strong continental architecture.

With regard to funding for the management of the programme, including funding for reviews, programme coordination, and monitoring, it is worth noting that this budget line was nearly tripled from Phase I (DKK 5 million) to Phase II (DKK 14 million) and then lowered again for Phase III (DKK 8 million). For this budget line, the graphs show only DKK 2 million for Phases III and IV because they were then fully incorporated into the engagement with AUC. These funds were fully at the disposal of the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa.

Figure 7 APP Phases I-IV – Budget distribution by recipient organisation

Figure 7 Source: MFA. Annex A.
Note: AU* - For phase III, excludes the technical assistance and reviews (DKK 8m); ECOWAS** - for Phase III, includes DKK 20 million carry-over from APP II; Other*** includes unallocated funds and expenditures for programme monitoring, reviews etc.

In the Programme Documents, it is argued that the AU and the RECs provide platforms for advocacy and dialogue, contribute to norm-setting in the field of peace and security, and actively intervene on governance issues (election observation) and – in specific cases – on active violent crises. Furthermore, the AU and RECs are expected to be able to cut across national boundaries and add value to national and international processes in a range of topics, deriving their legitimacy from their membership and their ability to deliver on their mandates.[153] The financial analysis bears out a consistent focus on three key organisations, providing a considerable level of funding predictability to help them deliver on the APSA and AGA ambitions. Thus, while the Programme Documents underline the uniqueness of each of the organisations and the regions in which they operate, making the APP appear as a collection of programmes with separate funding channels (and separate agreements with each of the organisations), the consistent organisational and thematic focus generates the programme-unity of the APP, guided by the APSA and AGA frameworks, as illustrated by Figure 8 below.

Figure 8 APP Phases I-IV – Budget distribution to APSA and AGA activities

Figure 8 Source: MFA. Annex A. Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) 2018-2021 Approved Budget, 2018.
Note: APP III includes the additional DKK 20 million carried over from APP II, under the ECOWAS component. In this graph, the DKK 16.5 million expenditure for APP IV Cross-cutting issues is presented as if allocated in equal measure to APSA and AGA activities.

Whereas the AU had not yet established AGA at the onset of APP Phases I and II, Denmark began supporting AGA activities in Phase III with 7% of the APP budget and plans to support these activities with 27% of the total APP budget during Phase IV.

4.5 APP support to continent-wide organisations

Support to the African Union

Throughout its life cycle, the APP has continuously supported the operationalisation of the APSA. Danish support initially focused on the AU’s PSC protocol, particularly the establishment and development of the continental early warning system. Another main focus has been the development of the AU’s preventative diplomacy role, e.g. assisting the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit (Phase II) and supporting the work of the AU’s Liaison Offices (AULOs) in crisis areas. Since Phase III, in order to contribute to the goal of embedding a more responsive approach to peace and security, the APP has included a focus on the AGA, i.e. on election support and the political diplomacy surrounding elections. An important Danish focus has also been on the AU’s gender policy as a cross-cutting theme of the APP. Finally, as the organisation matured, the APP’s support for institution and capacity building has lessened.

Figure 9 Focus areas of APP support for AU Component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP I (2004-2009) 72 Peace Fund of AU
  • Operationalise AU Peace and Security Council Protocol;
  • Enable civil society to play a stronger role in conflict prevention, in particular through forging stronger ties with the AU.
APP II (2010-2013) 90.5 Mixed incl. JFA for AULiaison Offices
  • AU Programme on Peace and Security:
  • Support the operationalisation of the APSA;
  • Facilitate programme development on conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
  • Promote and coordinate programmes on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD);
  • Promote the development and stabilisation of security, political and economic systems.
  • Promote the development of effective implementation of gender policies in member states, RECs, and AU;
  • Support Institution and Capacity Building.
APP III (2014-2017) 125 (incl. 8 for Technical Assistance (TA) and reviews) Mixed incl. JFAs for Electoral support and Capacity building
  • Support the operationalization of APSA;
  • Enhancing post conflict reconstruction and peace-building mechanisms;
  • Electoral Support on good governance and democracy;
  • Institutional capacity building.
APP IV (2018-2021) 115 (incl. 8 for M&E, Reviews, and TA) Mixed incl. JFAs for Electoral support and Capacity building
  • Preventive diplomacy/mediation;
  • Elections;
  • Cross-cutting issues.

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

Support to the Institute for Security Studies

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is an African organisation which aims to enhance human security on the African continent through evidence-based policy advice, technical support, and capacity building.

It does independent and authoritative research, provides expert policy advice, and delivers practical training and technical assistance, not least to the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD. It is registered in South Africa and has additional offices in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Senegal. The ISS’s areas of work cover transnational crimes, migration, maritime security and development, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, crime prevention and criminal justice.

Under the APP, the ISS did not receive funds directly; it has never been an individual programme component of the APP but is included in the upcoming Phase IV. Denmark has, however, been providing direct support to the organisation through an African think tank support programme, which ended as the APP Phase IV was starting. For the APP Phase I-III, services and activities provided by the ISS have been funded on a case-by-case basis, in line with the APP priorities. For example, throughout the APP I, the ISS received support under the SADC sub-component supporting civil society relations within SADC security structures.[154] Interestingly, according to the APP I completion report, only partial results were achieved.[155] Under the APP II, support to ISS continued, yet as the AU wanted to maintain freedom to work together with a number of CSOs on a subject basis, so therefore funds were not earmarked for the ISS.[156] Rather, the ISS was listed as a possible CSO partner for the AU to work with.[157]

During the APP III, the ISS received direct support from the Danish embassies in Pretoria and Addis Ababa. For example, the ISS received a grant of DKK 3.3 million from the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa between 2015 to 2016 to ‘Support […] ISS’ work with the African Union, ECOWAS and IGAD’. While not part of direct APP funding, the grant was justified on the grounds that ISS activities were, ‘in line with the priorities and objectives of the Danish Africa Programme for Peace III.’[158] Under the think tank component of the APP IV, the ISS is set to receive funds allowing it to continue to contribute valuable analysis and training to the AU for the APSA and AGA.

Support to the Institute for Peace and Security Studies

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), established in 2007, is an Ethiopian think tank linked to the Addis Ababa University (AAU). The IPSS offers various educational programmes in cooperation with the AAU focusing on peace, security, human rights and global studies. The IPSS also hosts conferences and forums with the aim to disseminate their research and expertise on peace and security in Africa. The Tana High-Level Forum, established in 2009, meets annually and brings leadership from all sectors to work on an African-led security agenda. Additionally, in cooperation with the AU the IPSS leads the Africa Peace and Security Programme, which seeks to resolve Africa’s peace and security issues through an intellectual approach with African-centred solutions.

The IPSS is not funded by the APP directly. Rather, services and activities provided by the IPSS are funded on an individual basis. For example, in 2012 the IPSS provided long-term training on peace and security issues to the AU. Under APP IV, IPSS has been allocated DKK 650,000 under a newly established think tank component.

Support to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Established in 1958 by the UN’s Economic and Social Council as one of the UN’s five regional commissions, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)’s mandate is to promote the economic and social development of its member states, foster intra-regional integration and promote international cooperation for Africa’s development. Made up of 54 member states and playing a dual role as a regional arm of the UN and as a key component of the African institutional landscape, UNECA is well positioned to make unique contributions to address the continent’s development challenges.

Danish funding to UNECA began external to the APP. Denmark, together with Sweden and the United Kingdom established a JFA to support the UNECA Business Plan (2007-2009). In addition, Denmark contributed DKK 8.2 million to the JFA and in 2006 granted an additional DKK 4.7 million in support of UNECA’s programmes for strengthening of the African countries’ negotiations with regard to global trade regimes (e.g. the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations). UNECA received funds only under the APP II. Within this phase, support to UNECA would allow the organisation to provide technical advisory services to the AU related to the interface between peace and security on the one hand and economic integration and development on the other hand. The available allocation was DKK 8 million for a two-year period (2010-2011) administered both as a bilateral agreement between the embassy and UNECA and later channelled through the JFA.[159]

When assessing UNECA’s provision of technical advisory services to the AU, the 2011 APP II Mid-Term Review found that it was difficult to establish whether this happened in a systematic way.[160] The Mid-Term Review noted that the AU seemed a reluctant partner, as services provided often did not match the AU’s absorption capacities and UNECA’s pace seemed too fast to truly have an added value. It was therefore recommended that the UNECA support as defined under the APP II should be reassessed when the agreement with UNECA lapsed. As a result, UNECA did not receive APP funding beyond Phase II.[161]

Support to the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), established in 1992, is a southern African regional intergovernmental organisation headquartered in Botswana. It was established with the objectives to enhance socio-economic cooperation as well as political and security cooperation among its 15 member states.[162] The main decision-making bodies and institutions are the Summit of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. SADC is led by a chair on an annually rotating principle and uses Troika formations.

In the run up to the APP I, Danish support in the Southern African region focused on the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, and the Institute of Security Studies. This support was gradually integrated into the APP and under APP Phase I, SADC was the largest recipient of funds (DKK 80 million of the total DKK 248 million budget). The support, however, soon ended. The APP I project completion report highlights the difficulties Danida had regarding the implementation of the SADC component. Of the component’s three immediate objectives, only one was implemented with satisfaction. The other two proved either to be unsatisfactory or less than satisfactory.[163]

Furthermore, the support made available for a more systematic involvement with civil society was deemed ineffective, confirming the difficulties SADC had in working with civil society at the regional and continental level.[164] At the end of the APP I, only DKK 34.7 million had been disbursed to SADC. Yet, importantly, the completion report does not mention what happened to the remaining budget (DKK 55 million).[165] In light of the above, and given the political problems in SADC – particularly the role of Zimbabwe – APP support to SADC was terminated at the end of the APP I.[166]

4.6 APP support to West African organisations

Support to ECOWAS

ECOWAS has consistently received support from the APP, aiming to strengthen ECOWAS’s capacity to provide effective leadership regarding peace and security issues affecting the West African sub-region.[167] Throughout the lifecycle of the APP, the contributions to ECOWAS have been more or less consistent in terms of size. However, contributions dropped considerably for Phase III due to the fact that ECOWAS operations were increasingly hampered by management turbulence in the ECOWAS Commission, and funding constraints (especially due to funding arrears from its major member, Nigeria). Unspent funds from APP Phase II were then carried over to Phase III.

Danish support has consistently focused on the development and implementation of the ECPF (focusing on mediation, electoral support, security governance, ECOWARN and the role of women in peace and security). In addition, support has consistently been geared towards capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission, with a specific focus on the bodies of the ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) that are involved in the development and implementation of the ECPF (such bodies include the ECPF Secretariat and the Mediation Facilitation Division). The APP contribution to ECOWAS capacity development dropped considerably for the APP III (DKK 4 million – including a DKK 2 million carry-over from Phase II) compared to the contribution made under the APP II (DKK 15.6 million). For the APP IV the contribution for capacity development increased again (DKK 12.5 million). Given the management difficulties that the ECOWAS Commission faced during the APP II, Denmark could have opted to specifically focus its support on strengthening the capacities of the Commission to deal with these difficulties, rather than mostly pulling out.

Figure 10 Focus areas of APP support for ECOWAS Component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP start-up phase (2002-2004) 7 Bilateral agreement (grant basis)
  • Support for the ECOWAS Peace Fund.
APP I (2004-2009) 66 Bilateral agreement (grant basis)
  • Operationalize ECOWAS Mechanism
    for Conflict Prevention Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping, and Security (DKK 30 million);
  • Support ECOWAS implementation of NEPAD initiative (incl. capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission) (DKK 18 million);
  • Enable civil society to play stronger role in conflict prevention (forging stronger ties with ECOWAS via West Africa Civil Society Forum) (DKK 12 million).
APP II (2010-2013) 60,1 Bilateral agreement (grant basis)
  • Implementation of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (including Early Warning support to WANEP – DKK 6m) (DKK 44.5million);
  • Capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission (DKK 15.6 million).
APP III (2014-2017) 20
(excl.
DKK 20m carry-over from APP II)
Mixed – incl. JFA for capacity building
  • Implementation of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (DKK 18 million – excl. DKK 18 million carry-over from APP II);
  • Capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission (DKK 2 million – excl. DKK 2 million carry-over from APP II).
APP IV (2018-2021) 38 Bilateral agreement (grant basis)
  • Implementation of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (with specific focus on political dialogue & mediation; and support to elections) (DKK 25.5 million);
  • Capacity development of the ECOWAS Commission (DKK 12.5 million).

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

Support to KAIPTC

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) received APP funding in Phases II and III. KAIPTC was established in 2003 as an international centre of excellence for peacekeeping training and gradually developed itself in the fields of individual and collective training and research support towards integrated Peace Support Operations (PSOs). KAIPTC was established by the Government of Ghana but operates as part of a regional group of peacekeeping institutions to serve ECOWAS, AU, and the international community. In 2007, KAIPTC signed a MoU with the ECOWAS Commission through which its role as a provider of operational peace support training in the APSA framework was recognised. In addition, the Centre recently signed a similar type of MoU with the AU in 2018.

Denmark has been supporting KAIPTC since 2005 and has provided core funding since the APP Phase II.[168] The APP contributions are based on the Strategic Plans (for 2010-2013 and for 2014-2018) that have been endorsed by the KAIPTC Governing Board (of which Denmark is a member). Support is provided via a JFA between Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and KAIPTC. The objectives identified in the JFA are in line with those of the APP. Danish funding to KAIPTC cannot be used for the military components of the Centre’s activities, as funds made available are ODA as defined by DAC. The APP documents acknowledge that the support to KAIPTC is challenged by the lack of adequate information of the organisation’s results at outcome level. Nonetheless, it is stated that the demand for PSO training remains high due to the number of peacekeeping missions on the continent. KAIPTC is considered to be the most competent organisation in West Africa in this area and the primary provider of capacity development to PSOs in Africa.[169]

Figure 11 Focus areas of APP support for KAIPTC component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP II (2010-2013) 25 JFA
  • Support to operationalization of the ECOWAS ECPF through realisation of the KAIPTC Strategic Plan 2010-2013. Key objectives of Strategic Plan:
  • Contribute to the development of a regional and sub-regional capacity in the delivery of integrated peace support operations;
  • Enhance capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution and peacebuilding;
  • Enhance understanding of critical peace and security in West Africa and the continent as a whole;
  • Create an effective management and support arrangement for KAIPTC.
APP III (2014-2017) 25 JFA
  • Enhance capacity of ECOWAS, AU, UN and other relevant actors in multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Integrated PSOs). Key objectives of Strategic Plan:
  • Enhance capacity of ECOWAS, AU, UN and other relevant actors in multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding (integrated PSOs);
  • Deepen understanding of and discourses on critical peace and security issues in Africa through research and policy engagements;
  • Contribute to knowledge creation that informs best practice in conflict prevention, management, and resolution in Africa;
  • Ensure an efficient, effective, and responsive governance and management system in the Centre.

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

Support to WANEP

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) received APP funding in Phases II and III. WANEP was founded in 1998 in response to the West African civil wars in the 1990s. Over the years, WANEP has succeeded in establishing national networks in every member state of ECOWAS with over 500 member organisations across West Africa, making WANEP a key organisation for facilitating early warning information as well as reaching out to civil society for response to crises. As such, WANEP entered into a partnership with ECOWAS in 2002 to support the implementation of ECOWARN. A MoU between WANEP and ECOWAS was signed in 2004 for five years and has continuously been renewed for five years. At the continental level, WANEP is a member of the Peace and Security cluster of the AU’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council representing West Africa.

Denmark has been supporting WANEP since 2009 with soft earmarking to its early warning programme. At first, this support was provided under the ECOWAS Component of the APP II (in which DKK 6 million was earmarked for the mobilisation of community-based resources for early warning and early response through WANEP).[170] Under the APP III WANEP became a separate APP Component. The APP III contributions to WANEP were provided on the basis of a JFA and linked to the organisation’s Strategic Plans for 2010-2014 and for 2015-2020. Up until the 1 January 2017, the JFA included Denmark and Sweden as partners to WANEP. In March 2017, Denmark signed a new JFA for WANEP, this time incorporating Austria as a new donor partner in addition to Sweden. This JFA covers the financial years 2017-2020 (with the agreement ending on 31 December 2020, unless otherwise agreed in writing between WANEP and the signatory contributing partners). The objectives identified in the JFAs are in line with those of the APP.

The APP support to WANEP was expected to enable the organisation to function as an important counterpart and partner to ECOWAS in the field of early warning and mediation. With WANEP providing the foundation for the data collection and reporting to ECOWARN, the support was considered to be linking up the APSA structure with civil society organisations.[171]

Figure 12 Focus areas of APP support for WANEP component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP II (2010-2013) (6) JFA
  • Early Warning component of APP support to ECOWAS (under Implementation of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework):
  • Provision of early warning data to ECOWARN;
  • Active civil society contribution to conflict risk reduction and resolution.
APP III (2014-2017) 10 JFA
  • Operationalize national conflict prevention mechanism in West Africa to ensure regular monitoring, analysis and responding to conflicts. Key objectives of Strategic Plan 2015-2020:
  • Strengthen capacity of peacebuilding organisations and practitioners in West Africa to engage actively in the transformation of violent conflicts through the use of non-violent strategies;
  • Develop a conflict prevention mechanism in West Africa to monitor, analyse and respond to conflicts;
  • Engender peacebuilding policy and practice in West Africa;
  • Promote a culture of non-violence and social responsibility among young people in West Africa;
  • Enhance policy formulation and influence on peace and security through regional and international linkages and advocacy;
  • Build the justice lens of conflicts to create a synergy between peacebuilding and human rights as integral to national reconciliation, conflict prevention and the protection of human security;
  • Promote and deepen democracy, governance, and human security in West Africa;
  • Strengthen WANEP’s research capacity on Peacebuilding, Early Warning, peace, and conflict prevention;
  • Strengthen WANEP programmes through documentation and Monitoring & Evaluation.

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

4.7 APP support to East African organisations

Support to IGAD

Throughout Phases I-III, the APP support to IGAD sought to strengthen the normative and institutional framework for its work in peace and security. Meanwhile, by supporting capacity building, Denmark aimed to operationalise IGAD’s role in peace and security. In Phase I, APP has also supported the African Standby Force Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (ASF EASBRICOM) support also came from the APP; it was later shifted to the PSF. In Phase IV, as IGAD has slightly matured, the APP focus on institution-building has diminished and its focus on programming has strengthened.

Figure 13 - Focus areas of APP support for IGAD component
Phase Amount DKK million Funding Modality Focus Areas
APP I (2004-2009) 20 Direct
  • Support for Operationalising IGAD Conflict Prevention;
  • Conflict Prevention Fund;
  • Support to ASF EASBRICOM Development;
  • Peace Fund Contribution.
APP II (2010-2013) 42.5 Mixed incl. JFA for Capacity building
  • Support to institutional transition;
  • Reducing pastoralist conflict;
  • Operationalize preventative diplomacy framework;
  • Broaden institutional security framework.
APP III (2014-2017) 30 JFAs for Peace & Security and Capacity building
  • Operationalize a more active IGAD role in relation to conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
  • Improving IGAD’s systems, including results-based management, resource mobilisation, communications, and interaction with member states and other stakeholders.
APP IV (2018-2021) 17 Mixed incl. JFA for peace and security
  • Preventive diplomacy/mediation;
  • Elections;
  • Cross-cutting issues.

Source: MFA. APP Programme Documents Phases I-IV.

Support to the East African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM)

EASBRICOM was established in 2005 in order to develop the Eastern Africa and Horn of Africa element (commonly known as the Eastern Africa Standby Force[EASF]) of the African Standby Force. The EASF is a regional mechanism consisting of military, police and civilian standby forces. Since late 2014, the EASF was considered to be fully operational with a Secretariat, with 5,000 military personnel, 700 police personnel, and 100 civilian employees. Its current mandate is to carry out the following functions: observation, monitoring and peace support missions; intervention in a member state in situations of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state; preventive deployment; humanitarian assistance; and post-conflict disarmament.[172]

During APP I, the EASF was funded through IGAD (DKK 5 million) as the REC held an interim coordination role of the force. This function, however, was transferred to EASBRICOM in January 2007, prompting Denmark to separate out this IGAD sub-component and directly channel funds to EASBRICOM. Under the APP II, Denmark continued its funding of the coordination mechanism, formulating the support as an individual programme component with the overall objective to ‘strengthen civil and police capacity within EASF’. A total of DKK 9.9 million was funded to EASBRICOM, with the force’s civilian component being allocated DKK 4.4 million and the police component DKK 5.5 million.[173] Prior to the start of the APP III, Danish support to the EASF moved from the APP to the PSF (Horn of Africa), which focuses on more immediate stabilisation and security needs and thus was a better fit compared to the APP.[174]


[117] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 2.

[118] In Phase I of the APP, support was also provided to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), in line with the fact that this was a priority region for Denmark in the 2000s. This support was cancelled in APP Phase II, partly due to the fact that Southern Africa was no longer a priority region for Denmark, and partly due to a lack of results in SADC support in APP Phase I.

[119] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 6.

[120] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 2.

[121] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 9.

[122] The other main African training centre that focuses on peacekeeping is ACCORD, based in South Africa.

[123] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 7.

[124] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 7.

[125] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 34.

[126] For each Phase, the Programme Document is preceded by a Concept Note. Given the timing of the evaluation, for Phase IV, the evaluation only had access to the Concept Note.

[127] Oxford Dictionary. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com.

[128] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Programme Document, May 2004, p. 86.

[129] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 34.

[130] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Programme Document, May 2004, p. 86.

[131] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, pp. 24-25.

[132] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 34 / Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, pp. 24-25.

[133] Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire (July 2016), p. 4.

[134] While the fact that the embassy in Abuja is not yet accredited to ECOWAS is a practical obstacle in this regard, interviews have made clear that there are no intentions to hand-over management responsibility of the West-African components of the APP to Abuja even if the embassy is accredited in due time.

[135] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, pp. 24-25.

[136] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 34.

[137] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 6 / p. 8 / p. 10.

[138] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 33.

[139] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016, p. 12.

[140] Which relates to the fact that more adaptive programming on the basis of ToCs requires a higher degree of monitoring skills and capacity, though both on the side of the recipient organisation and on the side of the managing organisation.

[141] The exception being the Southern African Development Community (SADC) component under APP I.

[142] This was only possible for Phases II-IV. For Phase I, the indicative budget was not defined enough to split expenditures across specific thematic focuses.

[143] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Programme Document, May 2004, p. 74.

[144] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 7.

[145] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Appraisal Report, June 2009, p. 14.

[146] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 10.

[147] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) – 2018-2021 – Inception Report, April 2017, p. 2.

[148] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – Review Aide Memoire, July 2016.

[149] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) – 2018-2021 – Inception Report, April 2017, p. 6.

[150] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) – 2018-2021 – Inception Report, April 2017, p. 6.

[151] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase IV (APP IV) – 2018-2021 – Inception Report, April 2017, p. 5.

[152] The UN Charter chapter VIII, art. 52.2 and 53.1 stipulate the subsidiarity option, whereby the Security Council may utilise, where appropriate, regional arrangements or regional agencies to deal with security issues.

[153] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 12.

[154] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Programme Document, May 2004.

[155] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report.

[156] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Appraisal Report, June 2009, p. 15.

[157] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Appraisal Report, June 2009, p. 16.

[158] Danida, signed grant agreement for DKK 3.3 million between ISS and Royal Danish Embassy in Ethiopia, October 2015, p. 3.

[159] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace – Phase II (APP III) – Review Aid memoire, April 2012. Note: The 2011 APP II Mid-Term Review noted that there was some ‘unclarity’ on the part of UNECA with regard to the integration of the Danish contribution into the ‘common’ JFA. It was later confirmed by the Danish embassy in Addis Ababa that hereinafter Danish support was channelled through the JFA.

[160] Danida, Mid-Term Review Africa Programme for Peace – Phase II (APP III) – Review Aid Memoire, April 2012, p. 17.

[161] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, November 2013, p. 71.

[162] The SADC member states are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[163] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report – p. 26-28.

[164] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report – p. 6.

[165] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase I (APP I) – 2005-2009 – Project Completion Report.

[166] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Appraisal Report, June 2009, p. 14.

[167] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace Phase III; 2014-2017 – Component Description: ECOWAS, Annex B (2013), p. 1.

[168] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, November 2013, p. 17.

[169] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, November 2013, p. 7.

[170] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 24.

[171] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, November 2013, p. 10.

[172] African Union. Protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and security council of the African Union, Durban, 9 July 2002.

[173] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase II (APP II) – 2010-2013 – Programme Document, September 2009, p. 33.

[174] Danida, Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) – 2014-2017 – Programme Document, June 2013, p. 75.

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This page forms part of the publication "Evaluation of the Africa Programme for Peace 2004-2017 – November 2018" as chapter 4 of 12.
Version no. 1.0, 2018-12-13
Publication may be found at the address http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/evaluation_africa_programme_for_peace_2004-2017/index.html